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Stephen A. Zeff
RICE UNIVERSITY
THE SEC PREEMPTS THE ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES BOARD IN 1965: THE 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFERRED 
TAX CREDIT RELATING TO 
INSTALLMENT SALES
Abstract: In 1959, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) replaced the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure because the latter was unable 
to deal forthrightly with a series of important issues. But during the 
APB’s first half-dozen years, its record of achievement was no more 
impressive than its predecessor’s. The chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Manuel F. Cohen, criticized the APB’s 
slow pace and unwillingness to tackle difficult issues. This article 
discusses the circumstances attending the SEC’s issuance of an Ac-
counting Series Release in late 1965 to demonstrate forcefully to the 
APB that, when it is unable to carry out its responsibility to “narrow 
the areas of difference” in accounting practice, the SEC is prepared 
to step in and do so itself. In this sense, the article deals with the ten-
sions between the private and public sectors in the establishment of 
accounting principles in the U.S. during the mid-1960s. The article 
makes extensive use of primary resource materials in the author’s 
personal archive, which have not been used previously in published 
work.
INTRODUCTION
 In 1959, the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants (Institute, AICPA) appointed a new body, the Accounting 
Principles Board (APB), to succeed the Committee on Account-
ing Procedure (CAP). The APB had been charged to do a better 
job than its predecessor in raising the standard of accounting 
practice [see Zeff, 2001]. But the APB got off to a slow and un-
certain start. In an embarrassing decision made in early 1962, 
it rejected the recommendations of a research study it had 
commissioned on broad accounting principles and shelved the 
Acknowledgments: The author is grateful to Hugo Nurnberg, Sundaresh 
Ramnath, and an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft, as well 
as to Bill Coxsey and Travis Holt for services provided.
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study [see Moonitz, 1974, pp. 17-20]. In early 1963, the APB was 
rebuffed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
on the investment tax credit [see Moonitz, 1966]. Finally, in 
1964-1966, the APB seemed poised to right its course. Foremost 
among the reasons for this turn of events were (1) the decision 
by the Institute’s executive committee to abandon its policy of 
appointing only the strong-willed managing partners of the Big 
Eight accounting firms to the board, and (2) the decision by the 
new board chairman, Clifford V. Heimbucher, a past president of 
the Institute and a partner in a small San Francisco CPA firm, to 
organize the board’s work more effectively [Carey, 1970, pp. 130-
132]. These were administrative improvements of considerable 
importance.
 But there was a third reason – the increasing public pres-
sure from the activist chairman of the SEC, Manuel F. Cohen. 
In a series of speeches, he urged the APB to make the difficult 
decisions so as to “narrow the areas of difference and inconsis-
tency in practice,” which the CAP had set as one of its objectives 
in 1953, and which had been laid down as an objective for the 
APB by the Institute’s Special Committee on Research Program 
in 1958 [“Report to Council of the Special Committee . . . ,” 1958, 
pp. 62-63]. 
 In 1965, the APB was drafting an Opinion on the status of 
the CAP’s Accounting Research Bulletins. In its exposure draft, 
it proposed to classify the deferred tax credit as a current li-
ability when it relates to installment sales receivables shown 
as a current asset. Then the board recanted its position, greatly 
annoying one of its supporters, Arthur Andersen & Co. (AA). In 
late 1965, AA petitioned the SEC to require its classification as a 
current liability, thus overruling the APB. Manuel Cohen seized 
upon the petition as an opportunity to lecture a delegation from 
the APB at a specially called meeting of the Commission and 
then to issue an Accounting Series Release on the deferred tax 
classification as requested by AA. It was unprecedented for the 
SEC to issue a rule on accounting recognition, measurement, 
or classification in an area in which the accounting profession 
had declined to act after having initially undertaken to do so.1 
This action by the SEC has been little noticed in the literature 
1To be sure, the SEC’s accounting staff had exerted its influence on the CAP 
and the APB in other ways. The only comparable confrontation between the 
standard setter and the SEC on income tax allocation occurred in 1945, when 
the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 53 [SEC, 1945] in order to limit the 
applicability of ARB No. 23 [CAP, 1944]. 
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[cf. see Pines, 1965, pp. 739-740; Defliese, 1974, p. 39], and 
there is some evidence to suggest that the SEC’s release was a 
factor contributing to the APB’s greater inclination to address 
difficult questions head-on in 1966-1967, especially on pensions 
and income tax allocation. In its later years, however, the APB 
foundered once again, in particular on accounting for business 
combinations [see Chatov, 1975, chap. 14; Seligman, 2003, pp. 
418-430]. In 1973, the APB was succeeded by the independent 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. It is the purpose of this 
paper to examine in some depth this unique intervention by the 
SEC in the process by which the profession established account-
ing principles in the mid-1960s.
BACKGROUND
 When the APB was established in 1959, the Institute’s ex-
ecutive committee, probably at the behest of President Louis H. 
Penney, decided that only managing partners would be invited 
to represent the Big Eight firms on the board.2 The executive 
committee apparently believed that the board would be mak-
ing broad policy decisions based on technical support from its 
research staff, and that the managing partners were the most 
suited to making such executive decisions. But it quickly be-
came evident that the board could not avoid immersing itself 
in highly technical issues. It also became clear that a number 
of the managing partners were not technical specialists, did 
not always read their agenda materials prior to the meetings, 
were typically men of strong conviction, and, thus, did not work 
easily together during the board’s early years. Also, the board 
exhausted itself in lengthy debates leading up to Opinion Nos. 2 
and 4 [APB, 1962, 1964] on the investment tax credit, on which 
a total of 11 members dissented and a further nine filed quali-
fied assents. Further, the board expended considerable time and 
energy on the controversial research study on accounting princi-
ples [Sprouse and Moonitz, 1962] and on a recommendation to 
Council on the authority that the board should be given to make 
changes in “generally accepted accounting principles” (GAAP) 
[Zeff, 1972, pp. 180-182].
 By 1964, it became clear to the Institute’s executive com-
mittee that its policy on managing partners had been a mistake, 
2The lone exception was Weldon Powell, the senior technical partner of 
Haskins & Sells. Powell had chaired the special committee that called for estab-
lishment of the APB and the new accounting research division to provide the 
board with technical support.
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and it proceeded to appoint the Big Eight firms’ senior technical 
partners as the terms of their firms’ managing partners expired 
[see Zeff, 1972, p. 193]. (It was always the Institute’s unstated 
policy to have one representative on the board from each Big 
Eight firm.) By 1966, all but one of the managing partners of 
the Big Eight firms had departed the board. The lone exception 
was John W. Queenan, who had succeeded Weldon Powell as 
the representative of Haskins & Sells in 1963. But Queenan had 
served on the CAP from 1949 to 1954 and was strongly inter-
ested in technical accounting issues.
 When Heimbucher became chairman of the board in 1964, 
he established subject-area subcommittees to study and draft 
Opinions. Previously, the board itself had done the drafting in 
plenum. Also, he arranged for an administrative staff to circular-
ize exposure drafts and to read and analyze the letters of com-
ment, thus freeing up time for the accounting research staff to 
concentrate on research. In addition, he set up a planning com-
mittee to set priorities and target dates for the board’s agenda of 
projects. Finally, he allowed board members to bring an adviser 
to board meetings [see Heimbucher, 1966].
 All the while, the board was being criticized in the financial 
press, in speeches by Leonard Spacek, the outspoken and feisty 
managing partner of AA, and by SEC Chairman Cohen. The is-
sue coming in for the greatest attention was over “uniformity” v. 
“flexibility” when companies made choices of accounting prin-
ciples, including the consequent diversity of accounting prac-
tice. Spacek spoke in favor of greater uniformity, while several 
other large firms, such as Price Waterhouse & Co. and Haskins 
& Sells, defended flexibility in the choice of accounting princi-
ples.3 The SEC was on record for many years as favoring greater 
uniformity, and, in a speech in late 1964, Cohen [1964, p. 12] 
became more insistent that decisive progress be made in that di-
rection. He said that “an immediate and pressing objective is to 
eliminate the use of alternative accounting principles underlying 
financial statements not justified by differing circumstances.” 
During its first 5½ years, by the end of 1964, the APB had issued 
only five Opinions, and none had had the effect of narrowing ac-
cepted practice.4
3See the symposium, “Uniformity in Financial Accounting” [1965], for pa-
pers by Spacek, Weldon Powell, J. Arnold Pines (of the SEC staff), and others. 
For the Price Waterhouse view, see Bevis [1965] and Grady [1965, pp. 32-34].
4It was not for lack of trying, however. In Opinion No. 2 [APB, 1962], a 
divided board tried mightily to limit to one the number of ways to account for 
the investment tax credit. But the SEC was lobbied into allowing an alternative 
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WHY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFERRED TAX 
CREDIT BECAME IMPORTANT TO SPACEK  
AND ANDERSEN IN 1965 
 It was in this roiling environment that Leonard Spacek and 
AA became concerned about the diversity of practice allowed for 
treating the deferred tax credit arising from retailers’ use of the 
installment method for recognizing gross income for income tax 
purposes coincident with recording sales revenue for financial 
reporting purposes as soon as an installment sale was made. Re-
tailers, especially the department stores and mail-order houses, 
were the industry most significantly marked by this diversity of 
practice. The majority of companies had been classifying the 
deferred tax credit as a noncurrent liability. A few were display-
ing it as a current liability. Some companies had deducted the 
deferred tax credit from the installment receivables [see Hicks, 
1966, p. 130].
 Norman O. Olson [1966, p. 60], a partner in AA’s executive 
office, explained why the deferred tax credit was becoming of 
increasing importance to companies in the retail industry. Refer-
ring to the divergence in practice between its classification as 
current or noncurrent, he wrote:
 The effect of this divergence in practice was assum-
ing greatly increased significance by 1965, and it was 
likely to increase even further. With the expanded use 
of revolving credit plans and various other installment 
payment plans by merchandising companies and with 
the relatively recent regulations of the Internal Revenue 
Service permitting sales under revolving credit plans to 
be treated as installment sales for income tax purposes, 
many companies were accumulating an increasingly 
large amount of deferred income taxes on installment 
sales.
Olson added that the classification of deferred tax “has a signifi-
cant effect on the determination of a company’s working capital 
and the credit rating it receives.”
 The classification of the deferred tax credit became an im-
portant issue to Spacek and AA in early 1965, when the presi-
dent of one of its major retail clients, Montgomery Ward & Co., 
Incorporated (MW) complained about having to show its credit 
method, and, in Opinion No. 4 [APB, 1964], the board reluctantly conceded de-
feat. This rebuff of the board by the SEC provoked considerable comment in the 
press.
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as a current liability in its 1964-1965 financial statements (fis-
cal year ending on February 3, 1965). In line with a position 
which it had recently announced, AA [1962, pp. 66-67] insisted 
that MW classify its deferred tax credit as a current liability. The 
current portion of the deferred tax credit balance in its balance 
sheet dated February 3, 1965 was $3.9m, which represented 
1.8% of its total current liabilities excluding the credit, but the 
president surely knew in early 1965 that this percentage would 
increase steeply in the years ahead. (It did indeed rise to 6.5% 
by February 2, 1966 and to 9.7% a year later.) Sears, Roebuck 
and Co., a much larger retail company, also based in Chicago, 
and audited by Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart, had been display-
ing its deferred tax credit as noncurrent. The balance of Sears’ 
deferred tax credit on January 31, 1965, the end of its fiscal year, 
was $454m, equal to one-third of its total current liabilities on 
that date.5 MW’s president wanted to know why his company 
should be penalized for carrying the credit as a current liability 
while most other major retailers were not. Spacek agreed that 
his company should not be penalized, and he offered him a deal. 
If MW would agree to show the credit as a current liability in its 
1964-1965 financial statements, and if Spacek could not get the 
APB to call for a uniform classification of the credit as a current 
liability by the end of 1965, he would approve of MW’s adoption 
of noncurrent treatment in its 1965-1966 financial statements. 
MW’s president agreed to the deal.6
SPACEK’S EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE APB  
TO ACT ON DEFERRED TAXES
 Previously, the CAP had dealt with the tax effect of a tim-
ing difference between reporting accelerated depreciation for 
income tax purposes and recording straight-line depreciation 
expense for financial reporting purposes (Accounting Research 
5Neither MW nor Sears disclosed the current portion of its deferred tax 
credit, that is, the portion relating to installment receivables shown as current 
assets, in their 1965 year-end annual reports. Yet both companies had to break 
down their deferred tax credit account into its current and noncurrent compo-
nents in their February 2, 1966/January 31, 1966 balance sheets, owing to the 
dictum in Accounting Series Release No. 102 [SEC, 1965] (see below). They were 
also obliged to give, which they did, the comparative current/noncurrent break-
down for the previous year’s balance sheet. As will be seen, the SEC release dealt 
with the classification of the deferred tax credit only in relation to installment 
receivables shown as current assets. 
6This anecdote is recounted in interviews with George R. Catlett, September 
3, 1970 and May 3, 1978.
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Bulletin [ARB] No. 44 Revised) [CAP, 1958]. It had recommended 
that, except in special circumstances, such differences should 
be accounted for as deferred taxes. The CAP announced in 1959 
that the deferred tax credit account relating to the depreciation 
differential should be shown in the balance sheet as a liability 
or deferred credit, not as part of equity capital [CAP, 1959]. As 
far back as 1944, the CAP had recommended that a provision 
should be made for the estimated tax to be paid on installment 
sales which were deferred for income tax purposes (ARB No. 23, 
final paragraph) [CAP, 1944]. The CAP reaffirmed this position 
in paragraph 18 of Chapter 10B of ARB No. 43 [CAP, 1953]. But 
the CAP did not say how to classify the deferred tax credit ac-
count. In the retail field, as indicated, there was a lack of agree-
ment whether the deferred tax credit should be shown as a cur-
rent or noncurrent liability when the installment sales receivable 
was shown as a current asset.
 During 1964-1965, the APB was deliberating a pronounce-
ment, which became Opinion No. 6 issued in October 1965, in 
which it was to announce which of the CAP’s Accounting Re-
search Bulletins should be continued without amendment and 
which should either be revised or be withdrawn entirely.7 All of 
the board members, as well as Andrew Barr, the SEC chief ac-
countant, were invited by Chairman Heimbucher to give their 
views on which of the ARBs should be retained, in their original 
form or as amended. In a letter dated May 26, 1965, Leonard 
Spacek, who was in his last year of service on the board, replied 
that the definition of current liabilities in ARB No. 43, Chapter 
3A, paragraph 7 [CAP, 1953] should be amended to include de-
ferred taxes to the extent that they relate to current assets, such 
as the current portion of installment sales receivable. It was 
expected that much of the impact of this amendment would be 
on retailers.8 On June 4, 1965, Andrew Barr replied at length to 
7The board’s review of the ARBs became necessary after the AICPA Council 
decided in October 1964 that any departures in company financial statements 
from accounting principles accepted in the board’s Opinions and in the ARBs 
had to be disclosed either in the footnotes or in the auditor’s report, effective 
with financial statements for fiscal periods beginning after December 31, 1965. 
The board, therefore, had to determine which of the contents of the ARBs, with 
or without amendment, were to serve as this benchmark.
8The references to board correspondence and board minutes are drawn from 
files that AA generously allowed the author to copy during the summers of 1982 
and 1983 in the firm’s Chicago executive office, at the invitation of Arthur R. 
Wyatt. Documents have been obtained from other sources as well. Researchers 
interested in pursuing the issue raised in this article are invited to inspect copies 
of the related documents in the author’s personal archive.
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Heimbucher’s invitation, and, among other things, stated that 
“Paragraph 7 [of ARB No. 43, Chapter 3A] should be expanded 
to specifically state that liabilities maturing in the time period 
of the operating cycle should be included in current liabilities, 
such as liabilities related to installment receivables and deferred 
income taxes on installment sales.”
 Spacek sought the view of Anson Herrick, a retired San 
Francisco practitioner who, as a member of the CAP in the 
1940s, had drafted ARB No. 30, “Current Assets and Current 
Liabilities – Working Capital” [CAP, 1947], which served as the 
basis for Chapter 3A of ARB No. 43. Herrick replied that he sup-
ported the proposed classification of the deferred tax credit as a 
current liability in such circumstances. He said that “[the classi-
fication] is completely consistent with the cycle theory which I 
originated.”9
 In 1953, no less an authority than Carman G. Blough, the 
Institute’s director of research, who attended the meetings of the 
CAP, had opined that the deferred tax credit relating to install-
ment receivables should be shown as a current liability in line 
with ARB No. 30 [Blough, 1953, p. 347].
 SEC Chairman Cohen [1966, p. 59] was later to say that, 
in 1965, “no fewer than four different reporting methods were 
used by companies for which the [deferred tax] item was of 
considerable importance. . . . Significantly, each method carried 
the opinion of an independent public accountant reporting that 
the financial statements had been prepared in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles.” Clearly, a uniform ap-
proach was lacking.10
 At its meeting on June 21-23, 1965, the APB unanimously 
approved Spacek’s proposed amendment of paragraph 7, and it 
was duly included in the board’s exposure draft that was issued 
in July [“Exposure Draft of Tentative Opinion . . . ,” 1965].11 The 
draft was widely circulated, including a special mailing to the 
presidents of the some 1,300 companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange. The pertinent passage in the exposure draft 
appeared in paragraph 13. In that paragraph, it was stated that 
the AICPA’s accounting research division will conduct a research 
study on current assets and liabilities, and that, “[p]ending 
completion of this study, and publication of a Board Opinion 
 9letter from Herrick to Spacek, dated June 17, 1965
10This matter was also discussed at length by Rappaport [1972, pp. 3-7 to 
3-10].
11AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, June 21-23, 1965, p. 1
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thereon,” the following paragraph was to be added to Chapter 
3A (p. 58):
10. Whenever it is appropriate to record deferred in-
come taxes, such deferred taxes should be classified as 
a current liability in the balance sheet to the extent that 
they are related to current assets which give rise to the 
tax deferment.
As can be seen, the proposed change was solely one of balance-
sheet classification, and it was to be reconsidered once the board 
could review the research study on current assets and liabilities. 
The provision did not pretend to impose tax allocation account-
ing (today known as deferred tax accounting) where it had other-
wise not been recommended by the CAP or the APB. Indeed, 
the APB was then considering whether to pronounce in favor or 
against tax allocation generally, and two of the Big Eight firms 
(Price Waterhouse & Co. and Haskins & Sells) had already regis-
tered antipathy, or at least profound skepticism, toward any tax 
allocation at all. AA was the Big Eight firm that was the strong-
est advocate of tax allocation.
 During the board’s June meeting, George R. Catlett suc-
ceeded Spacek as AA’s representative on the board. He later 
recalled that board member Ira Schur of S.D. Leidesdorf & Co., 
a middle-sized firm based in New York City, said that his firm 
had been trying to persuade City Stores, one of its clients, to 
reclassify its deferred tax liability relating to installment receiv-
ables as current but had been unable to do so because of the 
noncurrent classification used by most other companies in the 
industry. He also recalled that board member Donald J. Bevis of 
Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart said that he had always favored 
the current classification for the deferred tax credit relating to 
installment sales.12 Touche, Ross, the auditor of Sears, was then 
the predominant Big Eight firm with major clients in retail trade 
– department stores, mail-order houses, etc. [see Zeff and Fos-
sum, 1967, p. 317].
 Key commentators on the exposure draft expressed reserva-
tions or outright opposition to paragraph 13 on the current clas-
sification. The Panel on Accounting Principles of the Financial 
Executives Institute argued that the paragraph prejudged the 
research study on current assets and liabilities still under way 
 
12internal AA memorandum from George R. Catlett to partners R.I. Jones, 
W.J. Mueller, J.J. Brice, and J.W. Boyle, dated July 1, 1965
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by the board’s research staff.13 Awaiting the results of research 
has always been an easy argument to make against unwelcome 
changes in accounting principles. The Retail Committee on 
Accounting Principles of the National Retail Merchants As-
sociation (NRMA), representing 15 major department stores 
and mail-order houses (including MW, Sears, and City Stores), 
objected to the reclassification. It argued that only income taxes 
payable during the current year should be shown as current: 
“The deferred income taxes of retailers arising out of the install-
ment method of tax accounting are, in effect, a long-term obliga-
tion which is not payable until the outstanding receivables are 
liquidated – a very remote possibility in a going business.”14
 Of the 15 companies represented on the NRMA’s accounting 
principles committee (apart from MW and Sears), five had bal-
ances in their deferred tax credit account relating to installment 
receivables that were equal to or exceeded 15% of their total 
current liabilities, excluding the credit, at the end of their 1964-
1965 fiscal years: J.C. Penney Company, Inc. (16.8%), Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc. (18.8%), May Department Stores Company 
(20.3%), Miller & Rhoads, Inc. (48.9%), and Rich’s Inc. (50.6%) . 
Five of the other companies disclosed that they had balances of 
less than 15%, while no information is available for the remain-
ing three companies.15
 One reason why retail companies objected to the current 
classification of the deferred tax credit was that it did not rep-
resent a current claim on liquid assets and, thus, would give a 
misleading impression of a retailer’s ability to meet its financial 
obligations. It would also place such companies in an awkward 
position because of the working capital requirements stipulated 
in their bond indentures.16
 In correspondence among board members following issu-
ance of the exposure draft, the two Big Eight firms that were 
known to be unsympathetic toward tax allocation, mentioned 
13letter from J.R. Janssen, chairman of the Panel, to Richard C. Lytle (APB 
administrative director), dated September 15, 1965
14letter from K.S. Axelson, chairman of the committee, to Richard C. Lytle, 
dated September 15, 1965
15These percentages were developed from ProQuest’s Historical Annual 
Reports service and from Moody’s Industrials for the year 1966. Because of the 
unavailability of the other three companies’ annual reports and their omission 
from Moody’s Industrials, it was impossible to determine how much of the bal-
ances in their deferred tax credit account, if any, was attributable to installment 
receivables. 
16letter from Malise L. Graham, of the New York law firm of Faulkner, 
Dawkins & Sullivan, to William D. Hall, a partner of AA, dated March 30, 1966
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above, made known their disagreement with paragraph 13. In 
retrospect, it is surprising that they assented to the provision 
during the June meeting of the board. Board member Herman 
W. Bevis, the senior partner of Price Waterhouse, recommend-
ed that the paragraph be deleted, as it was not clear, he said, 
whether the deferred tax credit was a liability at all, even though 
it must be shown on the liability side of the balance sheet. He 
believed that it was, in essence, only a contingency.17 Bevis said 
he had canvassed his partners for their views, and it seems likely 
that his partners had in turn canvassed the views of their retail 
clients. Haskins & Sells submitted a memorandum in which it 
also opposed the provision, as it believed that the amount might 
never fall due. The firm said that the balance in the deferred tax 
credit account might constantly grow and, thus, may never ma-
ture as an amount to be paid. The firm conceded that it would 
be more theoretically defensible to classify the deferred tax 
as a current liability if it were expected to mature within one 
year from the balance sheet date. The firm also argued that the 
board’s proposed reclassification goes beyond prevailing prac-
tice. Furthermore, it said, any such recommendation should 
await completion of the research studies on current assets and 
liabilities and on tax allocation accounting.18 Letters submitted 
by the board members from Ernst & Ernst (E&E) and Lybrand, 
Ross Bros. & Montgomery (LRB&M), which were two of the 
other Big Eight firms, did not mention the proposed reclassifica-
tion in paragraph 13.19
 At the board’s next meeting, on September 16-17, 1965, it re-
versed its unanimous approval of paragraph 13. The board voted 
14-2 to delete the provision on the classification of deferred tax 
“on the condition that a subcommittee would be appointed to 
consider the subject.”20 It was the only item in the exposure draft 
that the board deleted in its entirety [Lytle, 1965, p. 72]. George 
Catlett “objected strenuously to deferring this question” [Olson, 
1966, p. 61]. Richard C. Lytle [1965, p. 72], the board’s admin-
istrative director, gave the following reasons for the board’s ac-
tion:
17letter from Herman W. Bevis to Reed K. Storey (AICPA director of account-
ing research), dated August 9, 1965
18memorandum attached to the letter from Oscar S. Gellein to Richard C. 
Lytle, dated September 10, 1965
19letters from Hassel Tippit (E&E) to Richard C. Lytle, dated July 20, 1965, 
and from Philip L. Defliese (LRB&M) to members of the APB, dated September 
13, 1965
20AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, September 16-17, 1965, p. 4.
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 Unlike other changes proposed in the exposure 
draft, this paragraph was directed to a matter not spe-
cifically covered in the ARBs and its inclusion would 
have been consistent with what appears to be the more 
predominant accepted practice currently.
He added that it could have “important implications with regard 
to the broad area of accounting for income taxes,” a subject on 
which a research study was being completed (which had been 
in preparation since 1961). One major question, he said, was 
“whether deferred income taxes are a ‘deferred credit’ or a ‘li-
ability’.” This last point, which had been debated for years, was 
probably significant in crippling the effort to classify the de-
ferred tax, if only in defined circumstances, as a current liability.
In its Executive Letter to partners and managers, Price Water-
house said: “The APB decided to omit the [reclassification] 
requirement from Opinion No. 6 largely because it was out of 
context with an opinion having the avowed purpose of revising 
existing pronouncements in order to ‘obviate conflicts between 
present accepted practice and provisions of outstanding Bulle-
tins’” [“Special Bulletin . . . ,” 1965, p. 4].
 AA’s Catlett was convinced that the reversal was a clear re-
sult of client pressure brought on the firms, whose board repre-
sentatives had not realized in June how large the impact of the 
reclassification might be on their clients’ balance sheets.21 Not 
surprisingly, the paragraph had met with considerable opposi-
tion from retail industry commentators on the exposure draft, 
including a number of major companies, such as Broadway-
Hale Stores, Sears, Spiegel, and MW, which wrote separate let-
ters apart from the letter from the NRMA.22 Many of those op-
posing the paragraph on classifying deferred tax criticized the 
precedent of linking an item on the liability side of the balance 
sheet with one or more classes of assets; instead, they believed 
that the deferred tax should be classified according to when it 
will be liquidated. Others questioned whether the deferred tax 
would ever actually be paid, and, thus, they saw no ground for 
requiring that it reduce working capital. Some said that the 
reclassification went beyond the scope of the pronouncement, 
which was to determine which pre-existing positions in the 
ARBs were to be regarded as still in force. Opinion No. 6, “Status 
of Accounting Research Bulletins,” was published in October 
21interview with George R. Catlett, May 3, 1978
22These separate letters were in the batches of comment letters conveyed to 
the board by Richard Lytle.
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1965 and reproduced in the November issue of the Journal of 
Accountancy.
AA PETITIONS THE SEC
 On October 1, 1965, two weeks after the board meeting 
at which paragraph 13 was deleted, AA petitioned the SEC to 
 issue an Accounting Series Release (ASR) that would classify 
the deferred tax arising from current assets such as installment 
sales receivable as a current liability. AA knew, of course, that 
SEC Chief Accountant Andrew Barr had advised the APB that 
he favored such a classification. And, as mentioned above, SEC 
Chairman Cohen had been railing against the diversity in ac-
counting practice. The firm had reason to believe that the SEC 
might be sympathetic to its cause. Yet it privately harbored 
doubts that the SEC would act favorably on its petition.23
 As was the SEC’s practice in such matters, AA’s petition was 
held in confidence, except that Barr notified Richard Lytle, at the 
board, that AA had filed the petition. Barr inquired if the board 
might be able to act on the deferred classification by November 
15, which was viewed as the deadline for the SEC to publish a 
proposed accounting rule that, after a 30-day exposure period, 
could be adopted in time to apply to financial statements ending 
on or before December 31. At Lytle’s request, and with the acqui-
escence of Barr, AA provided the APB with a copy of the petition 
for confidential circulation to the board members. The board’s 
planning subcommittee met on October 22. It concluded that 
the subject was too complex for the board to be able to act on 
the matter by the end of 1965.
 Contrary to what some might have expected, namely, that 
AA would publicize its petition to vaunt the role it was playing to 
achieve greater uniformity in financial reporting, the firm rarely 
mentioned its authorship of the petition in its publications, and 
only well after the event.24 Chief Accountant Barr had advised AA 
that the Commission would prefer that the firm not publicize the 
petition until it was acted upon, and the firm complied.25
23interview with George R. Catlett, September 3, 1970
24The only two mentions the author has found are in Olson [1966, p. 61] 
and AA [1969, p. 67]. Spacek did not mention the petition in his speeches. The 
author can find no other mentions in the literature of AA being the source of the 
petition. Cohen [1966, p. 59] said that “a leading accounting firm” had petitioned 
the SEC but did not name the firm.
25 interviews with George R. Catlett, September 3, 1970 and May 3, 1978
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THE SEC CONFERS WITH A DELEGATION  
FROM THE APB
 In November 1965, the SEC invited the APB to send a del-
egation to meet with the five members of the Commission to 
discuss the AA petition. The four members of the APB’s plan-
ning committee, composed of Chairman Clifford Heimbucher, 
Herman Bevis (Price Waterhouse and APB vice chairman), 
John Queenan (Haskins & Sells), and Frank T. Weston (Arthur 
Young & Company), accompanied by two senior staff members, 
attended the conference. All four of the APB members in attend-
ance were practitioners who were held in high regard for their 
serious dedication to the development of accounting principles. 
The hour-long meeting was held in the SEC’s offices in Washing-
ton on November 22. SEC Chairman Cohen presided, and Chief 
Accountant Barr attended.26 It was one of the rare occasions on 
which the Commission met formally with members of the APB, 
and it was rarer still for such a meeting to be recorded on a 
stenographic transcript.27 In his prepared remarks, Cohen made 
it known that the Commission’s staff had “as early as August, 
1950 recommended to a committee of the American Institute 
of Accountants to take a firm position” (p. 3) in the matter of 
the classification of deferred tax in such cases. He added: “The 
increasing incidence of these practices and the growing signifi-
cance of the amounts involved convince us that the petition is 
right in urging us to act now rather than to tolerate further delay 
which your procedures would seem to require” (p. 3).
 Cohen quoted from the AA petition as follows:
 Some companies which have heretofore included 
the deferred taxes in current liabilities have changed 
the classification to noncurrent liabilities. Other com-
panies (some of which are our clients) are now taking 
the position that they will change the classification to 
noncurrent at the end of the current fiscal year if other 
companies are permitted to continue the noncurrent 
classification. This represents a retrogression in ac-
26“In the Matter of Conference with Representatives of the Accounting 
Principles Board re: Arthur Andersen & Co. Petition,” Official Transcript of Pro-
ceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., 
November 22, 1965 (ACE-Federal Reporters, Inc, Official Reporters). Quotations 
from this transcript will be indicated by page number.
27On December 21, 1962, following issuance of the board’s controversial 
Opinion No. 2 [APB, 1962] on the investment tax credit, a delegation from the 
board met in Washington with four SEC Commissioners and several SEC staff 
members, but, as far as is known, no transcript was prepared.
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counting which occurs when such alternative practices 
exist.
Cohen stated that the SEC’s staff had already drafted a proposed 
release that would effectuate the AA petition, but that, before 
issuing the release, the Commission wanted to have the benefit 
of hearing the comments of the APB’s delegation. And then he 
bluntly expressed his unhappiness with the board’s performance 
and issued a thinly veiled threat (pp. 4-5):
. . . before we hear your comments I do want to take this 
opportunity to observe that this Commission, as you 
know, has been quite patient with the efforts of the ac-
counting profession to solve a number of accounting 
matters as to which questionable alternative solutions 
have been accepted for some time. I am sure you are 
aware that, we and important persons in other parts 
of Washington, hear and receive many complaints that 
the profession seems unable to come to grips with the 
problems and to adopt solutions, even though extensive 
studies have been made and published.
 As you know, we have certain statutory responsi-
bilities. It has been suggested strongly that if you can-
not or will not move with reasonable dispatch to cope 
with these issues, we should. Now, while our patience 
has not been exhausted and we believe that coopera-
tion with the Board has been most helpful and should 
continue, I wish to make the point that we do have a 
responsibility and that we do have to account for it.
 In reply, Heimbucher stated that the board’s decision to 
drop the paragraph on deferred tax from Opinion No. 6 [APB, 
1965] was that it had become controversial and that the pro-
nouncement had to be issued with dispatch. He added that 
“some of those who voted to remove it from the bulletin at that 
time did so on the condition that a committee of the Board be 
appointed immediately to deal forthwith with this question” (p. 
8). He said that he expected a three-man committee to report 
in time for the board’s next meeting, in December, “and it is 
our earnest belief that we will be able to reach a conclusion on 
this during 1966, allowing for all of our exposure requirements, 
which take two or three months, and then a final ballot on the 
draft” (p. 9). Heimbucher hoped to persuade the SEC not to 
 issue its release. Cohen then reminded the board members that 
the issue concerning the Commission is a larger one, namely, 
that “the profession finds great difficulty in arriving at solutions 
24
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to problems which, albeit difficult, nevertheless appear to be 
subject to solution” (p. 10).
 Herman Bevis pointed out that “these questions are far 
more difficult and far more complex than those you can state in 
rather simple form, and I myself believe, and I think you would 
agree, that what we are looking for is not just any solution which 
can’t stand up in trial very long. We are looking for sound solu-
tions” (p. 11). Cohen replied that he shared Bevis’ view, but “as 
I pointed out this problem was addressed with a certain amount 
of conviction by our Chief Accountant 15 years ago, and I would 
think anyone would agree that is a reasonable period within 
which to find a solution” (p. 11).
 John Queenan emphasized that the APB’s program of re-
search studies was now coming to the stage where the board 
will become more active in issuing Opinions. On the matter of 
income tax allocation, he said that he was one of those who did 
not consider it as a liability. To have approved the deferred tax as 
a current liability in some cases would, he said, have prejudged 
the outcome of the research study on tax allocation accounting 
that was still in preparation. Queenan also doubted that it was 
as urgent a matter as AA had argued, as he believed that the 
predominant practice was to show the deferred tax “outside of 
current [liabilities]” and that there are relatively few companies 
showing it as current. Hence, he implied, there would be few oc-
casions for switchovers.
 Chairman Cohen said he had no reason to question that the 
board could resolve the issue in 1966, but “I don’t know how 
your resolution will come out. . . . ” (p. 18). It was clear to every-
one that the Commission had made up its mind on the matter.
 Herman Bevis, who was no more sympathetic with the 
current liability classification than was Queenan, proceeded to 
argue a point that could be described as reductio ad absurdum. 
He cited Spiegel Co., which showed $120m of long-term debt 
and only $30m of noncurrent assets. He then proposed that, 
if the deferred tax associated with installment receivables (a 
current asset) should be shown as a current liability, “it imme-
diately raises the question of whether 90 of the 120 million of 
the long-term debt shouldn’t also go up there, because it has to 
apply to something on the current asset side”28 (p. 19). Chairman 
Cohen dismissed the argument peremptorily, as if everything 
 
28This same point was made by a number of commentators on the exposure 
draft.
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on the right side of the balance sheet should be linked to every-
thing on the left side. This strained argument by Bevis could 
not have given Cohen confidence in the board’s ability to solve 
the deferred tax problem. Then Bevis argued that most of the 
companies that show the deferred tax as a noncurrent item are 
the ones where the amount is the most significant, while those 
that show it as a current liability claim only small amounts, as 
if to suggest that the issue is not all that important. Amused at 
Bevis’ analysis, Chairman Cohen interjected, “May I partially in 
jest – I hope it will be so understood – say that I draw from what 
has been said that where the amount is not material and really 
can’t affect the current ratio very much they assign it to the cur-
rent section, but where it is material and could affect the current 
 ratio it is assigned elsewhere. Is that too unfair a suggestion?” 
(pp. 21-22). Bevis was not able to disagree with this reconstruc-
tion of his argument as an opportunity for manipulation.
 Cohen then ventured the view that the Commission’s draft 
release, being an interpretation of existing requirements, could 
be issued forthwith, without any prior exposure. He said he 
was interested in issuing the release in time to affect financial 
statements for the year ending December 31, 1965. Cohen also 
expressed exasperation with the board’s process: “there ought to 
be an end to all the studies and all the committees that review 
the work of prior committees, and someone ought to decide 
something” (p. 25). 
 In the course of the discussion, Heimbucher and Weston 
said they would classify deferred tax as a liability, while Queen-
an and Bevis had taken the other side. These matched pairs 
could not have filled Chairman Cohen with confidence that the 
board would successfully resolve the issue, even in 1966.
 At the end of the meeting, Heimbucher and Weston urged 
the Commission not to act in a way that would reflect unfavor-
ably on the standing of the board, and Cohen expressed sym-
pathy with their view. In fact, in a speech delivered eight days 
later, he was reassuring on this point. Cohen [1965, p. 11] said:
  We are now considering some limited action of our 
own [on accounting] – action which is not designed to 
undermine the efforts of the leaders of the profession 
but rather to emphasize to the entire profession the 
urgency of immediate and effective support of those 
who are seeking sound procedures to obviate unjustified 
differences in the treatment and presentation of similar 
problems.
26
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THE SEC ISSUES ACCOUNTING SERIES 
RELEASE NO. 102
 On December 7, 1965, the day before the next APB meet-
ing, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 102, “Balance 
Sheet Classification of Deferred Income Taxes Arising from In-
stallment Sales.”29 In the release, the Commission said: ”Where 
installment receivables are classified as current assets in ac-
cordance with the operating cycle practice [citing ARB No. 43, 
Chapter 3A], the related liabilities or credit items maturing or 
expiring in the time period of the operating cycle, including the 
deferred income taxes on installment sales, should be classified 
as current liabilities.” The SEC made no mention in the release 
of AA’s petition or of the fact that the matter had been under 
study by the APB. 
 Although AA had asked in its petition that the rule take ef-
fect for fiscal years beginning after December 31, 1965, the SEC 
opted for a much faster implementation. The rule would apply 
to fiscal years ending on or after December 31, 1965. Catlett had 
informed Chief Accountant Barr of his firm’s “deal” with MW, 
and he told Barr that if the SEC’s rule were not to take effect un-
til 1966 fiscal-year reports, MW and others in the small minority 
of retailers who were classifying the deferred tax liability as cur-
rent would all switch to noncurrent in their 1965 reports. Catlett 
believed that this argument may have been a factor in the SEC’s 
decision to accelerate the effective date.30
THE AFTERMATH OF ACCOUNTING SERIES 
 RELEASE NO. 102
 At the outset of the meeting of the APB on December 8-10, 
1965, Chairman Heimbucher handed out confidential copies of 
the transcript of the meeting with the SEC and said that, at the 
time of the meeting with the SEC, the members of the APB’s 
delegation were “certain” that the Commission would proceed 
to issue its draft release.31 Heimbucher then quoted from SEC 
Chairman Cohen’s remarks during the meeting that the board 
is taking much too long to solve the problems before it. Heim-
bucher was trying to impress on the members that, if the board 
29Publication of the release was reported in “SEC Acts to Make Concerns 
More Uniform in Handling of Assets-Liabilities Accounts,” Wall Street Journal, 
December 8, 1965, and in “SEC Prods Accountants,” Business Week, January 15, 
1966, p. 102.
30interview with George R. Catlett, dated May 3, 1978
31AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, December 8-10, 1965, p. 2
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did not begin to act more expeditiously, others, such as the SEC, 
would fill the void. Following the board’s three-day meeting, 
George Catlett reported to his partners that he detected more 
of a sense of urgency about achieving constructive and effective 
progress than had ever existed since the board’s inception. Not 
surprisingly, he said he noticed a degree of resentment toward 
AA on the part of some members, yet the salient point was that 
the impact on board members of the encounter with the SEC 
was palpable.32
 Two members of the APB’s research staff recalled that an 
effect of Accounting Series Release No. 102 was that the board 
became more careful to include in exposure drafts only those 
views for which there was strong support.33
 At a later point in the board’s meeting, some members 
thought it would be desirable for the board to state publicly 
that it was not in conflict with the SEC over Accounting Series 
Release No. 102. The board therefore voted to authorize the ad- 
ministrative director to publish a statement in the Journal of 
Accountancy [“SEC Issues Opinion...,” 1966] that it was “in 
substantial agreement with the position of the SEC.” Yet the 
informal vote to do so was 11-5, a bare two-thirds majority.34 
The statement appeared in the January 1966 issue. While there 
apparently were only a few board members who disagreed in 
principle with the position espoused in the SEC’s release, other 
board members had procedural concerns, including the belief 
that the board should not express a view on the classification 
question until the research study on current assets and liabili-
ties, and perhaps also that on income tax allocation, were com-
pleted. 
 In April 1966, Kenneth S. Axelson, the financial vice presi-
dent of J.C. Penney Company and chairman of NRMA’s account-
ing principles committee, attacked Accounting Series Release No. 
102 in a letter to the Journal of Accountancy. He said that the 
NRMA had petitioned the SEC to delay the effective date of the 
release by three months, but that its petition was denied [Axel-
son, 1966, p. 27].35
32memorandum by George R. Catlett to his partners in AA, dated December 
15, 1965 
33interview with Reed K. Storey and Paul Rosenfield, August 1970
34AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, December 8-10, 1965, p. 9
35Perhaps because of a belief that the retail industry should be better repre-
sented on the APB, the Institute’s executive committee appointed Axelson to the 
board in 1968. 
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 In May 1966, Leonard Spacek [1966, p. 381] said in a speech 
that “the SEC came to the rescue of professional accountants . . . 
while the accounting profession remained in an immobile state 
of indecision.” On the other hand, Herman Bevis [1966] criti-
cized the SEC’s release as supporting uniformity of method over 
genuine comparability in financial reporting.36
 By coincidence, in early December 1965, AA published a 
42-page booklet, Establishing Accounting Principles – A Crisis 
in Decision Making, in which it criticized the APB for its in-
effectiveness in narrowing the areas of difference in accounting 
practice. Copies of the booklet were distributed at the APB’s 
meeting on December 8. AA [1965, p. 28] argued in the booklet 
that the APB should take steps “to deal with current problems 
on a timely basis and carry out its responsibilities in a truly 
professional manner.” AA called for the establishment of a U.S. 
Court of Accounting Appeals in order to promote the uniformity 
of accounting practices prescribed by U.S. federal regulatory 
agencies, including the SEC [see “Accounting Court . . . ,” 1966]. 
At the board’s meeting, Chairman Heimbucher took the time to 
quote from SEC Chairman Cohen’s strong remarks during the 
hearing as well as from AA’s charge to the APB to improve its 
 effectiveness. The minutes of the board meeting reported that 
“Mr. Heimbucher stated that he quoted from these documents 
to emphasize the necessity for action on the part of the Board 
in dealing with accounting principles and to stress that, if the 
Board does not, other groups will assume the responsibility.”
37
 George Catlett, who was a member of the APB from 1965 
to 1971, said that the SEC’s release was the event that prompted 
the board to begin taking difficult decisions on matters that 
would change prevailing practice, and to begin paying more at-
tention to the SEC than to their clients.38
 For his part, SEC Chairman Cohen [1966, p. 59] sent a 
strong message to the APB in a speech in May 1966. He said 
that Accounting Series Release No. 102 was an example that 
“Stronger leadership by the Commission is one avenue being 
followed” in moving toward the goal of uniformity in accounting 
practice. He added: 
 Although Accounting Series Release No. 102 was 
used to resolve one problem of uniformity, I do not be-
36See also the searing criticism of the release by Theodore Herz [1966], one 
of Bevis’ partners.
37AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, December 8-10, 1965, p. 3
38interviews with George R. Catlett, September 3, 1970 and May 3, 1978
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lieve it will be necessary for us to use that device with 
great frequency—although the option is always open to 
us. The extent to which action on our part is required 
will depend in large measure on the vigor and determi-
nation of the Accounting Principles Board. . . .
 In December 1967, the APB issued Opinion No. 11, “Ac-
counting for Income Taxes,” which, in paragraph 57, explicitly 
adopted the SEC’s position in Accounting Series Release No. 102. 
The APB really had little option but to do so. Three board mem-
bers dissented, saying that this treatment “would contribute to 
a lack of understanding of working capital, because of the com-
mingling of contingent items with items which are expected to 
be realized or discharged during the normal operating cycle of 
the business.”39 The Opinion passed by the barest two-thirds ma-
jority, 14-6.
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19th Annual Conference on 
Accounting, Business & Financial History 
at Cardiff Business School 12-13 September 2007
Announcement of Conference and Call for Papers
Guest Speaker – Richard K Fleischman
Theoretical, empirical and review papers are welcomed in all areas of 
accounting, business and financial history.
The conference provides delegates with the opportunity of presenting 
and discussing, in an informal setting, papers ranging from early work-
ing drafts to fully developed manuscripts. The format of the conference 
allows approximately 40 minutes for presentation and discussion in or-
der to help achieve worthwhile feedback from those attending.
In the past, many papers presented at Cardiff have subsequently ap-
peared in print in Accounting, Business and Financial History, edited by 
John Richard (Dick) Edwards and Trevor Boyns, or in another of the 
full range of international, refereed academic accounting, business and 
economic history journals.
The conference will be held at Aberdare Hall, Cathays Park, Cardiff, 
CF14 3UX, UK, from lunchtime on Monday, 12 September 2007 to mid-
afternoon on Tuesday, 13 September 2007.
The fully inclusive conference fee (covering all meals, the conference 
dinner on Thursday and accommodation) is £130. 
Those wishing to offer papers to be considered for presentation at 
the conference should send an abstract of their paper (not exceed-
ing one page) by 31 May 2007 to:
Debbie Harris, Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU 
Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5730 Fax +44 (0)29 2087 4419 Email. HarrisDL@
cardiff.ac.uk
Following the refereeing process, applicants will be advised of the con-
ference organisers’ decision on 30 June 2007.
Sponsored by:
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THE END OF BETTERMENT 
ACCOUNTING: A STUDY 
OF THE ECONOMIC, PROFESSIONAL, 
AND REGULATORY FACTORS THAT 
FOSTERED STANDARDS CONVERGENCE 
IN THE U.S. RAILROAD INDUSTRY,  
1955-1983
Abstract: On January 26, 1983, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) announced that it would require all railroads under its regula-
tory jurisdiction to change from Retirement-Replacement-Betterment 
(RRB) accounting, to a more theoretically sound depreciation ac-
counting for matching revenues and expenses. The change was need-
ed because RRB did not allow for the recapture of track investment, 
leaving the railroads with limited capital to replace aging track lines. 
Over the previous three decades, it had become painfully obvious to 
everyone that the industry’s economic woes were the result of archaic 
accounting procedures that lacked harmony with the rest of American 
accounting standards, but the ICC was reluctant to change until new 
tax legislation in the early 1980s forced the issue. The decision was a 
culmination of a debate that started in the mid-1950s when Arthur 
Andersen, with the help of the securities industry, began an effort 
to harmonize railroad and industry standards using arguments that 
mirror those supporting the international accounting harmonization 
efforts of the early 21st century. 
INTRODUCTION 
 As the globalization of business markets grows, the debate 
over proper accounting standards to meet the needs of cross-
border and cross-cultural investors has grown. This is especially 
true since the reorganization of the international standards-
 setting apparatus in 2001 and the creation of the International 
Accounting Standards Board. Even before the reorganization, 
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the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had attempt-
ed to harmonize some of U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) with international principles. For example, 
one of the intentions of SFAS 128, Earnings per Share, was to 
make “computing earnings per share more compatible with EPS 
standards in other countries” [FASB, 1997, para. 1]. Other U.S. 
GAAP that is not yet harmonized lies in the areas of accounting 
for research and development and for inventories. These and 
other accounting standards lack current convergence with in-
ternational GAAP. Though the drive to harmonize international 
standards continues at the forefront of changing accounting 
thought, this debate over diverging accounting standards is not 
a new one.
 Nearly half a century before the current international ac-
counting standards debate, some in the accounting profession, 
led by Arthur Andersen (AA), felt that railroad accounting 
practices required by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) were rapidly diverging from GAAP and, in 1955, asked for 
a change. It was felt that such a divergence was a major cause 
of the economic hardships facing the U.S. railroad industry. At 
the core of these divergent practices was “betterment account-
ing” or, more theoretically, Retirement-Replacement-Betterment 
(RRB). The ICC had institutionalized the practice in the early 
20th century to account for “track and way structures,” but it 
was rapidly becoming an anachronism in the face of modern 
depreciation rules.
 In brief, AA and its allies felt that the ICC needed to phase 
out RRB in favor of depreciation accounting in an effort to al-
low the capital-starved railroads to recoup investments that, in 
some cases, were more than 50 years old. In addition, AA cited 
problems with comparable financial statements, problematic 
auditing procedures, and clarity as other reasons for the much-
needed change. Ironically, the drive for international standards 
convergence is predicated on some of the same reasoning as 
Andersen’s arguments. 
 The ICC and the American Institute of Accountants (AIA)1 
saw no reason to eliminate the traditional method of track ac-
counting because it tended to keep replacement costs in line 
with inflation. The railroads, however, were much more prag-
1In 1886, the American Association of Public Accountants was formed. This 
organization began publishing the Journal of Accountancy in 1905, changing its 
name to the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) in 1916. In 1957, the organi-
zation became the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 
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matic. They wanted to keep RRB due to the cost of the change 
and the impact such a change would have on their rate-of-return 
on assets (ROA), the centerpiece of ICC rate-making policy. In 
the face of powerful interests, the ICC refused the change.
 This paper will discuss the efforts by AA and various public-
interest groups to act as change agents to modernize railroad 
accounting principles and bring them into convergence with the 
accounting standards of other industries. The paper focuses on 
the efforts of the ICC to block such moves in light of congres-
sional hearings and pressure from the securities industry. The 
article follows the debate from 1955 to the ICC’s elimination of 
betterment accounting in 1983, using published research, news 
articles, and public documents, including those published by AA 
and the AIA. 
BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE
Betterment Accounting and the ICC: The process of changing 
from RRB to depreciation accounting for railroad track struc-
tures started nearly fifty years before AA’s intervention. In 1906, 
Congress passed the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate 
Commerce Act. This amendment provided the ICC with two 
cherished goals – the authority to set rail tariffs and the power 
to require uniform railroad accounting. With this newly found 
authority, the ICC issued revised accounting and reporting regu-
lations. Under the new regulations, railroads were compelled to 
report systematic depreciation charges for equipment and other 
“non-permanent” fixed assets. This new methodology would be 
in lieu of the traditional “betterment” accounting methodology 
used by the rail industry. 
 Betterment accounting or RRB had developed over the 
previous 40-50 years to account for track and equipment. FASB 
[1983, para. 5], at the time of RRB discontinuance in 1983, de-
fined the practice in Statement #73 explaining: 
Under RRB, the initial costs of installing track are capi-
talized, not depreciated, and remain capitalized until 
the track is retired. The costs of replacing track are 
expensed unless a betterment (for example, replacing a 
110-lb. rail with a 132-lb. rail) occurs. In that case, the 
amount by which the cost of the new part exceeds the 
current cost of the part replaced is considered a bet-
terment and is capitalized but not depreciated, and the 
current cost of the part replaced is expensed. Railroads 
generally have used RRB for financial reporting.
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 In essence, the railroad does not recoup the cost of the 
track until replaced. In some years, there would be no charges 
to current operating expenses from track usage if no track was 
replaced. This lack of cost recapture from RRB was indicated 
by the Union Pacific [Moody’s Investors’ Services, 1984, p. 151] 
that reported in 1983: “Under this method, the cost of in-kind 
replacements of track structure was changed to expense when 
incurred. Cost of betterments (improvements) to structure were 
capitalized and charged against earnings only when the asset 
was removed from service.”
 At the time of the 1907 change, the ICC felt that betterment 
accounting simply did not reflect the true cost of the railroad’s 
operations because in lean years there would simply be no re-
placements or upgrades. This policy also resulted in safety con-
cerns for the ICC and the public. With these problems in mind, 
the ICC designed the 1907 change to provide a more accurate 
rendering of these fixed asset balances through a more sys-
tematic matching of fixed expenses with revenue. As expected, 
the orders set off a firestorm of protest from the rail industry 
because it was felt that the ICC had overstepped its bounds and 
had jeopardized the rail industry’s financial well-being. 
 The railroads, however, felt that they were already recogniz-
ing “physical” depreciation of their assets through the replace-
ment process, but the ICC was pushing for a uniform applica-
tion of a relatively new concept called “economic depreciation.” 
Over the next six years, the industry attempted to get the order 
changed through public protests in the press, “civil disobedi-
ence” by neglecting to send depreciation reports to the ICC, and 
litigation. In the end, the Supreme Court in Kansas City South­
ern Railway v. U.S. [231 U.S. 423] would rule in 1913 that the 
ICC had the authority and jurisdiction to compel such reporting. 
According to AA, the court indicated that depreciation was “an 
inevitable fact which no system of accounts can properly ignore” 
[AA, 1962a, p. 128]. Though the ICC issued the equipment depre-
ciation orders to provide more uniformity in reporting railroad 
income, the ruling ironically affected each railroad differently, 
depending on its location, age, condition of its equipment, and 
maintenance schedules.2 Facing these logistical problems, the 
ICC compromised and did not order depreciation charges for 
track structures. By so doing, it institutionalized RRB for track 
structures as part of the Uniform System of Accounts, adopted 
by the ICC in 1914. In the end, the railroads lost on depreciating 
2See Delano [1908] for a further discussion of this problem.
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equipment but won on RRB for track and other structures, by 
far their largest asset.
 The debate over RRB for track accounting began again in 
1924 with the ICC issuing new preliminary orders for the rail-
roads to begin depreciating “permanent” fixed assets. At this 
point, the railroads were now “bucking” established business 
practices. Depreciation accounting for fixed assets came into 
widespread use in most U.S. industries at the turn of the cen-
tury, especially after the advent of federal income taxes. The ICC 
now wanted the railroads to depreciate track structures and take 
an annual charge to match revenues and expenses better. The 
railroads protested the ICC’s decision. By 1932, a poor economy 
forced the ICC to relent and continue to allow RRB for track 
structures. Continued debate was put on hold for the next 20 
years due to the Great Depression and World War II.
A Change in Economic Reality: By the 1950s, the railroads had 
to recognize a new economic reality in the U.S. with new trans-
portation alternatives for travel and shipping. A fledgling airline 
industry had introduced pressurized cabins, making air travel 
more appealing to the traveling public. Cheap energy fueled 
the country’s love of the automobile, and the newly announced 
interstate highway system began to hurt rail passenger service. 
With better roads and cheap energy, an expanding and cost-effi-
cient trucking industry negatively impacted shipping, the “bread 
and butter” of the railroad’s business. 
 The trucking industry was more cost-effective for shippers 
currently servicing smaller towns with “high cost,” short-line 
railroads, spurs off the more lucrative main-stem routes. This 
change placed pressure on rail revenues, causing the railroads 
to request abandonment of these unprofitable routes as well as 
a general reduction in maintenance and replacements of track 
structures. These economic problems facing the industry soon 
lead to renewed questioning of the RRB system of track ac-
counting. Safety concerns aside, this practice led inevitably to 
either artificially high income or low rates of return given no 
recapture of capital cost. 
 In addition to these new economic realities for the rail 
industry, the Internal Revenue Code in 1954 codified the use of 
accelerated depreciation charges for tax purposes. Because the 
Code still allowed companies to use straight-line depreciation 
for purposes of corporate reporting, the change had the effect 
of creating temporary tax differences for book income and tax 
income, requiring a deferred taxes disclosure to corporate share-
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holders. The ICC banned the use of deferred tax reporting for all 
companies under its jurisdiction, reasoning that it only allowed 
straight-line depreciation accounting for regulatory reporting, 
making it unnecessary for the railroads to deal with accelerated 
methods and interperiod tax allocations.
 By the mid-1950s, these conflicting betterment accounting 
rules for some of America’s largest corporations were viewed 
by some in the public accounting profession to be at variance 
with current GAAP rules and, consequently, at variance with the 
matching principle.3 Over the next three decades, a number of 
powerful special-interest groups and governmental organiza-
tions would array against betterment accounting with the ICC 
and the railroads putting up a spirited, if not misguided, defense 
of its cherished accounting procedure.
CHALLENGES TO RAILROAD ACCOUNTING PRACTICES4
AA Gets Involved: In August 1955, AA petitioned the ICC asking 
it to modify its position on deferred taxes. The CPA firm felt that 
the ICC needed to address this issue because the independent 
auditors might be compelled to issue qualified opinions given 
the lack of formal adherence to GAAP in the areas of depre-
ciation and deferred taxes. The railroads protested the desired 
changes because such tax deferrals threatened to increase 
reported (ICC) income and, in turn, negatively influence a very 
sensitive balance between reported income and return on invest-
ment for rate-review purposes.
 During its regulatory history, the ICC, with the help of court 
rulings, had settled on a basic ROA methodology to determine 
the efficacy of a railroad’s rate structure. Simply put, if the ICC 
felt that the ROA for a given railroad was too high in compari-
son with the industry and competition, it might well rule that 
the railroad needed to cut its passenger or freight rates. Unfor-
tunately, the ICC often ignored the opposite condition, denying 
rate relief to railroads that missed their target returns. The ICC 
thought that this odd regulatory process was for the public good 
regardless of its impact on the cash flow of the railroad or future 
3The Committee on Accounting Procedure had promulgated several Account-
ing Research Bulletins over the previous ten years related to the issue of depre-
ciation charges. The first, in May 1944, was ARB 22, Report of Committee on Ter­
minology, which defined depreciation as “a system of accounting which aims to 
distribute the cost … of a tangible asset, less salvage value over the estimated 
useful life of the unit…in a systematic and rational manner” [AIA, 1944, p. 179].
4Much of this section is derived from AA [1960, 1962a, b, 1969, 1973, 1976].
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equipment replacement needs. Because of the ICC’s regulatory 
theory, a railroad did not want its track structures subject to de-
preciation charges because they would lower asset balances and 
a corresponding increase in ROA. This myopic view of opera-
tions ignored the obvious purpose of depreciation, to recapture 
costs for track replacements. They did seem to understand that, 
due to inflation, any replacements would offset any correspond-
ing reductions in net assets. In the end, the regulators agreed 
with the powerful railroads and announced in December 1956, 
that it would not modify its Uniform System of Accounts to in-
corporate interperiod tax allocations [WSJ, 1956, p. 2].
Leonard Spacek and the AIA Committee: In the meantime, the 
securities industry also became alarmed with the problems re-
lated to railroad accounting and formally began to study the is-
sue. Corbin [1957, p. 86], quoting the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 
said, “a current [AICPA] study was instigated by the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) after consultation with the [ICC]. The 
exchange apparently fears that stockholders are being misled by 
income figures derived from the present accounting methods.” 
 To gain a better understanding of the issues, the NYSE 
asked the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) to form the 
Committee on Relations with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion in mid-1956 to inquire into “clearing the principal diver-
gencies between accounting practices of railroads and generally 
accepted accounting principles for other industries” [Journal of 
Accountancy, 1957b, p. 69, 1957a]. In the same article, a mem-
ber of this committee, AA’s Leonard Spacek, felt that these 
divergencies between railroad accounting and GAAP resulted in 
the “overstatement of current income and inaccurate property 
accounting.” Spacek charged that railroad officials pressured 
the AIA committee to make sure that “no recommendations are 
made which would affect the railroad companies adversely from 
the standpoint of regulation or income.” During the forthcoming 
congressional hearings, an ICC official would bring more “pub-
lic pressure to bear by indicating dire consequences if either 
depreciation accounting or inter-period tax allocations were 
instituted.” The WSJ [1957, p. 6] quoted Spacek as saying that 
he felt “the proposed accounting change would slash reported 
income by 20% and lead to higher rates.” 
 Though the AIA felt the change was unwarranted, it did get 
the attention of members of a House Congressional Subcommit-
tee that held hearings on the issue at the end of April 1957 after 
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the AIA committee had issued its report.5 In summary, the AIA 
committee6 [AA, 1962b, pp. 22-23] listed six specific procedures 
of ICC accounting that were at variance with GAAP procedures 
– (1) a number of items that would normally be deferred charges 
or credits are reported as expenses on ICC income statements; 
(2) appropriations to such accounts as sinking funds are consid-
ered expenses under ICC accounting rules; (3) only income taxes 
paid are recognized with no interperiod tax allocations; (4) rail-
roads are not required to provide a disclosure of the current por-
tion of long-term debts; (5) an acquisition adjustment account is 
used in lieu of separate fixed asset accounts; and (6) outstanding 
vouchers are considered liabilities rather than an offset to cash. 
Concerning each of these items, an AICPA Committee did make 
the judgment that, “As a result [of economic changes in the 
industry], the principles of determining and reporting annual 
income to the railroad investors differ materially from those fol-
lowed by other industries” [AA, 1962b, p. 5]. 
 The AICPA committee, however, left the most contentious 
issue, betterment accounting, for the final part of its discussion. 
The committee report began this section by noting that the ICC 
had studied this issue of depreciation versus betterment during 
World War II and had required depreciation of certain proper-
ties such as buildings and other structures,7 but that with con-
tinued railroad protests, it left betterment accounting practices 
intact for track structures. In a surprise to the CPA firms, the 
AICPA committee concluded that betterment accounting, though 
not in accord with GAAP, had a substantial authoritative basis 
and, consequently, there was no need to change to depreciation 
accounting. In defense of its position on track accounting, the 
committee [AA, 1962a, p. 125] wrote: 
… in consideration of the long history of use of replace-
ment accounting by railroads with respect thereto, the 
unique nature of this category of railroad property, its 
relatively stable physical quantity, and the mature eco-
5The congressional probe included hearings from April 30 to May 3, 1957 by 
the Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations. The probe itself was wide ranging but focused primarily on the 
depreciation and tax allocation issues. The Journal of Accountancy [1957b] pub-
lished an executive summary of the 292-page report in November 1957. The full 
range of the issues and arguments presented are beyond the scope of this paper. 
6The AIA Committee Report was issued on March 28, 1957 and was published 
in the Journal of Accountancy [1957a] in May 1957.
7According to Boberg [1985, p. 19], the ICC required this change on June 8, 
1942. 
41
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2007, Vol. 34, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2007
33Heier and Gurley: Railroad Accounting
nomic status of the industry, has concluded, … that no 
substantial useful purpose would be served by a change 
to depreciation accounting techniques in absence of 
evidence indicating that depreciation-maintenance pro-
cedures would provide a more appropriate charge to 
income for the use of such property. 
 The AICPA committee essentially agreed with the railroad 
industry and the ICC. In doing so, it developed a much broader 
definition of authoritative GAAP that now had its basis in histor-
ical precedent and industry usage regardless of the method’s the-
oretical or practical basis. This was a more utilitarian approach 
to the way accounting principles developed and ran counter to 
the trend of developing a body of accounting principles based 
on postulates and assumptions. The AICPA would eventually at-
tempt to institutionalize the criteria as a basis for authoritative 
GAAP in its 1965 publication of Accounting Research Study No. 
7, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Busi­
ness Enterprises. 
 The congressional committee’s responding summary [AA, 
1962b, pp. 39-40] took exception to the AICPA’s stance on RRB, 
but overall its reaction was mixed. On the one hand, the com-
mittee actually commended the ICC for putting the RRB issue 
on its agenda for study. But the congressional committee also 
vociferously complained about the ICC’s “intransigence” in re-
fusing to allow deferred taxes. In 1959, the ICC did make some 
changes related to the accounting variances listed by the AICPA 
but left intact RRB and its ban on deferred tax allocations. In 
the case of deferred taxes, the ICC again felt that since it re-
quired that only straight-line depreciation be used for account-
ing purposes, “only the actual tax payable need be recorded or 
a significant misstatement of current income can result because 
total tax would be the same under either method” [AA, 1962b, p. 
10]. AA and the accounting profession had lost this round with 
the ICC on accounting issues, but the debate between AA and 
the Institute would continue for some time to come. 
 In another challenge to the ICC in July 1958, Spacek and AA 
inquired about the validity of the special language included in 
the auditor’s report for ICC-regulated companies.8 They felt that 
8The audit report language read: “In our opinion the accompanying balance 
sheet and statements of income and retained earnings present fairly the position 
of the company and results of its operations for the year, in conformity with ac-
counting principles and practices prescribed or authorized by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, applied on a basis consistent with that of the previous year” 
[Spacek, 1969, p. 510]. 
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it did not fully comply with the ethics rule 5(e) of the Code of 
Professional Conduct. In a flurry of letters between the firm and 
the AICPA ethics committee, a brisk debate ensued with AA stat-
ing: “We have long questioned whether this form of the auditors 
certificate is acceptable under rule 5(e) … since it does not say 
whether the financial statements are in conformity with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles” [Spacek, 1969, p. 503]. In 
response to AA’s inquiry, on March 23, 1959, the AICPA’s ethics 
committee reaffirmed the current language of the auditor’s re-
port and did not require an explanation of the deviation between 
railroad accounting and GAAP because the accounting treatment 
had a legal or authoritative basis as prescribed by the ICC. The 
report went on to say that “the Institute’s Auditing Procedures 
Committee has not spoken specifically on reports of railroads. … 
[and] … In absence of some authoritative statement prescribing 
the reporting standards for what has been concluded is a special 
reporting problem, the validity of any reporting practice must 
rest on general use and general acceptance” [Spacek, 1969, p. 
510]. The language would remain for another 25 years.
 Again, AA’s desire for change in railroad reporting require-
ments was stymied, but the firm laid down some general prin-
ciples in the process. First, the firm saw a need to make railroad 
audit reports understandable and transparent to users. Second, 
it felt the need to harmonize both accounting and auditing 
standards. 
 With two setbacks now, AA took a new approach in deal-
ing with the ICC-GAAP variance problems by asking the ICC to 
allow the railroads and other regulated companies to publish 
statements in accordance with GAAP while continuing to use 
ICC Uniform Account rules for ICC reporting. The ICC balked at 
the proposal at first and issued a preliminary rule in December 
1959 ordering that no ICC-reporting company could issue any 
type of financial statements that varied from ICC accounting 
rules. The proposed rule generated huge opposition from the 
accounting profession, securities regulators, and the NYSE. 
The regulators and the accounting firms felt that the ICC was 
attempting to exercise powers over railroad securities transac-
tions never intended by the Interstate Commerce Act, an area of 
concern skirted by the congressional hearing. With the excep-
tion of the railroads, most other ICC-regulated companies, such 
as trucking and bus lines, protested the proposed rules because 
of the difficulty they would face in securing both debt and eq-
uity financing in the markets without GAAP financial statements 
matching revenues and expenses. 
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 In the face of the protest from all quarters, the ICC rescind-
ed its preliminary rule two years later in January 1962. A new 
rule allowed ICC-regulated companies to elect to publish GAAP 
financial statements with the caveat that they must make a 
footnote disclosure of the differences in income reported under 
GAAP and the ICC Uniform Accounting System. They, of course, 
were still required to report to the ICC using the Uniform Ac-
counting System. As will be reported later, few ICC railroads 
took advantage of the new financial reporting practices options 
because they would have to maintain two, possibly three, sets of 
books. Even with the compromise, this round of the deprecia-
tion debate had ended in a draw. The CPA firms had won some 
reporting concessions; other regulated companies had gained 
some flexibility in their financial reporting; the ICC had main-
tained its stance on deferred taxes; and, most importantly for 
this story, the railroads continued to use RRB accounting for the 
time being. Except at AA, the issues raised by the debate began 
to fade from the memories of most participants.
Andersen Challenges the AICPA’s Theory: In its 1969 edition of 
its series Accounting and Reporting Problems in the Accounting 
Profession, AA reported that it had renewed the debate over RRB 
with a letter to the AICPA in 1965. The correspondence was an 
attempt to persuade the Institute to reverse its position on bet-
terment accounting. In 1966, the AICPA issued a response to AA. 
In the letter, the AICPA continued to assert that RRB accounting 
had substantial authoritative support (e.g., Accounting Research 
Study No. 7). Though AA’s discussion did not identify the criteria 
on which the AICPA based its opinion, it may have been related 
to the criterion that read: “Each business entity must follow 
generally accepted accounting principles i.e. those which have 
substantial authoritative support in order to obtain an unquali-
fied opinion from certified public accountants” [Grady, 1965, 
pp. 33-34]. Grady explained that accounting entities should, 
“[a] choose the accounting practices and methods of applica-
tion most suitable to the needs and purposes of the entity and 
which,…will most fairly present the financial position and re-
sults of operations, and [b] at the same time, follow accounting 
practices and methods of other business entities.”
 The AICPA had again taken a utilitarian view of betterment 
accounting as it met the needs of the rail industry even though it 
did not harmonize with the growing body of accounting theory. 
The AICPA reiterated its original defense of betterment account-
ing as authoritative. According to Sayers [1979, p. 12], the 
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AICPA defense made the following points: 
•	 It has been used by the railroad industry for many years.
•	 Track components are unique in nature.
•	 There is a relatively stable physical quantity of track in-
dustry-wide.
•	 The industry is mature economically.
•	 Current operating charges under betterment accounting 
approximate those under depreciation accounting given a 
stable program of track maintenance.
 By 1976, AA had chipped away at these “justifications” and 
provided several criticisms of betterment accounting. The first 
was that betterment accounting had acted as an impediment 
to proper tariff rate making. Since rates are based on costs, the 
carrier that deferred maintenance, or did not use depreciation, 
could find itself failing to recoup capital through the railroad 
rates and, correspondingly, not having the capital to replace 
track structures. AA [1976, p. 151] wrote: “Had the railroads 
adopted depreciation accounting for the costs of grading and 
track structures, these costs could have been considered in the 
establishment or railroad rates in the past and been recovered 
through those rates and deducted for income taxes. This recov-
ery of cost would have placed the railroads in a much stronger 
financial position today.”
 In fairness to AA’s arguments, the ICC’s rate setting was an 
inflexible and archaic legal and regulatory structure that did not 
mesh with modern capital management concepts. For example, 
cost behavior theories related to fixed and variable cost func-
tions and operating “economies of scale” were virtually ignored 
by the ICC when determining rail tariff rates. 
 The next criticism dealt with the inconsistent track mainte-
nance and replacements practices of many carriers in contradis-
tinction to a major AICPA justification. Simply put, if a carrier 
elected to defer track maintenance and replacement, there were 
no charges against income for the use of the track in the year of 
deferral.9 Decreased expense levels led to high income and cor-
respondingly higher taxes, a frequent situation in World War II 
when, “railroads were generating substantial revenues but they 
9In a “regulatory irony,” the ICC partially agreed with AA’s position in a 1949 
study cited by the congressional panel. The report read, “… manipulations through 
deferring track work is subject to some limitation because of safety requirements. 
Track in unsafe condition cannot be drawn from service as in the case of equip-
ment. The ICC was treading a thin line by admitting the problem but dismissing 
it as unimportant because no railroad would ever leave its track in that bad of 
condition” [Journal of Accountancy, 1957b, p. 73].
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could not make extensive physical replacements of track struc-
tures due to ‘war shortages.’ Thus, the railroads were placed in 
a position of paying [higher] taxes because the improper ac-
counting procedures utilized failed to recognize the capital costs 
incurred to provide rail service” [AA, 1976, p. 151]. Again, this 
practice seemed to be one of many contradictions in the railroad 
industry’s efforts to maintain or increase ICC tariff rate levels. 
In this case, a higher income probably would have resulted in 
a corresponding increase in the road’s ROA, precluding it from 
getting rate relief. 
 Finally, the “stable physical quantity” justification cited 
above was also no longer valid in light of the elimination or 
abandonment of substantial quantities of existing track. AA felt 
that new technologies (e.g., air and trucking services) limited or 
eliminated the remaining economic life of the track structures. 
AA felt that betterment accounting “has led to misstatements of 
economic fact and have had serious adverse financial repercus-
sions in terms of … the railroad’s ability to maintain its financial 
strength through the recovery of its capital investment, its abil-
ity to determine the cost of providing rail service and therefore 
to have appropriate service rates established” [AA, 1976, p. 148]. 
The firm [AA, 1976, p. 152] further explained: “If depreciation 
that recognizes economic obsolescence is not adopted and if 
replacements are deferred because of an inability to obtain suf-
ficient replacement capital, large amounts of the original capital 
cost of the track structures will remain on the balance sheets 
even though service value of the assets represented by those 
costs is declining.”
 A GAO study [1981, p. 8] also used the AICPA justification 
criteria. The GAO, however, concluded that the economic condi-
tions had changed since 1957, and that betterment accounting 
“gives only a limited and obscure view of the effects of infla-
tion on the railroads because it concerns only a portion of the 
operating cost – costs associated with track structure replace-
ments.” AA pointed out that the massive bankruptcy of the Penn 
Central in 1969 was, in part, due to the problems caused by 
ICC accounting rules that left the railroad with little capital to 
make replacements. Finally, AA [1976, p. 148] indicated that the 
“adoption of depreciation accounting will facilitate management 
decision making in ways including product service pricing and 
financial planning.” 
 Finally, AA [1976, pp. 151-154] went on to list three ben-
efits to depreciation accounting. The first was that depreciation 
accounting would “improve financial reporting, through the 
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consistent and uniform application of these principles over all 
of the railroads, and would be consistent with other industries.” 
Second, AA felt that, “depreciation accounting would facilitate 
proper pricing” through the recovery of fixed costs. Finally, 
“depreciation accounting would improve financial planning” 
because more consideration would be given to the levels of track 
structures needed and corresponding depreciation charges when 
dealing with economic obsolescence of the fixed assets. In the 
end, AA never persuaded the ICC to change either its fixed asset 
accounting policies or its stance on deferred taxes. However, it 
did set the stage for the final series of debates that would spell 
the end of RRB accounting.10
Other Voices: Except for AA’s published arguments against RRB 
and its visible dispute with the AICPA, there was actually a 
dearth of published literature for or against RRB during the 
1960s. This was probably due to the arcane nature of an issue 
everyone assumed had been settled decades ago. By the mid-
1970s, only two prominent articles [Reynolds, 1964; Coleman, 
1970] surfaced from the academic and professional communi-
ties that challenged the status quo.
 
REGULATORY REFORMS
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act: In 1972, 
AA made one more attempt at changing the mind of the ICC re-
garding its accounting practices. In a December 1972 letter, the 
firm [AA, 1973, p. 73] suggested four benefits justifying an ac-
counting change. The change to depreciation accounting would 
promote uniformity of accounting, foster cost regulation and 
reduce incentives to postpone retirement, improve information 
for regulatory purposes, and reduce the potential for the man-
agement of income.
 This time AA streamlined its arguments and concentrated 
on issues of corporate governance and safety problems within 
the railroad industry. The list appears closely related to the per-
ceived reasons for the Penn Central debacle. Norby [1981, p. 77] 
noted some of these reasons when he explained, “opponents of 
betterment accounting believe that it allows railroad manage-
10As a side note, during the period of time that AA was quarrelling with the 
ICC and the AICPA over the propriety of RRB accounting, the IRS actually was 
bolstering its support for the methodology through the issuance of several rev-
enue rulings. These rulings and other tax issues related to RRB are discussed later 
in the paper.
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ments to overstate income in periods of economic recession by 
curtailing track maintenance and that obscures the failing con-
dition of such roads as Penn Central’s because net income can 
be sustained despite deteriorating roadbeds.”
 It was evident from the analysis that management decision 
making at Penn Central and similar railroads was clouded by 
poorly designed and differentially applied accounting principles 
that allowed the financial problems of the company to be hid-
den. AA felt that more uniformly applied accounting principles 
would have helped with the Penn Central problems, especially 
in the areas of management decision making and regulatory ac-
tions. Though AA did report in the 1973 edition of Accounting 
and Reporting Problems that the ICC had set up an accounting 
study group, nothing apparently came of the endeavor. In the 
face of mounting criticism, the ICC “circled the wagons” and did 
nothing to change its accounting practices, but the economic 
downturns and internal financial problems that would affect the 
health of the rail industry were just around the corner.
 To combat these problems, Congress acted by passing sev-
eral pieces of legislation aimed at deregulating railroads and 
strengthening their financial health. The first of these was the 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R 
Act).11 According to the Ford Library [2004], 4R Act provides for 
more efficient, more competitive, and thus less costly rail trans-
portation; increases competition between various kinds of trans-
portation and encourages a better utilization of resources by 
assuring that goods are transported by the most efficient means 
of transportation; eliminates certain antitrust immunities which 
permit carriers to set and hold rates at unreasonably high levels; 
assures that regulation provides adequate protection to consum-
er interests; provides needed financial assistance to the railroad 
industry;12 and encourages speedy and rational restructuring of 
the railroads which will improve their economic health.
 Babcock [1984, p. 4] points out that the Act allowed for the 
“variable cost of rail transport to be recognized as the minimum 
rate.” Under these new rules, “rates equal to or greater than vari-
able cost could not be declared ‘unreasonable’ unless so proven.” 
11This legislation came on the heels of internal criticisms by the staff of the 
ICC itself. An article in the New York Times [1976, p. 2] indicated that, “the Inter-
state Commerce Commission’s enforcement of the law has no overall purpose and 
concentrates on economically insignificant cases.”
12At this time, there was a restructuring within the rail industry that saw the 
development of Amtrak in 1973 and the merger of a number of eastern railroads 
into Conrail in 1975.
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This order ran contrary to the old ICC rate theory that had not 
always allowed for the recapture of fixed costs. In addition, the 
ICC could now eliminate regulation in markets where railroads 
had no “market power” and competed directly with other modes 
of transportation.
 According to the 1976 ICC Reports, one of the lesser-known 
provisions of the Act was to create “a wholesale revision in the 
format and content of the Annual Report R-1” [ICC, 1976, p. 
1598]. The new report, which was to be in effect by January 
1978, was to be more proactive in nature and provide the ICC 
with better revenue and expense data along with “funds flow” in-
formation.13 In addition, the ICC reported that it had conducted 
a new study of depreciation versus betterment accounting. To 
no one’s surprise, it concluded: “The results of the study on the 
Western Maryland Railway showed that the rate base or rate of 
return does not significantly change by application of deprecia-
tion accounting to the track structure” [ICC, 1976, p. 1536]. This 
is similar to the AICPA comments from 1957 that indicated that 
accumulated depreciation applied to railroad structures was 
similar in total to replacement expenses. The ICC did comment 
that there were still problems with the tax consequences of 
betterment accounting as applied to railroads. The ICC [1976, 
p. 1537] now began to see that the end of betterment account-
ing was at hand: “Until the difficulties of changing over from 
betterment accounting are resolved, it cannot ascertain if such 
a changeover would inure to the public benefit. However, the 
Commission should keep apprised of the methodologies used in 
such matters, and conduct depreciation feasibility studies and 
develop depreciation schedules for various accounts.”
 At the end of this portion of the report, it was noted that: 
“[the] Coordinator recommends continued research into the 
updating and upgrading of the Commission’s depreciation data 
base and the process used to analyze depreciation.” Though not 
reported until early 1979, the ICC accepted certain revisions for 
railroad accounts related to provisions in the 4R Act that would 
go into effect in January 1978. One of the first items addressed 
by the new accounting regulation was railroad compliance with 
GAAP, an AA request from nearly 20 years prior. The new regula-
tion quoted from the Act as requiring that accounting systems 
be established that “are in accordance with [GAAP] uniformly 
13Again, the ICC was late in the application of modern accounting methodol-
ogy because it had been nearly 15 years since the Accounting Principles Board 
issued Statement No. 3, The Statement of Source and Application of Funds. 
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applied to all common carriers by railroads subject to this part, 
and all reports shall include any disclosure appropriate under 
generally accepted accounting principles or of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission” [ICC, 1979, p. 125].
 The 4R Act did not have the force of putting the SEC in ac-
tual control of the railroad’s securities regulations, but it had the 
desired effect of taking most reporting requirements out of the 
hands of the ICC after nearly 70 years. Even with this change in 
external reporting, the ICC maintained its stance on RRB and as 
of April 12, 1977, denied a Department of Transportation (DOT) 
petition to change the accounting methods for track structures. 
The DOT, in its petition, took the position that the ICC’s policies 
create an incentive “for railroad management to allow deteriora-
tion of fixed assets” [SEC, 1977, p. 81]. In addition, there was 
no mention of the ban on interperiod tax allocations but for 
methodology on how to deal with some “reversing timing differ-
ences.”
SEC Intervention: In April 1977, the SEC finally entered the fray 
over the RRB issue with a docket ruling against the Burlington 
Northern Railroad. The SEC became concerned about a rash 
of accidents at the railroad and felt that part of the problem lay 
with lax policies regarding track maintenance and replacement. 
It was felt that a lack of disclosure of these policies and their ef-
fect on the company’s income was hurting the investing public. 
The SEC ordered the railroad to make certain disclosures re-
garding these issues, but it did not have the ability to apply this 
order to deal with an industry-wide problem.14 
 The SEC again acted in May 1977 [SEC, 1977] and issued 
preliminary orders regarding the rail industry’s deferred main-
tenance and depreciation disclosures. The impetus seemed to 
come from AA’s original concerns arising from an internal rail 
industry report. This report commented on how replacement 
 cycles in the industry were greater than the average useful lives 
of new rail and ties. This problem concerned the SEC because 
RRB accounting did not fully disclose replacement patterns to 
the shareholders and the markets and, hence, future cash out-
lays. Though the SEC never published final orders on this issue, 
it did take the railroads to task for their accounting policies and 
made it clear to the ICC that it needed to address these prob-
lems. 
14File No. 3-5211, promulgated April 28, 1977 
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The Staggers Act of 1980: Despite the deregulation efforts begun 
by the 4R Act, the railroad industry struggled through high in-
terest rates, high inflation, and the general economic recession 
of the late 1970s. To help mitigate the situation; Congress passed 
the Staggers Act, which reversed nearly a century of “rigid” regu-
lation. It had profound effects on railroads and the ICC:
•	 The ICC no longer had jurisdiction over maximum rail 
rates unless market dominance exists and/or the rate is 
180% or more of variable cost.
•	 As an upgrade to the 4R Act, the ICC no longer had ju-
risdiction over minimum rates as long as they at least 
covered variable cost.
•	 With some stringent limits, the railroads may provide 
contracted rates with specific carriers.15
•	 Again, as an upgrade to 4R Act, the ICC may exempt rail-
roads from markets where they have no market power. 
This represented a change in rules originally designed to 
eliminate market sharing by railroads.
•	 General rate increases may be made quarterly to offset 
the impact of inflation. 
 For the railroads and the ICC, the Staggers Act created a 
new, free-market business environment that the railroads had 
not known for nearly a century. Babcock [1984, p. 6] writes: “the 
Staggers Act permits a great deal of pricing freedom. [To] ensure 
that competitive forces determine rail rates, the Staggers Act se-
verely restricts joint ratemaking. No single-line rail rates may be 
discussed in rate bureaus, and joint rates may be discussed only 
by ‘practicably participating’ carriers.” 
 In response to the regulatory reforms, Odening [1980, p. 66] 
reported in Forbes Magazine that there would be an announce-
ment within the next 12 months that the ICC would begin to al-
low railroads “to capitalize some track costs and then depreciate 
them.” The article went on to explain the now familiar refrain 
from the railroads that the change over to depreciation would 
be costly both in terms of the switch-over costs (estimated in 
excess of $300 million industry-wide) and in terms of higher 
“cash-based” taxes resulting from the new, and presumably 
lower, “non-cash” expenses. Finally, the report indicated that 
Congress was about to act to remedy the situation by legisla-
tion that would “freeze the manner in which industry taxes are 
calculated.” Congress, in essence, was assuming that a lower 
15This was a practice outlawed by the original Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887.
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tax bill for the industry would give the railroads an incentive to 
finance more maintenance and replacement of track. The indus-
try had mixed emotions with respect to this assumption, but the 
article reported that the market was “cautiously bullish about 
the proposed accounting change.” 
 The proposed legislation discussed in Forbes turned out to 
be quite different in nature than expected and came in the form 
of Public Law 96-613, Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, which 
President Carter signed into law on the eve of his departure from 
office. Surprisingly, the bill turned out to be supportive of the 
industry’s position on betterment accounting and had the effect 
of specifically making the methodology legally acceptable for 
federal income tax purposes. From the industry’s myopic point 
of view, the need for this legislation was clear – institutionalize 
RRB in the tax code before it was banned. 
 The swift reaction of the industry to the potential account-
ing change reported by the ICC and supported by the Staggers 
Act changes showed that the railroad industry continued to have 
a considerable amount of political influence. Conversely, the 
ICC’s proposed change may have been a “trial balloon,” designed 
to galvanize industry reaction and protect RRB. In the end, the 
sweeping railroad regulation reforms and some partisan tax leg-
islation seemed to have two major effects. First, it created a new 
environment whereby the need for an ICC now became suspect. 
Second, and more ironically, the law had the effect of nearly 
derailing accounting reforms as the ICC, now mortally wounded 
due to the mandate of the Staggers Act that rate targets be de-
veloped using RRB-based numbers, institutionalized RRB-tax 
deductions. Any new accounting reforms by the ICC seemed to 
be dead on arrival, but not before the IRS had its say. 
The GAO Study: While Congress began debating new tax legisla-
tion for 1981, it directed the GAO to review the accounting and 
reporting practices of the ICC and the railroads. On February 4, 
1981, the comptroller general issued a 51-page report entitled, 
Accounting Changes Needed in the Railroad Industry. The report’s 
executive summary [GAO, 1981, p. iii] stated the following:
In contrast to other industries, which use depreciation 
accounting for capital assets, railroads used a unique 
betterment accounting method for their track struc-
tures. GAO believes the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
should require railroads to adopt depreciation account-
ing. This would enhance the comparability of railroad’s 
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financial reporting, assist the Congress in deliberations 
on regulatory reform and financial assistance to rail-
roads, and provide better information for shippers and 
small investors. Railroads should also include informa-
tion on their maintenance and replacement practices 
including deferred maintenance, in financial reports. 
 The three primary arguments for depreciation account-
ing set forth by the GAO again mirror those first brought into 
question by AA nearly a quarter century before. The first GAO 
argument for depreciation was, of course, improved expense 
recognition. Second, the GAO felt that it provided improved bal-
ance sheet presentation. Finally, the enhanced comparability of 
financial information would help Congress and other users of 
the information make better decisions. The new depreciation 
standards would help coordinate the efforts of regulators and 
the markets and, by extension, the management of the railroads 
as well, especially in the area of capital improvements and safety 
concerns.
 Though convinced that depreciation accounting was su-
perior, the GAO study, using data provided by the industry, 
pointed out the major problem that, with a change in account-
ing methods, there was every indication that net income would 
be substantially higher, as much as 35% [GAO, 1981, p. 21].16 
Higher reported net income should have been good news for any 
company, but for a railroad industry that had followed unsound 
ICC accounting practices for three quarters of a century, there 
would be no expense shield, leading inevitably to increased taxes 
and a cash outlay that struggling roads would find difficult to 
absorb. It was clear from the report that any change in deprecia-
tion recognition would need a corresponding change in the tax 
code. This lead to the GAO’s response to the passage of Public 
Law 96-613 on December 28, 1980: “There is no reason that 
the railroads cannot use betterment accounting for income tax 
purposes and depreciation accounting for financial reporting 
purposes” [GAO, 1981, p. 19, fn.]. 
 In the end, it appears that from 1976 through 1980, the ICC 
changed its tack to preserve betterment accounting by focusing 
on the presumed detrimental cash flows for the railroads. The 
16The GAO [1981, pp. 22-23] study had to admit that the income studies came 
from the railroads and the ICC and were not verified for their reliability. The idea 
that income would be that much higher could only occur if the railroads were ac-
tually making scheduled replacements of track. Evidence pointed to the fact that 
this was not really happening. 
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ICC knew the change was coming and tried to postpone it until 
the actual decision was out of its hands, resulting from either 
a tax code change or some legal remedy. The GAO [1981, p. iv] 
commented that, “the ICC agrees that adopting depreciation ac-
counting would benefit financial statement users. However, the 
ICC has been concerned that the accounting change would in-
crease Federal income taxes and undermine the financial stabil-
ity of even the healthiest railroads. ICC has been waiting for the 
tax issue to be resolved before further considering the adoption 
of depreciation accounting for track structures.” 
 From a regulatory point of view, the final obstacles for the 
switch to depreciation were Staggers Act problems associated 
with the calculations of income and return targets for rate pric-
ing based on betterment accounting data. The Staggers Act, 
however, turned out to be more “flexible” than anticipated, pav-
ing the way for the final changing of the accounting procedures 
[ICC, 1984, p. 158]. The venue for the final changes moved from 
the ICC and the GAO to the U.S. Congress as it debated tax leg-
islation that would spur a faltering economy. Congress had to 
again deal with problems related to railroad health and, in so 
doing, had to address the question of tax deductions that would 
promote capital recovery in the industry.
TAX REFORM AND THE END OF  
BETTERMENT ACCOUNTING
The Early Use of RRB for Tax Purposes: Since the ICC institution-
alized RRB in the early 20th century, the federal government 
had given tacit consent to its use of income tax assessments for 
businesses. For example, the U.S. Treasury Department accepted 
the use of RRB for determining income for tax purposes. Ac-
cording to Coughlan and Strand [1969, p. 24], some of the first 
regulations establishing RRB for track structures, when taxing 
authorities concurred, permitted “a reasonable allowance for 
the exhaustion, wear and tear, including a reasonable allowance 
for obsolescence, of property used in a trade or business or held 
for production of income.”
 Over the following decades, the IRS commissioner contin-
ued to support its use for tax purposes.17 For example, Sec. 41 of 
the 1939 Code provided support for consistency in the general 
rule for methods of accounting by indicating that:
17See The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 64 TC 352 (1975) for a 
formal discussion of the commissioner’s approval.
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The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the 
taxpayer’s annual accounting period … in accordance 
with the method of accounting regularly employed 
in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such 
method of accounting has been so employed, or if the 
method employed does not clearly reflect the income, 
the computation shall be made in accordance with such 
method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does 
clearly reflect the income.
 The Board of Tax Appeals in Central Railroad Company of 
New Jersey v. Commissioner [35 B.T.A. 501 (1937)] also recog-
nized the commissioner’s power: “[the commissioner] is given 
discretionary power to determine the effectiveness of the taxpay-
er’s method of accounting for use in computing taxable net in-
come, and, if the method does not clearly reflect the income, the 
statute directs him to make the computation by such method as 
in his opinion does clearly reflect the income.”
 The Supreme Court also addressed the use of regulatory 
accounting methods for federal income tax in the Old Colony 
Railroad Company v. Commissioner [3 USTC 880, (1932)] deci-
sion. The issue in this case related to the inclusion in taxable 
income of a later year part of bond premium received before 
March 1, 1913. The ICC required the Old Colony Railroad Com-
pany to amortize the bond premium over the respective lives of 
the bonds. The IRS commissioner asserted that the same treat-
ment should apply for tax purposes. The Court did comment on 
the weight of ICC rulings on computing taxable income, saying 
that “the rules of accounting enforced upon a carrier by the In-
terstate Commerce Commission are not binding upon the com-
missioner, nor may he resort to the rules of that body, made for 
other purposes, for the determination of tax liability under the 
revenue acts.”
 Over 40 years after the decision in the Old Colony case, the 
Supreme Court again considered the use of regulatory account-
ing in Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner [74-2 USTC 9521]. The 
Court’s comments describe the attitudes of the commissioner 
and the railroads during the 1913-1954 period regarding the 
acceptance of certain accounting procedures. While the IRS 
commissioner was not required to accept the RRB method of 
accounting, he approved of its use. In the course of time, sev-
eral railroad companies18 attempted to recognize depreciation 
18See Central Railroad Company of New Jersey v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 501 
(1937) and Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company v. Commissioner, 40-2 
USTC 9583 (CA-7) (1940).
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charges using the straight-line method on part of their property. 
In each case, the commissioner required the use of the RRB 
method. The courts decided in favor of the commissioner in 
each case by pointing out that taxpayer railroads had not ob-
tained the permission of the commissioner before changing to 
the straight-line method.
The Commissioner’s Continued Approval of RRB during the 
1960s: At the same time AA and the AICPA were struggling with 
the theoretical underpinnings of RRB, the IRS was enhancing 
its recognition of the method through a series of rulings starting 
with Revenue Ruling 67-22 [1967-1 CB 52]. Though this ruling 
dealt with a narrow issue related to track welds, it did help to 
explain RRB’s general application and, in doing so, gave a posi-
tive assent to its use. Essentially, the ruling indicated that RRB 
represents a rough equivalent to depreciation accounting in 
track.19 
 This argument bolstered both the ICC’s and the AICPA’s 
opinion that RRB had authoritative support. Two additional 
rulings [Rev. Rul. 70-163, 1970-1 CB 43; Rev. Rul. 73-135, 1973-
1 CB 80] further defined the extent of allowable RRB deduc-
tions in lieu of a depreciation charge. Even when a railroad 
replaced a substantial portion of its railroad track during 1966 
and 1967, Revenue Ruling 73-135 held that deductions under 
the retirement method resulted in a reasonable allowance for 
depreciation where “the taxpayer has consistently employed the 
retirement method of accounting and has maintained continu-
ously a regular and consistent practice of handling retirements 
and replacements.” 
 Though not explicitly mentioned, it is clear that the IRS 
was watching the railroads for “income management” through 
increasing replacements in years of higher earnings and limited 
replacements in low-income years, a problem that would not 
occur under a more traditional definition of depreciation. Ac-
cording to AA [1962a, p. 132], a 1931 ICC report highlighted this 
particular earnings management problem with RRB accounting. 
19According to the ruling, “depreciation” comes from: [1] the cost of replace-
ments in kind and quality less the salvage value of the materials recovered; [2] the 
cost of the uncapitalized portion of replacements where betterments are involved, 
less the salvage value of the materials recovered; [3] the capitalized cost of retire-
ments without replacements the salvage value of the materials recovered; and [4] 
the labor costs incurred in retirements and replacements.
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The Application of Railroad Depreciation and the 1954 Code: In 
1954, a new tax code replaced the earlier 1939 edition. Regard-
less of the ICC’s capitalization rules for railroads, the general 
rules for depreciation in Sec. 167(a) of the 1954 Code remained 
similar to those of 1939 with no specific mention of RRB. The 
new code, however, did have one major change; it allowed the 
use of accelerated methods to calculate depreciation deductions. 
In addition, the general rules for methods of accounting in Sec. 
446(a) of the 1954 Code were also similar to 1939, providing 
that “taxable income shall be computed under the method of ac-
counting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes 
his income in keeping his books.” Such language bolstered ICC 
claims that RRB was an accepted standard, but it left many rail-
roads unable to recapture investment costs.
 With the new code, some railroads made renewed efforts to 
use depreciation methods other than the RRB method for tax 
purposes. Several railroad companies first attempted to deduct 
depreciation on lines that were about to be abandoned. The 
commissioner rejected these attempts and required that the tax-
payers continue to deduct depreciation as retirement or aban-
donment actually occurred. The courts sided with the commis-
sioner regarding rails and like assets. However, some railroad 
companies found success in deducting depreciation for costs 
in the specific areas of grading and tunnel bores which, before 
1969, were only deductible in the year of actual retirement. After 
1968, Sec. 167(a), IRC provided for “a depreciation deduction a 
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (includ-
ing a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)…These assets are 
not subject to exhaustion due to wear and tear but could eventu-
ally become obsolete.” 
 The difficulty for the railroads was in ascertaining a reason-
able and determinable useful life for the asset, a problem they 
would also face if RRB were ever phased out. In some cases, 
the taxpayers attempted to deduct depreciation of grading and 
tunnel bores that were placed into service in prior years based 
on a service life that was calculated using projected obsoles-
cence. These cases seemed to relate to tax years beginning in the 
mid-to-late 1950s, ending in the early 1960s. The railroads went 
on to use statistical methods to predict future obsolescence.
 For example, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway (C&O) [64 
TC 352 (1975)] claimed that it should be allowed to take depre-
ciation deductions for the years 1954 through 1963 for its tunnel 
bores because the determinable useful lives of the assets were 
not more than 50 years because of foreseeable obsolescence. 
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The Court held that the C&O could deduct depreciation of its 
grading and tunnel bores over a fifty-year period and indicated 
that its decision was consistent with the 1969 Tax Reform Act, 
Sec. 185 that allowed railroad companies to amortize the cost of 
grading and tunnel bores first placed into service after 1968.
 Using the C&O case as a guide, several railroads were suc-
cessful in obtaining depreciation deductions for grading and/or 
tunnel bores by providing convincing evidence of useful lives.20 
By way of contrast, the Spartanburg Terminal Co. [66 TC 916, 
1976, 1982] relied on the C&O decision but failed to establish a 
reasonable useful life for its assets and was denied a deduction 
for a depreciation charge. In Burlington Northern Inc. v. U.S. 
[82-1 USTC 9250], the Court of Claims also considered the issue 
of depreciation deductions in the mid-1950s for railroad grading 
and tunnel bores. The evidence provided by expert witnesses 
did not convince the Court as to the validity of the estimates 
of useful lives, and it denied the deductions. Subsequently, the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 added an election to amortize pre-1969 
railroad grading and tunnel bores over a fifty-year period for 
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1974. One conse-
quence of the election under Sec. 185 was that it barred deduc-
tions at the time of retirement or abandonment of a railroad 
grading or tunnel bore. The amortization of the costs, however, 
would continue.21
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981: During this time of 
heavy litigation over such arcane matters as tunnels bores, most 
railroads continued to use RRB for track structures when com-
puting taxable income. Changes in the methodology, though, 
would be coming with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
that classified track structures under the Accelerated Cost Re-
covery System as five-year property. 
 Williams [1981a, p. 35], a reporter for the WSJ, wrote that 
the 1981 changes in depreciation of track structures provided 
20Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 75 TC 497 (1980), Kansas City Southern 
Railway Co., 76 TC 1067 (1981), Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 54 TCM 1334 
(1987), and Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 54 TCM 1352 (1987)
21The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed Section 185 for property additions af-
ter December 31, 1986. The House Report [1986, p. 174] explained that Congress 
enacted the special amortization provision for railroad grading and tunnel bore 
expenditures in 1969 to encourage investment in light of uncertainties about the 
useful life of such property. The scope of the provision was extended in 1976 to 
cover expenditures for pre-1969 property. The committee believed that continua-
tion of the benefit was inconsistent with tax reform.
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railroads with the ability to reap substantial tax savings. An 
estimated $1.5 billion in tax benefits was projected for 1981 if 
all railroads elected the most accelerated depreciation method. 
The article went on to say that there was some concern that the 
railroads, which paid only $600 million in taxes for 1980, would 
not be able to use all of the deductions. Presumably, they would 
have been able to obtain tax refunds from prior years by carry-
ing back net operating losses. In a related story, the WSJ [1981, 
p. 35] noted that the continuing shortsightedness hurt the rail 
industry by not taking full advantage of the provisions in the 
same tax act. The article specifically noted that the rail industry 
had “neglected” to order enough new rolling stock (boxcars) to 
take advantage of the newly “reinstituted” investment tax credit. 
The article then noted that, “railroad officials felt sensitive about 
the topic but a well-placed industry source confirms that rail-
roads, for economic reasons, missed a chance for one type of 
windfall under the tax law change.” The myopia of the industry 
and that of the regulators continued.
The ICC Ends RRB Accounting: After the GAO issued its report 
and before Congress passed the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981, the ICC announced in March 1981 that it had instructed 
the railroads to perform certain depreciation studies. These 
industry studies and others finally put the ICC on a fast track to-
wards changing its basis for track structure accounting. Fahren-
wald [1981, pp. 11, 15] reported in Railway Age that the ICC now 
“feels that the time may have arrived to do away with RRB.” 
The article pointed out many of the same arguments against the 
change as the GAO report, especially in the area of higher taxes, 
but a Mr. Holmes, an ICC accounting systems researcher, indi-
cated in an interview that RRB accounting:
… is all well and good while the track is being main-
tained. But, if track replacements are being deferred 
you’ll be charging too little to operating expenses. If 
suddenly you accelerated your replacements, you’ll be 
charging too much to operating expense. When you 
replace the track, it gives recognition [in an account-
ing sense] to the track’s deterioration. But replacement 
doesn’t always occur in uniform manner – though dete-
rioration usually does.
 After 25 years, the ICC began to understand AA’s original 
arguments for depreciating track structures to match revenues 
and expenses better. The article ended with Holmes comment-
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ing: “On [the] one hand there’s a bunch of railroads that like 
it, but they’re getting money from the government [and prefer 
higher earnings]. Other railroads are more concerned from a tax 
point. It’s up to us to come to a decision separate from all that.” 
This last point was the central thrust of the GAO’s argument that 
depreciation needed to be required regardless of the short-term 
tax effects on the railroads.
 After years of debate, on January 26, 1983, the Commission 
voted to change the method of accounting for railroad track 
structure from RRB to depreciation accounting. The ICC [1984, 
p. 158] explained, “after reviewing comments, we have decided 
that track structure should no longer be treated differently from 
other assets for accounting purposes.” It went on to say: “We 
have concluded that, because depreciation accounting [unlike 
RRB] related cost consumption to the utilization of assets over 
time, it should be used for all assets except land.” The concept of 
cost matching had finally taken hold. In a symbolic, last effort to 
defend RRB, however, the ICC report [1984, p. 158] averred: “We 
recognize that historical depreciation accounting fails to reflect 
the impact of inflation. But, depreciation accounting can be 
based on inflation-adjusted costs and can thereby reflect the im-
pact of inflation.” The ICC after 75 years had changed its policy 
but apparently not its long-held opinions.
 Even though the Commission had voted for the change, it 
would not make the official announcement for another month. 
In the meantime, the WSJ ran several articles on the topic. In 
the first article, published on February 4, 1983 [WSJ, 1983b, p. 
3], the WSJ mentioned that the ICC “has been trying for about 
four years to decide whether to let railroads use depreciation 
accounting for all their capital expenditures. Impetus for ap-
proving depreciation accounting came from a 1981 tax law that 
permitted roads to use the methods in earnings reports to the 
Internal Revenue Service.” The article also speculated that earn-
ings of railroads reported to stockholders could increase by as 
much as 20%. 
 In a follow-up article, Paul [1983, p. 4] reported the poten-
tial “paper profits” that the railroads would generate with the 
accounting change. This article included several interviews with 
railroad executives. Their opinion of the change varied from 
mild support to utter contempt. A CSX executive was quoted as 
saying that a railroad’s “annual costs would decrease and profit 
would increase – but only on paper. This doesn’t add one penny 
of cash to the railroad.” The rail industry executives then slipped 
into their old arguments against the change and indicated de-
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preciation accounting could “hinder efforts to secure federal ap-
proval of proposed rate increases and could force some lines to 
pay higher state income and property taxes.” One Southern Rail-
way executive said that, “we’re going to be fair game for unions 
and stockholders.” However, several other executives quoted in 
the article took a contrary view of the situation and said that 
depreciation accounting is probably better than existing meth-
ods because railroads would not have to continue the practice 
of deferring track replacement. In the end, it was hoped that in-
vestors would see the benefit of the change, “once railroads are 
reporting profit on the same basis as other corporations.” 
 Finally, the WSJ [1983a, p. 3] announced that the ICC had 
indeed required the change. According to the article, the change 
“will boost [the] roads’ reported profits.” This article then at-
tempted to explain the theoretical difference between RRB and 
depreciation accounting. It reported that the railroads would 
begin using the same depreciation accounting for track struc-
tures as they had been using for equipment costs. To this point, 
track improvement costs were “written off in the year they were 
incurred.” The article then explained, “the current method re-
sults in showing higher costs within the year an investment (ac-
tually replacement) is made and thus lower profits reported to 
the ICC. But the adoption of depreciation accounting will have 
the reverse effect, reducing costs and inflating reported profits 
when track improvements occur.” In its final analysis, the article 
revealed the central problem that caused the railroads to delay 
any change as follows: 
Under a 1981 law, railroads for tax purposes have had 
to use depreciation accounting for track work. Although 
the Securities and Exchange Commission suggested us-
ing the same approach for reports to stockholders, and 
to the public, only a few roads have done so. Some 
roads fear that doing so would boost pressure for them 
to raise wages and dividends and make it harder to get 
the ICC to approve freight rate increases. It is estimated 
the change will boost profits shown by railroads as 
much as 20%.22 
22Evidence of the tax problems (in reverse) appeared as the Burlington North-
ern “reported net income, restated for changes in its method of oil and gas ac-
counting, of $146.6 million, or $1.76 a share. The year-ago net, if adjusted for 
changes in railroad depreciation which don’t require a formal restatement, would 
have resulted in a pro forma profit of $138 million, or $1.63 a share” [Wells, 1986, 
p. 1].
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 It appears from the article that even though the railroads 
were already reporting depreciation to the IRS, they were still 
leery of capricious ICC regulators and the market dynamics 
of the change. Those problems were now ending with the de 
facto deregulation of the industry. Regardless of the railroad’s 
(and the ICC’s) final opinion on RRB, the theoretical basis of 
the matching principle had won out after all. After 75 years of 
official sanction, and probably 150 years of industry usage, bet-
terment accounting had met an ignominious end from the same 
bureaucratic organization that had defended it so long. With the 
ICC also relenting on the issue of deferred taxes in March 1983, 
railroad accounting finally came into harmonization with other 
U.S. industry practices.
THE LAST WORD
 After nearly 30 years, Leonard Spacek’s concerns pertaining 
to the “divergency” in railroad accounting principles could be 
put to rest. In the course of his arguments, however, he and his 
firm unknowingly put forth a set of principles that explained the 
need for the convergence of accounting standards based on clear 
accounting principles that would be theoretically sound, compa-
rable between companies, transparent in their understanding, 
and useful for both managers and investors to use for decision 
making. 
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Abstract: This paper contributes to an understanding of the historical 
development of management accounting by presenting an example 
of cost accounting practice in Portugal in the first half of the 18th 
century. It explores the integration of cost and financial accounting 
systems within a double- entry accounting framework by the Silk Fac-
tory Company (SFC) between 1745 and 1747. The SFC’s methods of 
product costing, pricing, inventory accounting, expense recognition, 
and production control are reviewed within the political, economic, 
and social context of Portugal at the time. The SFC is revealed to have 
used job-order product costing, with allocations of overhead costs, 
allowances for wastage and shrinkage, and elements of rudimentary 
standard costing. Our findings provide evidence of the existence of 
cost accounting and management control techniques at a private 
rather than a state-owned enterprise prior to the industrial revolution. 
INTRODUCTION
 This paper analyzes the management accounting system of 
one of the most important Portuguese manufacturing entities 
in the first half of the 18th century, the Silk Factory Company 
(Companhia da Fábrica das Sedas) (SFC), during its second ad-
ministration, 1745-1747 [National Archives of Portugal (Arqui-
vos Nacionais da Torre do Tombo) (ANTT hereafter), Conselho da 
Fazenda, Decretos, maço, 1699-1755; Neves, 1827, p. 41; Macedo, 
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1982, p. 97].1 The SFC had three administrations: the first from 
October 1734 to January 1745; the second, from February 1745 
to October 1747; and the third, from November 1747 to May 
1750. Upon its bankruptcy in May 1750, it became state-owned 
and known as the Royal Silk Factory (Real Fábrica das Sedas). 
 Although several books have survived from the first 
 administration of the company, only the accounting records 
from its second administration are analyzed here because it is 
only then that the company used a double-entry bookkeeping 
(DEB) system. The relevant records – journal (jornal), ledger 
(livro mestre),2 and inventory book (inventário) – were accessed 
at the ANTT. These records contain rich examples of cost ac-
counting techniques, such as job-order costing with overhead 
cost allocation. 
 We have three general aims: first, to explain the cost ac-
counting system of the SFC; second, to explore the accounting 
system of the SFC in the context of the ambient social, political, 
and economic context of Portugal; and, third, to contribute to 
an understanding of how and where management accounting 
techniques developed prior to the industrial revolution.3 
 Our exploration of the accounting system of the SFC 
reveals many useful insights to the development of manage-
ment accounting practice. Such insights arise because the 
 political, social, and economic context of Portugal during three 
years of the pre-industrial period, 1745-1747, is distinctive and 
under-explored in accounting history literature. The date of 
the accounting records analyzed is significant also because it 
precedes the first accounting book published in Portuguese, 
Exact Merchant and his Books of Accounts (Mercador Exacto nos 
1José Acúrsio das Neves, manager of the Royal Silk Factory from 1810-1821, 
wrote the administrative and economic history of the SFC. He described its foun-
dation as an historic occasion because it was the most important of all factories 
in Portugal and because its charter contained the same principles adopted sub-
sequently in the monopolist companies created by King D. José I (Joseph I). The 
only exception was the seventh paragraph of the charter which provided for the 
taxing of exports rather than imports. 
2The ledger is accompanied by a small book containing an index of accounts 
(Abecedário do Livro Mestre) in alphabetical order.
3In explaining the SFC’s cost accounting system, we do not focus, as did 
Macías [2002, p. 31], on exploring the role of a firm’s capital structure on “the 
parameters and uses of cost accounting information.”
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seus Livros de Contas)] by João Baptista Bonavie in 17584 and 
precedes the foundation of the Portuguese School of Commerce 
(Aula do Comércio) in Lisbon in 1759.5
 We draw from a rich vein of under-explored archival mate-
rial to provide fresh comparative counterpoints to the bulk of ex-
isting analyses of manufacturing accounting history which have 
been written from a predominantly Anglo-Saxon vantage point. 
We elicit information to sustain or refute existing conjectures 
about manufacturing accounting developments on the Iberian 
Peninsula. The results will be useful in evaluating the findings 
of many previous studies. Primary sources relied upon include 
several of the 1,115 accounting books written between 1734 and 
1835 which are available in the ANTT. They are catalogued there 
under the name of the SFC’s successor company, the Royal Silk 
Factory. Appendix 1 classifies this inventory and the 34 books 
accessible for the SFC’s operations in the period 1734 to 1750.
 Although manufacturing and industrial accounting has 
been studied in depth after the Industrial Revolution, there are 
fewer case studies of such accounting before the second half 
of the 19th century. This is consistent with the observations of 
 Carmona [2004, 2005] that “accounting history research pub-
lished in international journals focuses overwhelmingly on the 
narrow time segment of 1850-1940.” According to Boyns et al. 
[1998, p. 398] and Boyns and Edwards [1997, p. 2], few cost 
accounting texts focus on industrial accounting practice before 
1750, apart from Moschetti [1610],6 Monteage [1683], Collins 
[1697], North [1714], and Dodson [1750]. Few scholarly papers 
in the English language analyze cases of manufacturing account-
ing before the second half of the 19th century. The principal 
4There is some dispute about the identity of the first Portuguese accounting 
book. Yamey [1969] and Bywater and Yamey [1982, p. 9] claim that the first such 
books were published in Portuguese by Bonavie (1758) and by an anonymous 
author (Tratado Sobre as Partidas Dobradas por Meyo da Qual Podem Aprender a 
Arrumar as Contas nos Livros (Treatise on Accounting Using Double-Entry Book-
keeping), 1764; and that both these books “correspond closely” with (plagiarize?) 
Barrême’s book, Traité des Parties Doubles (Treatise on Double-Entry Bookkeep-
ing), 1721. 
5This school is alleged, in the Portuguese literature at least, to be the first gov-
ernment-sponsored school of commerce in the world. Four subjects were taught: 
arithmetic, algebra, and geometry; exchange, weights, and measures; insurance; 
and the DEB method [Rodrigues et al., 2003, 2004]. 
6According to Sá [1998, pp. 59-60], this is the first book dedicated to indus-
trial accounting.
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exceptions are papers with an Anglo-Saxon bias [e.g., Edwards, 
1989; Fleischman and Parker, 1990, 1991; Edwards and Newell, 
1991; Fleischman et al., 1995, 1996; Boyns and Edwards, 1997; 
Fleischman and Tyson, 1998] and papers focusing exclusively on 
examples from Spain [e.g., Carmona et al., 1997; Carmona and 
Macías, 2001; Carmona and Gómez, 2002; Carmona and Dono-
so, 2004; Gutiérrez et al., 2005; Martínez Guillén, 2005; Romero 
Fúnez, 2005] and those from Italy [e.g., Zan, 2004; Zambon and 
Zan, 2005]. Several papers in languages other than English [e.g., 
in French, by Nitikin, 1994] deal with cost accounting develop-
ments in other countries. There are some comparative studies 
[e.g., Boyns et al., 1998] of the similarities and differences in 
industrial accounting prior to 1880 between Britain and France. 
Carmona [2006] provides an instructive review of the history 
of management accounting in four European Latin countries: 
Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal.
 We concur with Boyns and Edwards [2000], Hoskin and 
Macve [2000], Fleischman and Tyson [1998], and Fleischman 
et al. [1995], among others, that it is desirable to conduct 
 further research into cost and management accounting history 
by examining business records in a wide variety of countries. 
We contend that Portugal should be one of the countries for 
which such further research is needed and likely to be insight-
ful. In Carmona’s [2006] review of management accounting 
history in four countries of Continental Europe, the focus is 
preponderantly on the histories of Spain and France, and to a 
lesser degree Italy, with only a brief mention of the development 
of management accounting in Portugal. Accordingly, this paper 
adds to extant literature by presenting, in English, an example 
of cost accounting practices, 1745-1747, in a privately owned, 
Portuguese, silk textiles manufacturing company. Analysis of the 
SFC’s accounting system has the potential to enhance under-
standing because of the SFC’s distinctive geo-political context, 
the time period, the SFC’s private ownership, and the strong 
competition the company faced from imports and small firms. 
 We begin by discussing relevant previous literature on early 
cost and management accounting practices. Then we present a 
brief historical background of Portugal in the 18th century and 
a brief historical overview of the SFC. Thereafter, we outline the 
operation of the SFC’s management accounting system, high-
lighting its distinctive features and formative influences. The 
final section discusses our findings and conclusions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW
 A growing body of research has concluded that sophisti-
cated cost accounting techniques were used before the second 
half of the 19th century [see, for example, Gutiérrez et al., 2005]. 
This is contrary to some earlier management accounting his-
toriography [see Fleischman and Parker, 1991, citing Solomons, 
1952; Garner, 1954; Pollard, 1965; Kaplan, 1984]. Pollard [1965], 
for example, contended that high profit margins and the absence 
of competition provided little incentive for firms to adopt cost 
accounting during the British Industrial Revolution. However, 
Fleischman and Parker [1990, p. 220] have argued that some 
 notable innovative cost accounting methods were used in the 
U.K. between 1760 and 1850. They cite the accounting practices 
of the Carron Company, a Scottish ironworks, in which the cost 
accounting processes “appear to have been motivated by the 
firm’s early problems with securing adequate partnership capi-
tal, attaining profitability, and maintaining liquidity.” 
 Carmona et al. [1997, p. 412] analyzed the cost accounting 
system used by a large, state-owned tobacco factory in Spain, the 
Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville (RTF). They argued that intense 
competition most likely stimulated cost calculations which could 
be used in a quest to improve firm efficiency and strengthen 
competitive position. Nonetheless, they contended that in the 
case of the RTF, linking the emergence of cost accounting purely 
to the logic of profits “yields only a partial explanation of the 
cost accounting phenomenon” and that the development of cost 
accounting practices at the RTF was part of a strong disciplinary 
regime7 which aimed to minimize opportunities for tobacco theft 
and facilitate the surveillance of factory labor. Cost account-
ing techniques assumed this disciplining role, prompted by the 
importance of tobacco revenue to the State Treasury. Because 
of problems in ensuring effective visual supervision, the cost 
accounting system calculated expected costs of direct labor and 
material consumption for each phase of the production process.
 In a similar vein, Carmona and Donoso [2004] studied the 
role of cost accounting systems in enforcing public policy in 
early regulated (monopoly) markets at the Royal Soap Factory 
of Seville (RSF) (1525-1692). They found that a complex system 
of cost calculation had been the basis for price negotiations for 
7Romero Fúnez [2005] develops this point by analyzing the regulations of the 
RTF. He concludes that the RTF’s accounting system contributed to a “spirit of 
discipline,” aimed at ensuring the behavior of individuals complied with require-
ments under the regulations. 
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many years and that centuries before the advent of scientific 
management in the late 19th century, the RSF’s raw materials 
standards anticipated the introduction of standards based on 
expectations from prior results. Martínez Guillén [2005, p. 101] 
analyzed a memorandum authored by Antonio Bordázar de 
 Artazu in 1732 (13 years before our analysis period), in which 
a costing model is presented for use in the Spanish printing 
industry. Bordázar’s model is significant for two major reasons: 
first, it advocates cost-based retail price calculations in order to 
help challenge a monopoly within a strictly regulated market; 
and second, it includes “concepts such as the imputation of in-
direct costs, application of interest and the separation of direct 
and indirect wages. In addition, the retail price was determined 
as a multiple of the total cost of the books.” 
 Gutiérrez et al. [2005] applied the model used by Fleisch-
man and Parker [1991] and concluded that sophisticated cost 
accounting practices existed in Spain before 1800. The surveys 
of company practices by Fleischman and Parker [1991] and 
Gutiérrez et al. [2005], although differing considerably in terms 
of their political, institutional, and social contexts, both suggest 
the emergence of modern cost accounting after 1760. The survey 
of Spanish practices by Gutiérrez et al. [2005] was conducted 
predominantly in monopoly companies and in an environment 
of government (or crown) intervention. In contrast, the focus 
of Fleischman and Parker [1991] was on UK companies which 
were predominantly subject to private ownership and non-
interventionist governments. Gutiérrez et al. [2005] contend 
that sophisticated costing emerged in Spain as the cumulative 
result of two sets of factors. First, there were economic factors. 
Because the textile industry was open to foreign and national 
competition, most managers required information for decision 
making because of the business complexities they faced. Second, 
there were political factors. Most factories analyzed were related 
closely to the crown. Gutiérrez et al. [2005] claim that the royal 
textile factories faced financial difficulties because of the high 
levels of capital investment they required, the need to integrate 
activities, high transport costs, and the lack of skilled workers. 
Such difficulties, especially the financial one, are argued plau-
sibly to have prompted Spanish textile companies to monitor 
and control costs more closely and to use innovative accounting 
techniques [Carmona and Gómez, 2002, p. 237]. Of particular 
concern was the impact of fixed costs since the interest on debt 
was substantial and the salaries of accountants and managers 
were very high.
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 Fleischman et al. [1995] argue that firms focused initially on 
controlling raw materials, and then turned to the develop-
ment of proper techniques to evaluate and assess production 
 processes and operational performance. Using the accounts of 
the Royal Textile Mill of Guadalajara (RTM), 1717-1744, as a 
case study, Carmona and Gómez [2002] contend that the RTM’s 
cost accounting techniques concentrated on control of raw 
materials and waste, control of labour and management, and 
allocation of overhead to determine product cost. However, be-
cause of the lack of expertise in textile manufacturing in Spain 
in the early 18th century, the state-owned RTM company hired 
experienced Dutch workers who received high fixed salaries. In 
this context, Carmona and Gómez [2002, p. 248] found that the 
“RTM deployed standards of control for labour either before, or 
contemporaneously with, the implementation of standard costs 
for raw materials.” Their findings are inconsistent with those 
of Fleischman et al. [1995] who argue that because control of 
labor requires a higher degree of sophistication than control 
of raw materials, accounting controls for labor usually were 
developed after accounting controls for raw materials. How-
ever, as Carmona [2005] has noted, the evidence is mixed about 
whether standards for control of raw materials preceded those 
for labor. Some results [e.g., Zan, 2004; Zambon and Zan, 2005] 
are consistent with those of Fleischman et al. [1995], whereas 
other results show the simultaneous use of control standards for 
materials and labor [Carmona et al., 1997, 2002].
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Political, Economic, and Social Context of Portugal: In the 
western world of the first half of the millennium, Italian city-
states, such as Venice, dominated international commerce with 
the East. Their accounting was highly developed and their busi-
nessmen were well educated. However, in 1498, this dominance 
was put at risk by the discovery by Portugal’s Vasco da Gama 
of the sea route to India, via the Cape of Good Hope. Portugal 
exploited this discovery. It gained trading advantages with Asia 
and maintained them for fifty years [see Peres, 1959; Godinho, 
1962, 1981; Boxer, 1969; Livermore, 1976; Serrão, 1980]. Mer-
chants from Italian city-states came to Lisbon seeking to profit 
from the Portuguese advantage, bringing with them knowledge 
of DEB techniques. 
 Portugal’s influence as a colonizing nation flourished in 
the first decades of the 16th century but was soon eclipsed by 
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the rise of other major colonial powers. Portuguese affluence 
began to decline during the reign of King D. João III (John III) 
between 1521 and 1557. A major reason for this was the onset 
of the Portuguese Inquisition in 1531. This prompted a signifi-
cant number of Portuguese Jews, who had played an important 
role in Portuguese discoveries, to leave the country [Kayserling, 
1971; Livermore, 1976, p. 147; Tavares, 1995; Nogueira, 2001; 
Rodrigues et al., 2003; Rodrigues and Craig, 2004, p. 341]. The 
loss of influential merchants was accompanied also by the flight 
of much capital from Portugal and the depletion of the country’s 
entrepreneurial skills [Marques, 1984; Rodrigues et al., 2003]. 
The Portuguese Inquisition was on-going and adversely affected 
many influential businessmen, progressively weakened the bour-
geoisie, and helped lead Portugal to “abysm and ruin” [Kayser-
ling, 1971, p. 284]. 
 During the reign of King D. Pedro II (Peter II) (1668-1706), 
when Portugal was under the governship of the Count of 
Ericeira, the country experienced economic difficulties. It at-
tempted to develop industry by encouraging manufacturing ac-
tivity. Throughout the country, factory systems were established 
to operate in concert with artisan workshops and a domestic 
cottage industry. Artisans required very little capital and low-
priced equipment. However, with the transition to manufactur-
ing, large sums of capital and a large workforce were needed. In 
1677, King D. Pedro II authorized Rolando Duclos to establish a 
silk factory. A complex industrial entity with fifty silk looms and 
about one thousand workers was constructed [Macedo, 1982, p. 
37]. A supporting infrastructure of medieval guilds developed 
around the factory. To help ensure a stable workforce, protec-
tion was given to the factory by the king. Factory workers could 
not terminate their employment unless other workers were 
available to replace them [Macedo, 1982, p. 251]. In the same 
way, the Bragança8 silk factory, which was in a state of decline 
at the time, was supported by the king who summoned experts 
and technicians from Toledo to teach silk producers appropriate 
techniques and methods [Sousa, 2005, p. 2].
 During the first half of the 18th century, Portugal benefited 
from the flow of diamonds and gold from Brazil. The Portuguese 
court became one of the richest in Europe [Serrão, 1996]. Never-
theless, the economy was under-industrialized in comparison 
with other European nations [Marques, 1984; Maxwell, 1995]. 
8Bragança is located in Trás-Os-Montes, in Portugal’s northeastern interior, 
bordering Spain.
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After the death of the Count of Ericeira in 1690, interest in 
manufacturing declined, so much so that in the first quarter of 
the 18th century, silk manufacturing activity was conducted only 
in artisan workshops and in a “cottage system” [Macedo, 1982, 
p. 70].
 The ideals of the Enlightenment, imported from France 
during the reign of King D. João V (John V) (1706-1750), spread 
slowly in Portugal. The king wanted to modernize Portugal and 
expand its power, but he had only limited success. The economy 
was under-industrialized and in decay. Attempts to industrialize 
were not pursued as vigorously as they had been, in part be-
cause it was easier to derive wealth from shipments of gold from 
Portugal’s colony in Brazil [Almeida, 1989-90, p. 1]. Portugal’s 
generous commercial treaties with England also were a disin-
centive to industrialization [Macedo, 1982].9 
 Applying the French model, D. João V sought to expand 
his power base and to modernize the country, thereby reinforc-
ing an absolute monarchical regime in Portugal [Livermore, 
1976; Marques, 1984]. Despite such political reforms, the strong 
conservatism, cultural backwardness, and religious intolerance 
of Portugal provided a weak base for the adoption of Enlight-
enment ideals [Fonseca, 2000]. The Inquisition, through its 
censorship of many books, helped suppress intellectual creativ-
ity and promoted hostility to innovation [Marques, 1984]. The 
Catholic Church was wealthy and dominated teaching, but it 
did not teach accounting. Rates of illiteracy were very high and 
the nobility did not value education or business [Azevedo, 1929; 
Rodrigues et al., 2003].
 In the 1730s, interest in silk manufacturing activity was re-
kindled [Macedo, 1982, p. 72], but many problems had to be ad-
dressed. Administrators, for example, lacked management skills 
and knowledge of how to market manufactured products effec-
tively [Macedo, 1982, p. 72]. Portugal began to imitate French 
mercantilism [Dias, 1984, pp. 142-150, 212-213). Influenced by 
Colbert’s example in France, Cardeal da Mota, the prime min-
ister of D. João V, supported the development of big to acquire 
the  corporations operated by privileged bourgeoisie [Falcon, 
2005]. He encouraged industry to acquire the skills of foreign 
artisans and craftsmen. A popular model for establishing a 
9From 1661, Portugal had a political alliance with England. This was strength-
ened in 1703 with the Metween Treaty establishing special conditions, including a 
reduction in taxes, for the export of Portuguese wine to England. It also removed 
restrictions on the import of English textiles into Portugal.
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manufacturing operation involved inviting a foreigner to initiate 
the project, and later to invite the participation of Portuguese 
partners. According to Macedo [1982, p. 72], the social and eco-
nomic structure which supported Portugal’s keenness to engage 
in manufacturing between 1720 and 1740 was characterized by 
“improvisation,” insufficient capital, and lack of technical and 
administrative skills. The SFC was regarded as one of the most 
important activities of the new manufacturing era. It was the 
largest manufacturing company operating during the reign of D. 
João V [Almeida, 1989-90, p .2]. Although there were only a few 
factories in Portugal at the time, there were many artisan work-
shops and many vestiges of a cottage industry system.
 The accounting at the SFC, which we explore, was con-
ducted in the transition from the cottage industry10 to the in-
dustrial revolution era. This transition period, which witnessed 
the initial uses of a factory system, is often described as the 
manufacturing era. To better understand the accounting at the 
SFC, in a footnote we provide a brief outline of the 18th century 
Portuguese systems of weight (arrátel), length (côvado), and cur-
rency (real).11 
Brief History of the SFC: The SFC was created in 1734 as a pri-
vate company by the Frenchman Robert Godin, with financial 
support from wealthy backers and authorization from King D. 
João V. Godin received a charter on February 25, 173412 from 
the king, granting him many privileges, including monopoly 
rights to produce silk for 20 years (no further silk factories could 
be created without Godin’s permission, para. 2 of the charter), 
tax exemptions for ten years from a wide variety of taxes (para. 
6), no import tax on raw materials (paras. 7 and 8), exemptions 
of employees from military service (para. 6), and execution of 
10This describes a system in which materials were put in an artisan’s work-
shop or in a person’s home to be transformed into products. 
11One arrátel was 459 grams or 16 onças (ounces). 32 arráteis (plural of arrátel) 
constituted one arroba. In this paper, we represent arrátel with the notation “a.” A 
côvado was 0.66 meters and was written Cdo . Percent was written as pCt 
 The monetary unit was a real (plural réis, and abbreviated to rs.). To indi-
cate one thousand réis, a $ was written, followed by three zeros. Thus, 2,000 réis 
was written as 2$000. A million réis was written using a colon (:). Thus, 5,000,000 
réis was 5:000$000. Tables presented by Mata and Valério [1993, p. 279] help us to 
understand the relationship between réis in 1745 and their conversion into euros 
in 2000; approximately 25 réis in 1745 are equivalent to €1 in 2000. One thousand 
réis are equivalent to approximately €39, and one million réis to €39,000.
12Neves [1827] states that the original charter was destroyed in the 1755 Lis-
bon earthquake. A copy of the charter has survived.
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the company’s debts as royal debts (para. 20). However, the king 
insisted also that compulsory preference be given to Portuguese 
raw materials and labor (especially in the case of apprentices, 
para. 14); and that the factory be audited annually by the state 
(paras. 10, 11, and 12) [ANTT, Ministério do Reino, book 167, 
sheet 211; ANTT, Cartórios Notariais de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, 
book 526, sheets 4-6 and 8V-9; Neves, 1827, pp. 25-40; Macedo, 
1982, pp. 251-256].
 Godin and his partners13 raised capital and formed a joint 
stock company. The company produced silk products trimmed 
with gold and silver, velvet, damasks, grogram, brocades, satins, 
taffetas, and gold and silver laces [Santos, 2002]. The SFC en-
ticed expert designers and craftsmen to Portugal from France 
and commenced operations in a modest factory in Fonte San-
tana, where Godin lived. In 1738, the SFC established itself in a 
new and large factory in Rato, Lisbon, even though construction 
of the factory was not finished until 1741. In 1749, there were 
100 assembled looms in the factory [ANTT, Conselho de Guerra, 
Decretos, maço 258; Neves, 1827; Santos, 2002].
 The administrators of the company were elected by the part-
ners. They supervised three main offices: general administration, 
sales administration, and accounting [ANTT, Cartórios Notariais 
de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, book 526, sheets 4V-6V]. The directors 
of the first Administration were Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal, 
Francisco Ferraz de Oliveira, and Domingos da Silva Vieira. Af-
ter the death of Ferraz de Oliveira and Silva Vieira, Tojal was left 
as the sole administrator, but he acted with the advice of Manuel 
de Sande de Vasconcelos [ANTT, Conselho da Guerra, Decretos, 
maço 258]. The administrators were responsible for purchases, 
sales, payments, maintenance of the accounting books, and gen-
eral decision making. Godin provided technical advice on the 
manufacturing operations [Almeida, 1989-90].
 At the end of October 1734, the capital of the company was 
16 million réis (40 shares of 400$000 each). However, the capi-
tal needs increased quickly with the construction of the large 
13They were: Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal, Manoel de Sande de Vasconcelos, 
Francisco Xavier Ferraz de Oliveira, João de Castro Carneiro, Manoel da Costa 
 Pinheiro, Domingos da Silva Vieira, D. Gabriel António Gomes, Christian Stockler, 
and Domingos da Cruz Lisboa. Godin did not subscribe any capital, but he was 
considered to be a partner who gave to the company his knowledge and “his intel-
ligence and activity” [ANTT, Cartórios Notariais de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, book 
526, sheet V]. Godin received an annual salary of 480$000. He received a smaller 
amount of dividends “because he did not deliver any capital” [ANTT, Cartórios 
Notariais de Lisboa, Cartório no. 11, book 526, sheet 6V].
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factory at Rato between 1735 and 1741 [Neves, 1827]. By May 
1742, capital had risen to approximately 61.2 million réis (153 
shares) [partners’ share register book (entrada de sócios) no. 
980].14 Soon the company’s capital needs were such that it had 
to borrow money, repayable with interest. 
 In addition to the manufacturing plant, the building had 
six retail shops. There were several offices housing the com-
mercial staff (a merchant specializing in sewing silk, a merchant 
specializing in wool and silk, a general director of sales, a clerk 
and a director of production) and the directors of the company. 
Several employees of the company lived in the same building 
(the bookkeeper, the clerk, and the doorkeeper). The SFC’s 
staff also included silk weavers, silk manufacturers, foremen, 
designers,15 sock makers, lace makers, dyers, a storekeeper, 
blacksmiths, carpenters, two cooks, a water carrier, a doctor, 
and a nurse [Macedo, 1982]. In 1749, “the factory employed 
200 men (specialized workers and artisans) and approximately 
one thousand female silk winders. The factory also contracted 
many silk throwers, gold and silver drawers, carpenters, turners, 
joiners and blacksmiths” [ANTT, Conselho de Guerra, Decretos, 
maço 258]. Many of the specialized foreign workers were French 
[Almeida, 1989-90].
 On July 3, 1745, the cashier and administrator of the SFC, 
Manuel Nunes da Silva Tojal, was advised by the government 
auditor that the company had sustained a very sizable operat-
ing loss of 18:796$990 from its inception through to August 
1744 [ANTT, Conselho da Fazenda, Maço, Decretos, 1725 e anos 
seguintes]. The company’s capital had been exhausted by the 
construction of the new factory in Rato. A memorial written by 
Godin on September 1, 1749 revealed that the first administra-
tion had expended 31:037$875 réis building the new factory. 
In the period, salaries and gratuities totalling 32:644$800 réis 
were paid as well [ANTT, Conselho da Guerra, Decretos, maço 
258]. Manufacturing was undertaken in the face of strong ex-
ternal competition from legal imports and contraband products 
[Macedo, 1982, p. 72; Pedreira, 1994, p. 40], and the SFC was 
not profitable.
14This amount corresponds to 1.2% of the large amount received in gold from 
Brazil in 1745 (about 5,200 million réis) [Mauro, 1991, p. 247]. Besides the capi-
tal subscription, the partners loaned the company 21:000$000, bringing the total 
amount delivered by the partners to 82:200$00 (ANTT, Conselho da Guerra, Decre-
tos, maço 258). That amount corresponds to 1.6% of the amount received in gold 
from Brazil in 1745.
15The fist designer was a Frenchman, Mr. Alezon [Santos, 2002].
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 To help ease the difficult trading situation faced by the SFC, 
the Companhia da China (China Company) was created in June 
1741. It was granted privileges in the commercial traffic with 
Macau for a period of 16 years.16 The charter of 1741 suggested 
that this company “would improve both companies, consoli-
dated in only one” [ANTT, Chancellaria de D. João V, book 102, 
sheets 270V-272V]. The objective was to help the SFC obtain 
silk foliage which was much cheaper in Macau than in Europe 
[Almeida, 1989-90, p. 7]. The elected administrators (Christian 
Stockler, Manuel Passos Dias, Rodrigo de Sande de Vasconcelos, 
and Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal) prepared the statutes of the 
new company, whose capitalization was open to public subscrip-
tion. The close relationship between commercial and industrial 
activities created hope that the prosperity of commerce would 
extend to the manufacturing sector [Almeida, 1989-90].
 On July 4, 1745, Godin requested that the king extend these 
privileges for a further ten years. Godin argued that the partners 
had not benefited from their investment in such a “fantastic fac-
tory, one of the biggest of its type, which has become of public 
interest not only because of the silks produced but also because 
of the many craftsmen employed” [ANTT, Conselho da Fazenda, 
Maço, Decretos, 1725 e seguintes]. However, neither the granting 
of the extension of the privileges for a further ten years nor the 
stopping of major expenses related to the building construction 
was sufficient to help the company recover its poor financial 
situation [Macedo, 1982, p. 71; Pedreira, 1994, p. 40]. The SFC’s 
financial deficit made it impossible to take advantage of the 
industrial and commercial privileges it had received [Macedo, 
1982]. 
 The second administration was conducted by Ma-
noel de Sande Vasconcelos, Christian Stockler, and Manoel 
Nunes da Silva Tojal. Christian Stockler was a consul who 
represented the City of Hamburg in Lisbon. There were se-
rious disagreements between Godin and Stockler [ANTT, 
Conselho da Guerra, Decretos, maço 258; Almeida, 1989-90]. 
Godin accused Stockler of incompatibility on the grounds 
that it would be impossible to promote the commercial in-
terests of Portugal and Hamburg at the same time [ANTT, 
Conselho de Guerra, Decretos, maço 258]. It seems that the 
SFC’s financial problems were compounded by personal-
ity differences and discipline problems [Almeida, 1989-90]. Al- 
16However, since the company was in a difficult financial situation, the num-
ber of ships per year never exceeded one [Macedo, 1982].
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though Stockler was replaced17 in the third administration, the 
company failed in 1750. The cause was attributed to the high 
costs of property and of training personnel [Neves, 1827]. This 
was not surprising in view of the criticism by Sebastião José 
de Carvalho e Melo,18 better know as the Marquis of Pombal, of 
the strategy the company had adopted. In a letter written from 
London to Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho, the secretary 
of state for war and foreign affairs to King D. João V, Pombal 
noted that unlike the big and expensive factory the SFC had 
just constructed in Rato, in London he could see only small and 
cheap factories [Macedo, 1982; Barreto, 1986]. Pombal [1741a] 
contended that companies should be small and cheap to make it 
easier for them to be profitable. Pombal, who was later foreign 
affairs minister (1750-1755) and chief minister (1756-1777) in 
the Portuguese government, had a very influential impact on 
Portuguese economic thinking of the time [Rodrigues and Craig, 
2004, pp. 333-337].19 It was under Pombal’s leadership that the 
SFC was transformed into the Royal Silk Factory, a state-owned 
enterprise.
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM OF THE SFC
 The SFC factory was surrounded by houses in which strands 
of raw silk were produced from silk cocoons. They were then 
passed to the factory for processing into finished silk products. 
The production cycle was:
silk filament Ë raw silk thread Ë dyed silk Ë  
reeled silk Ë silk fabrics Ë finished silk clothes
 An integrated accounting system using DEB and job-order 
costing computed full costs of units produced. It was allied with 
17The third administration was conducted by Rodrigo de Sande de Vasconce-
los, Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal, and Francisco Ferreira da Silva.
18He acquired the title, Marquis of Pombal, in 1769. In 1741, he was the am-
bassador of the Portuguese King D. João V to the English Court of King George II. 
In this letter, Pombal advised the King that in England the small manufacturing 
operations he observed there were not experiencing the same financial problems 
as were being experienced in Portugal because the English firms did not have the 
same structure and amount of costs. Pombal stated that the value of the building 
where the Silk Company was established was greater than all the similar compa-
nies established in London and surrounding regions [Pombal, 1741a].
19Pombal’s “Report on Grievances” to the king of Portugal in 1741 is regarded 
by many, such as Barreto [1986], to be one of the most important expressions of 
Portuguese economic thought in the first half of the 18th century.
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a charge and discharge system of accounting in which admin-
istrators and artisans were each accountable for the materials 
disbursed to them. The quality of production was controlled and 
the cost per côvado was computed. Artisans were discharged 
from responsibility for raw materials when they forwarded 
finished products. Stocks were valued at an average estimated 
cost. Expense control was achieved by comparing the variance 
between allocated costs and actual costs. Administrators were 
responsible for controlling expenses, rendering accounts, and 
paying creditors. The central account was a “finished goods” 
account (fazendas em ser na mão da administração da venda das 
fazendas da fábrica; literally, “finished fabrics held by the sales 
administration”). 
Cost Calculation and the Finished Goods Account: The computed 
cost of each job was entered in the factory invoices book (livro 
de facturas da fábrica). For the first job order, direct costs were 
71$540 réis and indirect costs were 15$022 réis, with total costs 
of 86$562 réis. The output was 66½ côvados so that the unit 
cost was approximately 1$301 réis per côvado. During Febru-
ary 1745, 20 job orders were completed, comprising 1323.25 
côvados, or approximately 873 meters of silk, at a total cost of 
réis 2:776$272. Job number 1, the first of 20 pieces completed 
on February 28, 1745, is recorded in the “account of cost” as fol-
lows [ANTT, book no. 676, p. 1]:
Figure 1
Job-order cost sheet, sFc, February 28, 1745
No. 1 1st Piece -66 1/2 côvados of brilliant grey colour produced by Loom no. 76
by Vicente Febregat
a  9 " 15 " weight of the piece [9 arratéis and 15 ounces]
a  - “ 10 " loss
a  10 " 9 " of dyed silk @ 4000 réis. rs. 42$250
salary of the artisan and foremen @ 260 rs. per C.do [by côvado] " 17$290
salary of the apprentice @ 150 rs. by C.do "  9$900
Silk reeling @ 200 rs. per a [by arrátel] "  2$100
    "  71$540
interest @ 6 p C.t  "  4$292
general factory expenses @ 3 p C.t "   2$146
wages @ 6 p C.t  "   4$292
letting of the house and looms @ 6 p C.t "   4$292
    " 86$562
We have 66 1/2 C.do s. The cost per côvado is 1$301 réis and the 
remainder is 45½ réis.
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 Full cost per côvado was defined in a fashion similar to the 
French prix de revient, the total cost accounting system that 
 Nikitin [1990] found at Saint-Gobain between 1820 and 1880 
and that Bordázar proposed in the Spanish printing industry 
in 1732 [Martínez Guillén, 2005]. As with Bordázar’s proposal, 
there is an indirect imputation of costs and a separation be-
tween wages of workers directly involved with silk production 
and those who were not. Estimated overheads were applied in 
a consistent fashion as a set percentage of direct costs. Indirect 
wages, interest, and costs of “letting of the house and looms” 
were allocated at 6% of total direct costs, and general factory 
expenses at 3%. Because the SFC had obtained a charter with 
monopoly rights, managers believed that the fair sales price 
could be calculated by adding the “cost price” and a fair profit. 20 
Accordingly, calculation of the “cost price” (full cost of products) 
was most important. Note that at the RTM of Guadalajara in 
1742, indirect salaries of “the superintendent and the personnel 
employed in the accounting and cash offices and in the ware-
houses” were allocated (at the rate of one-eighth of their yearly 
wages) to the cost of the white twill [Carmona and Gómez, 2002, 
p. 246]. It is also relevant to note that in the costing model pro-
posed by Bordázar in 1732 [Martínez Guillén, 2005], cost was 
increased by 5% per year to reflect the financial interest costs 
likely to be incurred in storing finished goods (books) for several 
years. In the case of the SFC, the imputation of interest costs 
arose because the company had to borrow a large sum of money 
to construct the new factory in Rato.
 The integration of cost accounting and financial accounting 
can be seen in the journal and ledger. For instance, at the end of 
February, the following entry was recorded in the journal [ANTT, 
book no. 720, pp. 13-14]:
 DR. Finished Goods 2:776$272
 CR. Creditors21 2:776$272
 During the month of February, 20 pieces of silk were pro-
duced by the looms and were delivered to the Administration:
20This reasoning was wrong since, as Sousa [2005] argues, the silk industry 
was the most important sector of Trás-os-Montes. Records show that in 1721-
1724, Bragança had 30 registered spinning wheels and 350 looms. Freixo de Es-
pada à Cinta, another city in the region, had more than 100 looms.
21“Creditors” here means all costs that contribute to the finished goods.
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Figure 2
items transferred to Finished goods inventory, sFc, 
February 1745
 1st Piece  – 66 1/2 côvados of brilliant grey colour   86$562
 2nd Piece – 46 1/2 côvados of black and silver grogram 157$344
 3rd Piece – 74 côvados of black Grodetur  98$701
 4th Piece – 100 côvados of black Grodetur 135$713
 5th Piece – 45 1/4 côvados of white and gold grogram 187$755
 6th Piece – 80 côvados of black skirt 144$728
 7th Piece – 44 3/4 côvados of purple and gold satin 340$314
 (7 pieces – 457 côvados)  1:151$117
 (next page)
 (7 pieces – 457 côvados)  1:151$117
 8th Piece – 45 1/4 côvados of purple and gold satin 349$374
 9 th Piece – 94 côvados of mantles  82$103
10th Piece – 92 côvados of white serge  58$170
11th Piece – 99 1/2 côvados of mantles  84$268
12th Piece – 89 côvados of black Nobreza  64$363
13th Piece – 45 1/2 côvados of green grogram  96$025
14th Piece – 48 côvados of blue Persiana  68$216
15th Piece – 45 1/2 côvados of silver grogram  263$422
16th Piece – 68 1/2 côvados of black grogram 81$535
17th Piece – 66 côvados of brilliant gold colour  70$336
18th Piece – 36 côvados of white and gold damask  191$134
19th Piece – 92 côvados of brilliant cinnamon-colour  118$039
20th Piece – 48 côvados of black skirts  98$180
20 pieces – 1323 ¼ côvados 2:776$272
 Dyed silks of 20 pieces 935$875
 Expenses of artisans and foremen of 20 pieces   444$205 
 Expenses of apprentices of 20 pieces  230$509
 Silk reeling  46$294
 Interests 137$684
 Factory general expenses  68$337
 Wages  137$684
 Letting the house, factory and looms    137$684
   2:138$272
 Gold, silver strand  638$000
   2:776$272
The double-entry system facilitated computation of the value of 
finished goods at the end of the period (2:776$272). Such a value 
was computed using information in the account that recorded 
the cost of each job order. For example, the cost of the first piece 
(86$562) was the first debit in the finished goods account. This 
sum was obtained from the invoice book, the book of cost ac-
count. Such a treatment provides evidence of the integration 
of the SFC’s cost and financial accounting systems. The SFC’s 
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integration of costing procedures into its double-entry account-
ing system, like such systems elsewhere, had the potential to 
give “managers improved control over operations” [Edwards 
and Newell, 1991, p. 48]. This was because there was less chance 
of omitting costs within the more secure double-entry account-
ing framework. All transactions which supported the costing of 
products were recorded. The SFC provides evidence additional 
to that gathered for the coal, iron, and steel industries to show 
that the “two branches into which accounting is today conven-
tionally categorized – financial and costing – rather than devel-
oping from separate beginnings, as was previously believed, in 
certain industries at least grew naturally out of a single system” 
(Boyns and Edwards, 1997, p. 20]. At the SFC, costing informa-
tion was provided jointly with important information about 
products.
 During the SFC’s second administration, there were 663 job 
orders for silk products and monthly orders for silk stockings. 
Product costs were determined as full costs, using a job-order 
costing system. Each job order included, as direct costs, dyed 
silk at an estimated cost based on weight (including a shrinkage 
loss), salaries of artisans and foremen (paid by piece), salaries 
of apprentices (paid by piece), and silk reeling (paid by weight 
unit). Indirect costs were comprised of interest (6% of direct 
costs), factory general expenses and indirect materials (3% of 
direct cost), indirect labor wages (6% of direct cost), and rent on 
the house, factory, and looms (6% of direct cost).
 Materials were valued at an estimated average cost, a rudi-
mentary form of standard cost. A particularly interesting feature 
of line 2 of the job cost sheet for Job No. 1 is that the weight 
of materials included an allowance of approximately 6% (10 
ounces) for losses due to spoilage and shrinkage. The recogni-
tion of materials wastage was observed also by Zan [2004] in 
managerial and accounting discourse at the Venice Arsenal, 
and by Carmona and Gómez [2002] at the RTM of Guadala-
jara. Artisans, foremen, and apprentices were paid by piece rate. 
Manufacturing overheads, interest, non-manufacturing wages, 
and building and equipment repair were included at a pre- 
determined percentage of direct costs. The SFC was also one of 
the early entities to include interest in the identification of costs, 
as was the case with the Essex textile manufacturer, Thomas 
Griggs, 1742-1760, noted by Edwards [1989]. 
 Further, as with other firms noted by Edwards and Newell 
[1991], the SFC was aware of the imperative to recoup all its 
costs. This provided an incentive to control costs, particularly 
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during periods when market conditions squeezed profit levels. 
Total costs were expressed as averages, in cost units of “cost per 
covâdo.” (See Figure 1 where the unit cost of job order no. 1 was 
approximately 1$301 réis per covâdo.) Such averages would have 
been useful for control and efficiency assessment since these 
“units could be compared over time to provide indicators of 
changes in production costs of the pieces of silk and compared 
with the market price” [Edwards and Newell, 1991, p. 46]. The 
SFC had some controls over material usage, as we explain later. 
Although it was possible to exercise some control over payments 
made to each artisan and foreman, control of labor efficiency 
seems to have been lacking because foremen and artisans were 
paid according to the amount of production they completed. 
 Overheads were calculated as a percentage of direct costs 
as outlined earlier. But, as Gutiérrez et al. [2005, p. 131] note, 
“different foundations” for overhead allocation were used in the 
management accounting systems of the 13 large and medium-
sized 18th century Spanish companies they examined. The “stor-
age costs” of the Royal Textile Factory of Ezcaray were allocated 
on a flat rate of seven reales per unit and “damages and contin-
gencies” at 1.5% of production costs. The notion of “ability to 
bear” was an instrumental determinant of overhead allocation 
because “baling cost and the managers’ and accountants’ wages 
were allocated at a different rate for each type of fabric depend-
ing on its class – allowing higher rates for higher quality fabrics” 
(emphasis added). 
 The fact that the cost of each job order was computed in 
the “invoice book” leads to the belief that a major objective 
of  product costing at the SFC was to compute selling price. 
Although the SFC had been granted monopoly rights by the gov-
ernment to produce silk in Portugal, it suffered strong competi-
tion from small and big factories which were in operation when 
the SFC was created. The competition between the SFC and the 
companies from Trás-os-Montes is recognized by Sousa [2005, 
p. 3] who argues that “the second industrial boom (1720-1740), 
during the reign of D. João V, did not seem to have any positive 
impact on the revival of the Trás-os-Montes silk industry. On the 
contrary, the establishment of the Rato silk factory in Lisbon 
led to a fall in the demand for silk fabrics from Trás-os-Montes.” 
Most importantly, national silk fabrics were subject to competi-
tion from untaxed imported goods. King D. João V’s govern-
ment adopted a policy of taxing silk exports but allowing silk 
imports to remain tax-free. This arrangement made export and 
national sales very difficult for the SFC to achieve. “This was a 
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fatal mistake for agriculture and even more for manufacturing. 
Later, all developed nations, as did our King D. José I, adopted 
the opposite policy of facilitating exports and shutting out im-
ports” [Neves, 1827, p. 41]. To suggest that the SFC determined 
its own prices would be an over-simplification because prices 
for silk and silk products were influenced by market forces and 
governmental economic policy. Selling prices were not a func-
tion of cost plus a mark-up, but could vary. This can be seen by 
comparing sales prices and full costs by job order (in réis) in the 
following examples [ANTT, comparison of books 676 and 978]:
Figure 3
Job cost/sales price comparisons, 1745, sFc 
 Job total sales
 no. cost price (loss)
 10 631 620 (11)
 18 5$309 5$200 (109)
 29 1$988 1$800 (188)
 35 1$030 960 (70)
 40 1$403 1$300 (103)
This comparison suggests that there were difficulties in selling 
finished product. Indeed, the company’s sales were low in com-
parison to its level of production. As with the textiles factories 
in Ezcaray and Guadalajara [Gutiérrez et al., 2005, p. 136], the 
SFC had trouble selling its products in the market. Its costs were 
higher than the prevailing sales prices.
Other Important Accounts: The account “administration of 
fabric sales” (administração das vendas das fazendas da fabrica) 
was a partial profit and loss summary account [ANTT, book 
no. 978]. Sales of silk fabrics were credited to this account, 
and the full applied cost of goods sold debited, with an amount 
transferred from the finished goods account. The resulting bal-
ance, representing the expected trading surplus for the period, 
was transferred to the profit and loss account. The actual profit 
would have differed from this expected profit if, as was usual, 
there were differences between actual costs and applied costs. 
The profit and loss statement served mainly as “a weeding-out 
process, in which the detailed and unwanted information in the 
ledger was removed” [Yamey, 1977, p. 23]. 
 Two other important accounts were “dyed silks” (sedas 
tintas) and “general factory expenses” (gastos gerais da fabrica) 
[ANTT, ledger, book 718]. The dyed silks account was credited 
with the estimated costs to produce dyed silk and debited with 
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the actual costs incurred. The difference was transferred to the 
profit and loss account. “Dyed silks” was also an account on 
the balance sheet that was debited with the opening stock and 
credited with closing stock when charging the new administra-
tion. The “general factory expense” account was credited with 
applied cost and debited with actual cost; it was also a balance 
sheet debit account. The actual profit would have differed from 
this expected profit if, as would be usual, there were differences 
between actual costs, including actual overhead costs, and the 
applied costs, including applied overhead costs. 
 As Nikitin [1994] found in the cost accounting at the Forges 
D’Oberbrück Company (1738-1745), the cost accounting system 
revolved around the inventory accounts. However, at the SFC, 
the cost system was more sophisticated. The cost accounts and 
finished goods account were debited with the actual costs and 
credited with estimated costs. The differences were transferred 
to the profit account. The balance of the account “administra-
tion of fabric sales” showed the difference between sales and 
total estimated cost. The profit and loss account was composed 
of this value and the differences between actual and estimated 
costs. As with Bordázar’s cost accounting model [Martínez Guil-
lén, 2005], the profit and loss statement did not include depre-
ciation expense. Whenever a fixed asset had to be repaired, the 
cost was simply booked as an expense against the period.
Charge and Discharge System and DEB: In the transition from 
the first to the second administration, the company’s accounting 
system was a mixture of agency bookkeeping or “charge and dis-
charge” accounting and a system of double-entry accounting in-
corporating several costing procedures. The main characteristic 
of agency bookkeeping “is that the party reporting would charge 
himself with the values he became responsible for and discharge 
himself in the records for every release from responsibility 
regardless of the cause” [Littleton, 1933, p. 2]. Agency bookkeep-
ing systems were more common before the arrival of the Italian 
method of DEB. They were gradually abandoned around the 
middle of the 18th century when the transition from charge and 
discharge accounting to double-entry accounting, and the inte-
gration of the two systems, gained momentum [Jones, 1985, p. 
41]. Administrators at the SFC, particularly the cashier, Manoel 
Nunes da Silva Tojal, were responsible to promoters of the com-
pany for the capital resources placed in their hands. They were 
charged with these resources at the beginning of their admin-
istration [ANTT, book 718, pp. 4-8] and discharged at the end 
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[ANTT, book 720, pp. 192-197], as the opening page of the jour-
nal book (jornal) shows clearly. The inventory at the beginning 
of a new administration was important. It helped to establish 
what was owned by the company, what it owed creditors, and 
what its administration was accountable for. The words at the 
top of the inventory account state explicitly “this is the inventory 
delivered by the former administration to the new administra-
tors Mssrs. Manoel de Sande Vasconcelos, Christian Stockler, 
and Manoel Nunes da Silva Tojal who will be obliged to pay to 
creditors, not only the capital but also the interest from now on 
and these are the effects 22 [assets] that are being received.” The 
February 1, 1745 inventory appears as Figure 4 [ANTT, book no. 
718, pp. 4-8].
Figure 4
inventory, February 1, 1745, sFc
Dyed silks  6:655$062 
Raw silks  4:712$606
Silks in foliage  277$750
Raw silk strand  168$187
Dyed silk strand  25$510
Alducar for borders   8$276
Possolos and waste  108$021
Gold and silver strand   3:213$634 
General factory expenses  339$000 
Soap 112$761
Clothes awaiting shipment to Macao to Belchior Araújo Costa & Cª   3:880$580
Finished clothes  9:259$362
João José del Rey (debtor) 1:872$000
Pedro Villela (debtor)   252$000
Rev (Priest) José Oliveira da Patriarcal (debtor)   685$903
Francisco Sparsa Tintoreiro (dyer)   139$873 
  31:710$525
less what we owe to Mr. Manuel Nunes Silva Tojal 
 by his disbursement   12:800$000
  18:910$525
payment of the above 18:910$525 is to be made by this administration to the 
following creditors: 
Dean of the Patriarchal Holy Church   6:000$000 
Eugénia Marianna Gonzaga   600$000
Mother Abbess and other religious persons, Monastery of St. Marta  1:350$000
Mother Abbess and other religious persons, Monastery  
of the Mother of God, Guimarães (...)  4:800$000
Patricio Pires Quaresma   4:800$000
Rev. Priest Luís Gonzaga of Companhia de Jesus by the hand of 
Manoel de Sande e Vasconcelos 1:000$000
Rev. Priest José Dias of the Oratório Congregation  365$525 
   18:910$525
22Nikitin [1990] found the same word used to refer the inventory value of all 
assets of the Saint-Gobain Company.
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The company’s inventory account of 31:710$525 was comprised 
of inventories of direct and indirect materials, finished goods, 
and amounts owing from customers. This inventory had been 
financed through the deposit of 12:800$000 by the cashier and 
through loans of 18:910$525, principally from the Church. It was 
necessary to resort to such loans to overcome the lack of capital 
and to help meet the high costs of building the factory and 
houses. Therefore, the sum of the charge (31:710$525) exceeded 
that of the discharge (18:910$525) and measured the indebted-
ness of the new administration to the cashier, Manoel Nunes da 
Silva Tojal. From reading the Cash Account in the ledger, we can 
ascertain that the cashier deposited 12:800$000 on February 1, 
1745 and received it back on February 28, 1745. 
 As Lemarchand [1994] points out, the charge and discharge 
model depended on the separation between capital ownership 
and management, centered on notions of responsibility account-
ing, and resembled certain aspects observed in early joint-stock 
companies. However, it seems that the inability of the single- 
entry bookkeeping system to cope fully with the complexity of 
the SFC became evident in the first administration, prompting it 
to adopt a DEB system in its second administration. As Macedo 
[1982] argues, this period is characterized by “improvisation” in 
terms of managerial activities. This change can be understood in 
a context where DEB began to be seen in Portugal as a system 
of rational beliefs23 through which organizational structure is 
legitimized. As already noted, on July 3, 1745 the government 
auditor presented his report dated August 31, 1744. He con-
cluded that the losses were a consequence of the large amount of 
interest the company was paying on the substantial loans it had 
obtained to finance construction of the factory buildings [ANTT, 
Conselho da Fazenda, Maços, Decretos, 1725 e anos seguintes]. 
The prospect of changing to an accounting system which facili-
tated the control of interest costs by charging them to the cost of 
the products would probably have been appealing. 
Salaries and Wages: As with the RTM in Spain [Carmona and 
 Gómez, 2002, p. 233], Portugal had to hire foreign workers 
to provide technical skills in production and accounting. The 
salaries paid were very high as the wages for the three months 
to March 1745, shown below, reveal [ANTT, book no. 720]:
23The system of rational beliefs is evident in Pombal’s [1741b] treatise in 
which he concludes that the DEB system was being used successfully by mer-
chants in London. 
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Roberto Godin, factory manager 120$000
Nicolao Julio Cortinovis, bookkeeper  50$000
Carlos Roland, silk printer  75$000
João G. Rebelo  45$000
Bento Ferreira, Roberto Godin’s  
keeper (February/March)  12$000
Matias Patrão, factory porter  7$200 309$200
By the end of the second administration (1747), the salary of 
the bookkeeper (Cortinovis,24 effectively the SFC’s accountant) 
increased from 50$000 to 75$000 for a three month period. The 
best paid workers, Godin (the factory manager), Cortinovis, and 
Roland (a silk printer), had foreign names.
Balance Sheet: The balance sheet was very different from its 
equivalents today; it did not include capital, fixed assets, or 
depreciation. The accounting system was based on debits and 
credits not on assets and liabilities. This made it difficult to 
calculate the net worth of the company. But this did not seem to 
bother the proprietors of the SFC who were concerned princi-
pally with controlling agency relationships. Figure 5 is the Octo-
ber 31, 1747 balance sheet [ANTT, book no. 720]:
Figure 5
Balance sheet, sFc, october 31, 1747
Débito (Debit)
Shag and raw silks   9:154$210
Raw silks in foliage    650$725
Raw alducar for border    27$312
Raw silk strand    178$509
Dyed silks    10:322$525 
Colour dyed alducar   5$550
Colour dyed muzzle   15$875
Silk wastes   147$004
Gold and silver strand   1:903$132
Factory general expenses    413$530 
Dye    599$095
Soap for silk baking    64$550
Silk samples    60$375
24Lourenço Cortinovis was from Venice and was the nominated consul of Por-
tugal in Venice in 1720 [ANTT, Registo Geral de Mercês, D. João V, book 84, sheet 
117-V]. Our conjecture is that Nicolao Cortinovis was a relative, but we could not 
find evidence to substantiate this. The earthquake Lisbon sustained in 1755 de-
stroyed documents dealing with foreign affairs matters.
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Finished clothes held by sales administration   43:870$418
   [silk retail  42:208$726
   stocking pairs  1:661$692]
Shipment to Macao held by Caetano da Silva & Co.  2:087$050
Patriarchal Holy Church and for the Reverend Abbot José Oliveira   83$653
Cardinal of Motta (Prime Minister)  21$600
Maurício Henrique and João Andrade Dias  2:322$595
António Fragozo (debt of the Princes)   151$250
António José, artisan of this factory   6$325 
Francisco Duarte, artisan of this factory   6$000 
Cash    4:238$191 
    76:329$474
Crédito (Credit)
Monsignor Mattos    1:600$000
Dean of the Patriarchal Holy Church  6:000$000
Eugénia Marianna Gonzaga    600$000
Rev. Priest Luís Gonzaga of Companhia de Jesus  1:000$000
Mother Abbess and other religious persons, 
 Convent of Saint Apolónia  2:500$000
Marcos António de Araújo Coutinho   400$000
Jozé Rebello Palhares    4:000$000
Macao Company   17:000$000 
Ana Dorotheia de Sande Vasconcelos   30:540$700
Maria Custódia do Sacramento and her religious sisters in
 the Monastery of Saint Marta  1:350$000
Mother Abbess and other religious persons of the Monastery of 
 God Mother of Guimarães   4:800$000
Patrício Pires Quaresma    4:800$000
    74:590$700
Profit and Loss   1:738$774
    76:329$474
The balance sheet was concerned with chargeable values that 
needed closer control, so fixed assets and capital accounts were 
not included. Measuring the value of the company was not im-
portant.
 The debits appear to comprise cash and amounts paid in re-
spect of inventories (direct materials, indirect materials, finished 
goods in store, finished goods in transit), advances for wages of 
artisans, and amounts owing from customers and other debtors. 
Most of the credits comprise amounts owing on capital loans to 
the Catholic Church which, in this period, was acting as a bank. 
The excess of the debits over the credits was regarded as profit.
 The financial situation of the SFC reveals total indebted-
ness of 74:590$700. A large amount of the assets (43:870$418 of 
76:329$474) was represented by finished goods inventory. There 
was also an imbalance between inventories of raw materials 
and goods in process (22:981$858 or 30.1% of total assets) and 
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inventories of finished goods (57.5% of total assets). The SFC 
appears to have been suffering from overproduction and poor 
marketing.
DISCUSSION
 In the SFC’s second administration, administrators were 
faced with a challenging socio-economic climate. Their re-
sponse, which included enhancements to the SFC’s accounting 
system, offers support to “Fleischman and Parker’s hypothesis 
that accounting innovations were often the product of percep-
tive businessmen struggling with real problems” [Boyns and 
Edwards, 1995, p. 48]. 
 Further, the SFC’s adoption of more elaborate calculative 
routines might be conceived as reflecting “specific rationales 
and ideals of order which the state valued and sought for the 
governance of society” [Bhimani, 1994, p. 407]. The French 
mercantilist ideas that were spreading in Portugal prompted the 
development of industry and state control. The SFC had been 
granted privileges, monopoly rights and some tax exemptions, 
from the state, and was to be audited by a government audi-
tor. Because of this, the accounting system of the SFC might be 
perceived as “enrolled in certain pursuits of the state and as 
assuming ‘its place alongside other practices of Government’” 
[Bhimani, 1994, p. 407]. King D. João V and Prime Minister 
Cardeal da Mota wanted to add to the power and independence 
of Portugal, and attempted to do this by embracing the ideals of 
French mercantilism, particularly Colbert’s ideas. This required 
the SFC to institute an efficient and modern system of book-
keeping which would allow good control and oversight of opera-
tions. The calculative routines used by the SFC were capable of 
improving the company’s control of operations, and accorded 
with the state-sponsored mercantilist ethic of the time.
 The development of several of the cost accounting practices 
evident at the SFC is often attributed to the factory system of 
the industrial revolution [Littleton, 1933; Johnson, 1981]. The 
accounting system observed at the SFC, 1745-1747, is consistent 
with Garner’s [1954] argument that the initial impetus for the 
development of cost accounting was to replace the domestic sys-
tem of production with the capitalist processes of production, 
and that the British Industrial Revolution (1760-1830) was not 
the main stimulus for change but merely accelerated the pace of 
pre-existing change. 
 The SFC’s accounting system is noteworthy also because 
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it integrated the cost and financial records in a DEB system 
that included elements of a charge and discharge accounting 
(or agency bookkeeping) system. The SFC operated a job-order 
costing system that allocated overhead costs to products, al-
lowed for direct materials shrinkage, and included interest cost 
as an indirect product cost. Elements of a rudimentary standard 
raw material costing system were evident. The SFC’s balance 
sheet did not include fixed assets, accumulated depreciation, 
or a statement of owners’ equity. The profit and loss account 
included interest costs but not depreciation expense. 
 The cost and management accounting practices used by the 
SFC support the contention [e.g., by Fleischman and Parker, 
1990, 1991; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Boyns and Edwards, 
1997] that many of the cost and management accounting proce-
dures used today had origins and exemplars prior to the British 
Industrial Revolution, particularly in the first half of the 18th 
century. The SFC’s cost accounting practices are also consistent 
broadly with case descriptions of the accounting systems that 
were used in Spain in the first half of the 18th century [Carmona 
et al., 1997; Carmona and Gómez, 2002; Gutiérrez et al., 2005]. 
 The example of the accounting system at the SFC adds 
weight to the contention that the development of management 
accounting was a response to multiple influences, and that it 
ought not to be explained in terms of any single variable alone, 
such as the level of industrialization, the relative impact of fixed 
and variable costs, or the organizational structure of business 
activity [Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991]. The cost 
and management practices of the SFC are a rich source for fur-
ther enquiry. The inventory of 34 accounting books of the SFC, 
listed in Appendix 1, are an under-explored archival resource 
that merits closer enquiry by scholars fluent in the Portuguese 
language. Such enquiry might explore the transformation of the 
SFC into a state-owned company in the 1750s under the leader-
ship of Pombal, perhaps helping us to understand the “inter-
relations of accounting and the state” and accounting change 
[Miller, 1990, p. 316]. In particular, the transition to state owner-
ship may shed light on how ownership structure affects the cost 
and financial accounting systems of business entities.
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appendiX 1
inventory of accounting Books of the  
Real Fábrica das Sedas
This inventory of 1115 accounting books includes 34 for the Companhia da Fá-
brica das Sedas: 
 period  Book no.
1.1 Accounting
 1.1.1 Main accounting books
   Ledger (Livro Mestre) 1745-47 718
   Journal (Livro Jornal) 1745-47 720
   Inventory 1745 214
 1.1.2 Auxiliary accounting books
   Cash 1746 267
   Account of the amount the house cost 1735-44 536
   Partnerships entries 1734-42 980
   Sheet of the partners’ interest 1735-47 303
    1738-47 304
    1735-54 305
    1735-45 306
    1738-50 537
   Current accounts of partnerships 1734-45 797
   Invoices from abroad 1745-47 516
    1747-49 523
   Shipments 1735-45 712
   Debtors waste-book 1735-49 520
    1747-48 530
   Foremen wages 1745-47 521
    1747-50 290
   Several accounts waste-book 1745-47 522
1.2 Crude Silk Warehouse and Materials
 1.2.1 Warehouse
   Entrance and exit of silk and other products 1734-45 1054
    1747-51 1050
   Entrance and exit of silk to the socks factory 1747-50 1051
 1.2.2 Dye-house
   Dyers account 1747-50  289
1.3 Tint Silk Warehouse
 1.3.1 Warehouse
   Entrance and exit of silk and other products 1745-47  574
    1747-50 1049
 1.3.2 Silk clothes
   Computation of the cost of silk cloth (the 1745-46  676
   original title of this book was “Invoices book”) 1746-47  675
1.4  Sale
 1.4.1 Sale warehouse
   Entrance and exit of silk cloth 1734-45 1020
    1745-47  978
    1747-50  621
 1.4.2 Shop of the company at Douradores Street
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   Entrance and exit of silk cloth 1747-50 1048
   Sales of the shop waste-book 1745-48  758
    1747-50  524
These books are related to the three administrations in the following way, with 
some common to two or three administrations:
 administration
 1  2  3 1,2 2,3 1,2,3 total
Main accounting books   3      3
Auxiliary accounting books 5  4  3  2   3  17
Crude silk warehouse 1   3     4
Tint silk warehouse   2  1   1   4
Sales 1  1  3   1   6
Total 7 10 10  2  2  3  34
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call for papers for a special issue of Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal: “accounting and the visual”
 This special issue aims to contribute to a recent and steadily growing interest in organi-
zational visual images and methodologies with particular application to the field of account-
ing. In essence, the practices of accounting for and auditing organizational activity relate to 
visualisation – rendering tangible and intangible values visible in the form of reports, charts, 
graphs, diagrams, and pictures for instance. These artefacts can fruitfully be studied from a 
visual perspective as being traces of – and drivers for – organizational action, processes and 
culture, as indeed can organizational artefacts more generally. Likewise, the changing image 
of accounting as a profession can be read visually, for example trends in corporate architec-
ture, space and accountants’ professional identity.
 The extent to which organisations trade on their image in such societies is also worthy 
of attention. Branding, organizational and/or corporate aesthetics management, and the con-
struction of symbolically redolent buildings are all visual activities, and ways of accounting 
for the visual is also a theme we might usefully engage with. For example, in New Zealand, 
the ‘arts bonus points’ scheme allows organizations to gain more favourable planning deci-
sions if they agree to invest in and display publicly accessible artworks in their buildings 
– importantly, these points are tradable, effectively creating a market that leads to the concept 
of an ‘aesthetic bottom line’ (Monin and Sayers 2006). In addition, accounting and manage-
ment control processes can be studied visually through the use of documentary photography, 
photo-elicitation techniques and respondent-led photography. 
 In sum, as contemporary societies become defined by their ‘visual culture’ and techno-
logical advancements mean that ‘the image’ becomes all-important in every sphere of life, so 
organizational and accounting scholars must engage with these developments theoretically, 
empirically and methodologically. To date, the role of images and the visual world has been 
strangely overlooked in organizational research despite having a healthy provenance in the 
social sciences more generally, and a prominent profile across arts disciplines and associated 
cultural studies. This special issue aims to begin to rectify this neglect .
 With these ideas in mind, we invite contributions that address any aspect of the visual 
and accounting, whether theoretical, empirical or methodological. We would particularly 
welcome creative, innovative approaches to the topic. An indicative, but not exhaustive, list 
of what we see as potential questions or approaches of interest is given below:
• Financial reporting as visual artefact
• Reflections of the image-dominated society within accounting
• The impact of developments in visual technology on accounting
• Visual representations of tangible and intangible values
• Visual rhetoric and accounting
• The role of the visual image in branding
• Corporate aesthetics management
• Accounting for the visual image
• Management accounting and the visual
• Architecture and the accounting profession
• The changing visual image of accountants’ professional identity
• Visual images as historical records of accounting interest
• Photo-elicitation as a contemporary and/or historical research method
• Respondent-led photography as a research method
• Parallels between art and accounting
• Studies that criticise the desirability of an increasingly visual approach
 The submission deadline for this special issue is 1st March 2008, but earlier submissions 
are welcomed. Manuscripts should be sent electronically by email (in a word file format) to 
Dr Samantha Warren, University of Portsmouth (sam.warren@port.ac.uk) All papers will be 
reviewed in accordance with AAAJ’s normal processes Authors are asked to follow Account-
ing, Auditing & Accountability Journal’s standard formatting requirements. For details, visit 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/info/journals/aaaj/notes.jsp. 
 Authors wishing to discuss their papers prior to submission may contact any of the three 
guest editors:
Dr Samantha Warren, University of Portsmouth, UK (sam.warren@port.ac.uk)
Prof. Lee Parker, University of Adelaide, Australia (lee.parker@adelaide.edu.au)
Dr Jane Davison , Royal Holloway, University of London, UK (jane.davison@rhul.ac.uk)
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Abstract: For centuries, accounting was a manual process. Starting 
in the late 1800s,  a series of technological innovations emerged that 
not only changed the way the accounting process was conducted but 
dramatically changed the workplace, the  workforce, the information 
provided, and the accounting profession itself. By 1930,  most major 
US companies had adopted mechanical accounting as a more efficient 
way  of processing accounting information. This paper examines the 
historical development  and influence of mechanical accounting in 
the U.S. from 1880 to 1930.
INTRODUCTION
 For centuries, accounting was a manual process. Whether 
by quill or steel pens, entries were recorded by hand in the 
journal and posted by hand to the ledger. Although there were 
devices (abacus, Napier’s rods) that helped with basic computa- 
tions, most accounting tasks (e.g., totaling, closing entries, trial 
balances) were dependent upon the mental and manual dexter-
ity of the accountant for their completion. In large organizations, 
prompt access to financial information was basically impossible 
due to a need to conduct extensive and time-consuming manual 
searches through bound ledgers, resulting in “trial balances 
[that] appeared at historic intervals, and departmental digests 
and comparison reports were almost unheard of” [Leffingwell, 
1926, p. 18].1 “Typically, only external transactions were re-
1In a vivid description of the information process before mechanization, Lef-
fingwell [1926, p. 18] writes: “The average executive preferred to keep most of his 
facts in his head rather than burrow through the hand-made office encyclopedias 
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank former editor, Stephen Walker, 
and the current editor, Richard Fleischman, for their excellent suggestions for im-
proving this paper. We also would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for the 
comments and suggestions which improved the paper significantly.
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corded,” for even in the late 19th century, there was no efficient 
way to process management accounting information, and the 
demand for such information was only emerging [Yates, 2000, 
pp.108-109].
 Starting in the late 19th century, a series of information 
processing innovations emerged that changed not only the way 
accounting tasks were accomplished but dramatically changed 
the workplace, the workforce, the information provided, and the 
accounting profession itself. Although there was an early reluc-
tance to accept such innovations, by the third decade of the 20th 
century, the adoption of mechanical accounting by major com-
panies was nearly universal in the U.S. The “mechanical” period 
would last for two more decades until there emerged a second 
major innovation in information processing, the computer. In 
contrast to the computer’s electronic era (vacuum tubes, transis-
tors, chips), the mechanical era was dominated by devices that 
were dependent upon the mechanical actions of levers, gears, 
and wheels to process data. Although hand operated at first, 
later mechanical devices were often electric or motor driven; 
however, they still relied upon levers or gears to process data. 
Thus, although referred to as electric calculators or billing ma-
chines, they remained mechanical in nature.
 An examination of mechanical accounting is important for 
the evolution of mechanical accounting encompasses far more 
than the simple adoption of information processing innova-
tions such as typewriters or bookkeeping machines. In actuality, 
mechanization changed nearly every facet of the business world 
and accounting. Mechanization would be a major contributing 
factor to the expansion of the availability of information that be-
came necessary for the emergence, expansion, and managerial 
control of large corporations. As Chandler [1977, p. 19] points 
out, “a constant flow of information was essential to the efficient 
operation of these new large business domains.” Prior to mecha-
nization, however, such information often was unavailable, or, if 
available, its cost was “almost prohibitive because of the expense 
and time involved” [Galloway, 1919, p. 83].
 Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 8] note that often the infor-
mation required was cost or managerial in nature, and “without 
a corresponding increase in the quantity and quality of manage-
to dig out his information. If the proprietor of a large enterprise wanted to get a 
line on a given department, he usually went into that department in person and 
stayed there until he had made a check-up. Personal contact was his chief means 
of intercourse both with his employees and his customers.”
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ment accounting information, these organizations would not 
have been able to capture the full potential gains from increased 
scale of operations.” With mechanization, managerial and finan-
cial data became easier and quicker to obtain at a much reduced 
cost. In fact, these methods became “so rapid and inexpensive…
they encouraged new uses of data not thought of by the original 
systematizers” [Yates, 1994, p. 41]. As a result, in Abbott’s [1988, 
p. 228] view, “the machines created, virtually overnight, the field 
of cost accounting.”
 There has been considerable controversy as to when cost 
accounting actually emerged. As Tyson [1992, p. 2] points out, 
by the early 1820s and 1830s in the Lowell cotton textile mills, 
“cost information was fully utilized by mill owners and manag-
ers and, in conjunction with other disciplinary and social fac-
tors, provided critical information needed to the business profit-
ably.” Chandler [1977, pp. 109-120] writes extensively about 
the development and use of cost systems by the railroads in the 
mid-1800s in the U.S. However, as Marquette and Fleischman 
[1992, p. 130] write, during these early periods, “accountants, 
on the other hand, were unimpressed by cost accounting and 
generally considered ‘cost-keeping’ and ‘cost-finding’ the work of 
others.” This indifference was to change with mechanization, for 
companies could now obtain the data needed to implement cost 
systems and establish sales analysis programs [Strom, 1992, pp. 
181-182]. With the increased importance of and demand for 
such information, the accountant was forced to become involved 
with cost finding and cost analysis or risk the loss of influence in 
this area.
 Mechanization was also an important contributing factor to 
the separation of bookkeeping from accounting. With the onset 
of mechanical accounting, the recording of accounting informa-
tion became routine and repetitive. A bookkeeper or clerk could 
process, at a lower cost, the information that the accountant 
once had recorded. At the same time, the type of information 
that companies needed was changing. Corporations now re-
quired information for capital management, standard costing, 
financial statement preparation, and cost and ratio analysis – in-
formation that bookkeepers could not provide, but accountants 
could. While accounting became responsible for providing and 
analyzing financial/managerial data and the way the informa-
tion was to be used [Abbott, 1988, p. 228], bookkeeping became 
routinized, concerned primarily with clerical tasks. Accounting 
became a profession while deskilled, repetitive, task-based book-
keeping became a trade.
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 The mechanization of bookkeeping was a major factor in 
the genderization change of the bookkeeping workforce. With 
a perception as a menial task with few opportunities for ad-
vancement, bookkeeping became an occupation for women. In 
addition to the demand created by a shortage of male bookkeep-
ers, women were perceived to have greater manual dexterity 
and greater patience with routine tasks [Oppenheimer, 1968, p. 
227]. Moreover, women could be hired at much lower wages. 
Thus, while accounting remained largely male, women began to 
dominate the bookkeeping workforce. Unlike previously, when 
bookkeepers were paid a “skill” premium in comparison to other 
jobs, the “deskilled” female bookkeepers were paid considerably 
less [Cooper and Taylor, 2000, p. 556].
 With an increased demand for accounting information and 
accountants, the accounting area became more complex with 
additional layers of management. Within accounting, major 
changes had to occur to accommodate mechanization because 
the mechanical devices could process the information only if it 
was uniformly presented. Thus, standardization of accounts and 
reporting, within a company and an industry, became necessary 
for the efficient processing and analysis of information. With 
mechanization came centralization as the bookkeeping function; 
machines often were located in a single office. Macve [2002, p. 
465] adds that it was this business expansion that led to “the 
modern explosion in accounting, and the growth of the modern 
accounting and auditing profession in the nineteenth century.” 
In only 60 years (1870-1930), the number of accountants/book-
keepers in the U.S. increased from circa 54,000 workers [U.S. 
Census Office, 1872, p. 706] to more than 900,000 [U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, 1933, Tables 3, 49].
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 Though the mechanization of information processing af-
fected many facets of the business world, studies have often 
concentrated on the effect of mechanization upon labor and the 
composition of the office workforce, of which bookkeepers were 
increasingly considered a part. These studies [e.g., Coyle, 1929; 
Baker, 1964; Rotella, 1981; Davies, 1982; Lowe, 1987; DeVault, 
1990; Fine, 1990; Strom, 1992; Kwolek-Folland, 1994; Wootton 
and Kemmerer, 1996] have traced the transformation of the of-
fice workforce (typists, secretaries, stenographers, bookkeepers) 
from predominately a male occupation to one primarily staffed 
by women, who were paid substantially lower wages than the 
men they replaced.
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 In several studies, Yates [1982, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993, 
1994, 2000] examined the changing needs for communications 
within businesses and the development of innovative commu-
nication, storage, and analyzing devices (e.g., file systems, press 
books, tabulators, telegraphs, typewriters) to serve these needs. 
Yates [1994, pp. 28-29] has also set forth the concept that while, 
for many years, there was little need for extensive financial/
managerial information due to the owner/manager structure, 
the availability and cost of such information became increas-
ingly important as companies grew larger and more geographi-
cally diverse, resulting in management becoming separated from 
ownership.
 Studies also have examined individual business machines 
and/or the effects of innovation upon specific industries. 
Norberg [1990] examined the introduction and the effects of 
punch-card machines on business and government in the early 
20th century. Campbell-Kelly [1992] reviewed the introduction 
of data-processing innovations at the Prudential Assurance 
Company to handle the vast amount of information generated 
within the insurance company. Wootton and Wolk [2000] traced 
the development of the loose-leaf system, its influence upon 
accounting, legal challenges to the concept, and its final accep-
tance by businesses. In November 2004, a special Accounting, 
Business & Financial History issue appeared whose purpose was 
“to provide a forum for the expression and hopefully the further 
development, of ideas relating to the historical impact of tech-
nological change on banking and the financial services” [Batiz-
Lazo and Boyns, 2004, p. 226]. Included here was Bonin’s [2004] 
discussion of the introduction of accounting machines in French 
banks from the 1920s to the 1960s. Commenting on the articles, 
Cortada [2004, pp. 235-236] wrote that the “topic of how in-
formation technologies were used by individual industries and 
organisations is a vast untapped area of exploration.”
 One important area for exploration is the influence of 
mechanization upon the cost/managerial side of accounting 
practice. Accounting innovations were largely responsible for 
the dramatic change in the availability and timeliness of ac-
counting information and the noticeable decrease in the cost of 
processing such information. Moreover, mechanization had a 
major influence upon the “development and use of standard ac-
counting systems” by corporations and trade groups (e.g., Retail 
Dry Goods Merchants Association), for as Geier and Mautner 
[1932, pp. 336, 338] wrote: “machines can only be economically 
applied when the operations are such that there is an endless 
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duplication of transactions.” Mechanical accounting also had a 
significant influence upon the evolution of financial/managerial 
accounting and the resulting expansion of accountants’ respon-
sibilities. Finally, the entry and role of women into account-
ing/bookkeeping for nearly one hundred years were defined and 
influenced by mechanization.
PURPOSE AND SOURCES
 The purpose of this paper is to examine the historical devel-
opment and influence of mechanical accounting from its begin-
nings in the late 19th century to its widespread use by most large 
companies in 1930. In doing so, we examine the informational, 
economical, and social forces that influenced and ultimately led 
to its use in the business world. Especially useful to our study 
were the contemporary discussions of the merits, weaknesses, 
and implementation of mechanical accounting contained in 
such journals as System, World’s Work, The Magazine of Business, 
and Commerce, Accounts & Finance. Equally important in the 
journals were the advertisements which first reflected the cre-
ation then, subsequently, the evolution and improvement of the 
mechanical devices. As the practical use of such machines was 
largely unknown, advertisements served an important role in the 
adoption of mechanical accounting by businesses. Moreover, the 
journals and advertisements of the period reflect the changing 
role of bookkeeping and women. Rarely seen in early advertise-
ments, as comptometers and bookkeeping machines evolved, 
advertisements increasingly featured women as the machines’ 
operators and, by the end of the period, the only operators of 
such machines.
OUTLINE OF PAPER
 The paper consists of five sections. The first section dis-
cusses the manual process of accounting before the emergence 
of technical innovations. The inflexibility of such a system is 
reviewed, and its hindrance on the collecting and reporting 
of financial/managerial information is noted. The section also 
examines the first emergence of basic informational processing 
devices (e.g., typewriters, adding machines). The second section 
examines the development of machines/systems (e.g., loose-leaf 
systems, bookkeeping machines) specifically designed for the 
processing of accounting information, and their influence upon 
the availability, cost, and analysis of such information. It notes 
that a new innovation often increased the efficiency of a previ-
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ous innovation – a movement toward an accounting system. 
The third section reviews the mechanization of the account-
ing process. As the availability and flexibility of mechanical 
devices increased and the costs of such machines dramatically 
decreased, the use of mechanical accounting greatly expanded. 
With this expansion, bookkeeping became a trade, staffed by 
women, while accounting assumed a more managerial role, 
staffed by men. The fourth section recognizes the emergence 
of a true accounting system and contrasts the processing of ac-
counting information in the 1880s with that in the 1930s. The 
final section presents the summary and conclusions of the study.
NEW MACHINES EMERGE, 1880-1895
 In 1880, accounting was still a manual process. As both 
the journal and ledger were bound books, only one person at 
a time could work with a volume. Moreover, entries could not 
be recorded in a journal while it was being posted. Thus, larger 
companies often maintained two sets of journals in order that 
entries could be recorded in one journal while the other was 
posted. On the following day, the journals were reversed [Betz, 
1944, p. 515].2 Of course, with a bound ledger, only one person 
at a time could perform the closing process. The bookkeeper 
performing these tasks was a white male who considered book-
keeping a respected career with an excellent chance of advance-
ment, maybe even the possibility that it might lead to one’s own 
business [Wootton and Kemmerer, 1996, p. 548].
 De Wit et al. [2002, pp. 69-70] write that office machines 
were usually introduced with one “specific functional domain” 
in mind, but due to the dynamic interaction between the pro-
ducers and users of the machines, the functions of a machine 
normally expanded. The introduction of one technology often 
leads to “the development and use of other types.” This was the 
case with the typewriter. Introduced with one activity (writing) 
in mind, the typewriter was the antecedent for the mechaniza-
tion of accounting that followed. Its introduction and adaptation 
2The number of books involved and the labor intensity can be seen in a de-
scription of the accounting process in a factory before the introduction of me-
chanical devices: “Factory accounting can be performed, long hand, by the use of 
the ordinary commercial books, which are a blotter in which is recorded a plain 
statement of every transaction made, a day-book, in which the blotter entries are 
translated into commercial language, a journal in which the day-book entries are 
once more translated into debit and credit items, and a ledger in which these 
debit and credit journal items are collected in individual accounts” [Arnold, 1901, 
p. 9].
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would not only change accounting but the office place itself and 
the very composition of the labor force within the office.
 For more than a hundred years, various writing (typing) 
machines had been patented; however, none had proved practi-
cal or commercially successful. Then, in 1873, E. Remington 
& Sons, a well-known manufacturer of firearms, agreed to 
manufacture a “type-writer” that Christopher Latham Sholes, 
aided by Carlos Glidden and James Densmore, had spent five 
years perfecting [Bliven, 1954, pp. 42-56]. Although the original 
market for type-writers was thought to be reporters, lawyers, 
and authors [Cortada, 1993, p. 16], by the early 1880s, the type-
writer or caligraph had begun to gain acceptance in businesses.
 The introduction of the typewriter also coincided with the 
U.S. becoming the world’s leading industrial nation [Chandler, 
1990, p. 47], and the emergence of large corporations that were 
dependent upon the prompt completion of reports to keep 
track of their vast operations. Although first used to type letters 
and office memos, the typewriter was soon seen as a way to 
prepare invoices and reports.3 In contrast to reports that “had 
to be laboriously written out by hand,” reports now could be 
prepared at the rate of several words per minute. Purchase or 
sale invoices could be completed in a few minutes, especially if 
a business used prepared forms that had “spaces for entering 
specific information” [Yates, 1991, p. 122]. Companies, such as 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Montgomery Ward, found typewriters 
and their adaptations essential to their operations. Sears often 
filled 100,000 orders a day from a single Chicago plant [Chand-
ler, 1990, p. 61]. With increased sales and invoices, managers in 
“credit and collection” departments found it essential to work 
closely with those in the accounting department [Chandler, 
1977, p. 222].
 In addition to increasing the efficiency of the typewriter, 
the use of preprinted forms also encouraged greater consistency 
and uniformity in the reporting of financial information. Con-
sistency in reporting was essential as companies expanded their 
manufacturing capabilities and branch offices throughout the 
U.S. and the world. Moreover, standardized forms “made it 
easier to extract the data for compilation and analysis at higher 
levels.” Using carbon paper, typists could even prepare several 
3In a 1890 advertisement [“Caligraph,” 1890, p. 12] in The Atlantic Monthly 
emphasizing the “caligraph” as “best for manifolding (making multiple copies),” 
the American Writing Machine Co. “caligraph” was listed with a price of $85. 
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copies of an invoice at once [Yates, 1994, pp. 32-33].4 With 
such innovations, the cost of processing information noticeably 
dropped [Page, 1906, p. 7682], and with lower costs, the demand 
for information increased. In addition to the demand for infor-
mation created by expanded operations, the need for financial 
information was further increased as large corporations began 
to provide some, but often crude, financial reports to their 
shareholders [Norberg, 1990, p. 757].
 Although the typewriter increased the efficiency of process-
ing information such as invoices, it could not directly enter ac-
counting transactions in bound records. It would be nearly two 
decades (1896) before the loose-leaf accounting system emerged, 
permitting individual journal/ledger sheets to be placed around 
a typewriter’s platen for processing. As a result, the typewriter 
had to be modified to work with bound volumes, and the modi-
fication became known as the book-typewriter. The premise 
behind the book-typewriter was that it would type on a flat sur-
face, but instead of requiring ledger sheets to be brought to the 
typewriter, the typewriter would go to the ledger. The first flat-
surface typewriters emerged around 1891, when two competing 
companies, the Elliott Book Typewriter Company and the Fisher 
Book Typewriter Company, introduced typewriters, both with 
flat platens that could record accounting transactions directly in 
bound volumes [Moore, 1932, pp. 56-57].
 The book-typewriter, which had a flat keyboard, was placed 
above a bound volume, and the carriage, the writing mechanism, 
moved on rails along the surface of the book with the “type bars 
strike[ing] downward.” An important feature of the Elliott book-
typewriter was “the tabulating attachment which permits the op-
erator to jump from the last character…on a column to the exact 
place…on the next column” [“Elliott Book-Typewriter,” 1902, p. 
436]. Although developed for recording transactions in bound 
volumes, the book-typewriter because of its ability to make 
multiple copies quickly became used for “all sorts of billing and 
inter-office reports as well as general commercial billing and 
4In 1906, Page [pp. 7682-7683] related the prior practice of recording sales 
at his Dry Goods Commission: “Our old office practice in charging goods was to 
have the bill, the duplicate bill, the salesbook and the sheet for our Boston house 
written by four different men to whom a fifth called off the terms, yardage, etc.” 
and “there were three sets of men…for the three sales departments.” Continuing, 
Page stated that the men were replaced by one billing clerk, who through the use 
of carbons recorded the same information, and a woman, who “extends the yards 
on the comptometer and extends the bills on the arithmometer, and does the work 
of six men with great ease.”
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statistical recording” [Moore, 1932, p. 57]. The book-typewriter’s 
ability to type upon various surfaces and to make multiple 
copies (manifolder) made it especially attractive to banks and 
railroads. Commerce, Accounts & Finance [“Book Typewriter,” 
1902, p. 28] reported that one railroad employed more than 700 
book-typewriters “for way-billing freight, twelve or fifteen copies 
of these way-bills being required.”
 At approximately the same time as the book-typewriter was 
introduced, the first widely available, commercially successful, 
adding machines (adders) and calculators (arithmometers) be-
came available in the U.S. Like the typewriter, adders or calcula-
tors had been patented for over a century in various countries. 
Some calculators like the Thomas arithmometer, developed 
by Charles Xavier Thomas de Colmar in France around 1820, 
became successful in Europe and continued to be used there 
for nearly a century [Cortada, 1993, pp. 27-28]. However, in 
the U.S., the Thomas arithmometer achieved little popularity, 
and most accounting computations continued to be performed 
manually.
 In the late 1880s, however, this changed with the introduc-
tion of the “comptometer,” “a multiple-order key-driven calculat-
ing machine,” developed by Dorr Eugene Felt [Turck, 1921, p. 
75]. Martin [1925, p. 93] wrote in an early history of calculating 
machines, “the comptometer belongs to the class of true calcu-
lating machines because not only addition and subtraction but 
also multiplication and division may conveniently be carried 
out.” Moreover, comptometer items “could be footed directly 
from the book or papers, while to be added the old way they 
would have to be listed” [“Mechanical Accountant,” 1902, p. 
27]. By 1888, major production of the comptometer had begun 
[Turck, 1921, p. 75], and, in the following year, Felt received a 
patent for his comptograph, a device similar to the comptom-
eter except that it printed results [Martin, 1925, p. 104]. During 
the same period, William S. Burroughs received a patent for 
his recording-adder machine [Turck, 1921, p. 95]. Although 
Burroughs did not live to see the success of his machine, the 
company he founded, the Burroughs Adding Machine Company, 
became a leader in the development of billing and bookkeeping 
machines.
 In only a few years, dozens of adders/calculators entered the 
marketplace with the principal market being businesses [Corta-
da, 1993, p. 26]. These machines had an immediate impact upon 
accountants and auditors, greatly increasing their efficiency, 
since computation was a major component of accounting. In 
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fact, Seward [1904, p. 607] in Engineering Magazine stated: “ad-
dition, indeed, makes up about 95% of all the accounting work 
required in a factory.” Previously, in order to prepare a trial 
balance from a ledger, to determine totals from invoices, or to 
determine the cost of manufacturing an item, each number had 
to be first listed on paper and then the column totaled manually. 
Once calculated, the total had to be verified by re-adding the col-
umn. Companies even employed “lightning calculators,” “people 
who could add long, wide columns of numbers rapidly” [Cor-
tada, 1993, p. 27]. With the adding machine, account balances 
could be entered directly into the machine without first listing 
the balance with the total automatically determined. Commerce, 
Accounts & Finance [1902, p. 27] commented on the increased 
efficiency: “There is no class of arithmetical work connected 
with accounting…on which it cannot be used, when skilfully op-
erated, at a saving of from one-half to three-quarters of the time 
required by an expert mental computer.”
 Although it would be the early 1900s before it would be 
widely utilized for this function, the calculator/comptometer also 
made possible the “rapid and accurate analysis” of data [Abbott, 
1988, p. 228]. Previously, data had to be manually processed. 
Many companies did not collect or analyze financial/managerial 
data because of the cost and time involved [Galloway, 1919, p. 
83]. With the calculator, costs could be quickly obtained, and 
the determination of unit costs became a simple process. As ac-
counting tasks (e.g., trial balances, closings) could be completed 
in a timelier manner and at a lower cost, more businesses began 
to prepare quarterly or monthly reports instead of simply an an-
nual report.
 Another important impact of the adding machine was that 
it often allowed an accountant to be replaced by a clerk. As Cor-
tada [1993, p. 30] writes, “a less well-paid clerk could do more 
work with an adding machine than a better-paid accountant 
working by hand.” There was a consequence of replacing an ac-
countant with a less well-paid clerk, namely, the loss of status 
for the task being performed. Actually, at this time, the status 
for clerical work was diminishing in all facets of the business 
office. There was a movement toward functionalization; that is, 
workers specialized in one function or on one machine, greatly 
increasing their efficiency and output. With the introduction of 
mechanical processors (e.g., typewriters, comptometers), the 
need for an office in which these functions could be centralized 
also increased [Yates, 1989, p. 10]. Thus, at many firms, the 
operators of typewriters and comptometers were assigned to 
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a “central” office. As specialization and the number of clerical 
workers increased, those performing the tasks suffered a loss of 
status, a deskilling of the positions. Prior to mechanization, cler-
ical jobs often were considered as “transitional” positions, a job 
which would lead to upward progression in the firm or a posi-
tion in which one could secure the knowledge necessary to start 
one’s own business [Fine, 1990, p. 10]. At most firms, the clerical 
workforce was small and consisted of white, middle-class men. 
Thus, as Cooper and Taylor observe [2000, p. 561]: “Clerks of the 
mid 19th century were the predecessors of modern middle man-
agement rather than the army of clerks found in the modern 
workplace.” However, with the vast increase in the clerical work-
force, a thousand-fold in 60 years, coupled with functionaliza-
tion [Hooks, 1947, p. 75], a clerical job was no longer considered 
a transitional position. It was perceived as a deskilled, dead-end 
job, often occupied by women. DeVault [1990, p. 17] writes that, 
at this time, there was the widely accepted belief that women 
were well-suited for “routinized, dead-end employment.”
 With the increased demand for office workers and a short-
age of potential male workers, the composition of the clerical 
workforce changed, including the bookkeeping area. Prior to 
mechanization, bookkeepers held a well-respected position 
within the firm, often assuming responsibilities that would 
now be considered managerial [Rotella, 1981, p. 52]. However, 
with specialization, the duties of the bookkeeper changed from 
managerial to task-based. With a shortage of men available for 
bookkeeping positions and the lower wages women command-
ed, companies began to hire women as bookkeepers [Wootton 
and Kemmerer, 1996, pp. 578-579]. In 1870, less than 1% [U.S. 
Census Office, 1872, p. 706] of the bookkeepers in the U.S. was 
women; however, by 1890, the number had risen to more than 
17% [U.S. Census Office, 1897, Table 116]. Although they were 
paid substantially less than male bookkeepers, women in book-
keeping positions normally earned considerably more than 
women in nearly every other area [DeVault, 1990, p. 56]. Thus, 
bookkeeping became an attractive employment area for women. 
Yet, at the same time, the field of accounting offered few em-
ployment opportunities for women [Wootton and Kemmerer, 
1996, pp. 556, 581].
NEW METHODS OF INFORMATION  
PROCESSING, 1896-1915
 With many companies recognizing typewriters and adding 
machines as essential to their businesses, manufacturers began 
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to design machines more directly related to specific industries 
or accounting needs. In adopting accounting innovations, banks 
often preceded other types of organizations. For example, in the 
mid-1890s, Leicester Allen developed what was called “Allen’s 
double entry accounting machine.” The Allen machine recorded 
a deposit/withdrawal of cash on the depositor’s bank book while 
at the same time generating “a paper tape, giving the number 
of the depositor’s book, and the amount” which became the 
permanent record of the event [Arnold, 1901, p. 383].5 In 1896, 
an Allen machine was accepted for trial by Union Dime Sav-
ings Institution in New York. After a three-year trial, two more 
machines were purchased. The noted accountant and president 
of Union Dime, Charles E. Sprague, wrote: “I consider the Allen 
Double Entry…a valuable invention…It insures desirable results 
which – with less certainty…could be attained only by the em-
ployment of two special clerks” [Arnold, 1901, p. 381]. Given the 
adaptability of mechanical accounting devices to the banking 
industry, manufacturers often sought and advertised such finan-
cial institutions as customers. For example, in a 1900 advertise-
ment [“Burroughs Registering…,” 1900, p. 93] Burroughs Book-
keeping Company emphasized the adoption of its registering 
accountant machine by over 3,000 banks, small as well as large” 
(emphasis in the original).
 Near the end of the 19th century, another innovation oc-
curred that greatly increased the efficiency of accounting, the 
loose-leaf system. Like the typewriter, it was an innovation eas-
ily integrated with others, a process that greatly hastened its 
further development. Up to this time, accounting transactions 
were recorded in bound journals and posted to bound ledgers. 
For larger businesses, the process was quite complex and labor 
intensive [Wootton and Wolk, 2000, p. 83]. Bound ledgers also 
prevented more than one person at a time working on an ac-
count, thus greatly slowing the closing process. Moreover, a 
bound system prevented further modification of the typewriter 
to process accounting information more efficiently. Although the 
book-typewriter could enter transactions in bound volumes, it 
was a large, slow, sometimes difficult to operate machine [Oden, 
1917, pp. 54-55].
5Before accepting the Allen double entry accounting machine for trial, the 
Union Dime Savings machine set 19 specific requirements that the machine had 
to meet. Most of the requirements dealt with the prevention of fraud by the ma-
chine user and the maximum time required to complete an operation, “the aver-
age time of the entire operation is about twenty seconds” [Arnold, 1901, p. 383].
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 Garner [1954] points out that, in addition to being condu-
cive to the modification of the typewriter and the creation of the 
bookkeeping machine, the loose-leaf system (often represented 
as the “card system”) played an important role in the develop-
ment of cost accounting and the introduction of perpetual 
inventory. Henry Metcalfe in 1885 articulated the card system 
as an essential element in the control and determination of raw 
material costs, advocating that “a card should be made out for 
almost every possible type of transaction or transfer of material” 
[Garner, 1954, p. 92]. As Metcalfe [1885, p. 20] pointed out, the 
card system was much more flexible and efficient in a large fac-
tory “where books required to transact the morning’s business 
numbered 18 and weighed about 60 lbs.”
 The card system was widely used for inventory control. In 
1899, H.L. Arnold, in Complete Cost-Keeper, described a “stores 
ledger card system” in which the balance in the materials ac-
count “was known at the end of each day,” and which would be 
physically verified “at least every sixty days” [Arnold, cited by 
Garner, 1954, p. 95]. By 1904, “cost authorities were referring to 
the perpetual inventory plan [stores ledger card] by its present 
title [Garner, 1954, p. 96].” Even in banks, which Sprague [1913, 
p. 100] noted had previously “posted the depositors’ accounts 
from these clumsy books and not from the easily handled (de-
posit) tickets,” now “universally” posted from the tickets.
 Two leading companies in the vanguard of the loose-leaf sys-
tem were Baker-Vawter, which began national sales of a loose-
leaf ledger in 1896 [Vawter, 1917, p. 17], and the Krag Manufac-
turing Company, which began sales of the Tengwall file system 
in 1897 [Stoeckel, 1940, p. 26]. Both systems were similar to 
today’s three-ring notebooks in that leaves could be added to or 
removed from the binder [Wootton and Wolk, 2000, p. 88]. The 
loose-leaf system allowed the greater use of adding machines as 
several accounts could be totaled at the same time, significantly 
reducing the time required to close accounts. Another advantage 
was that loose-leaf forms could be inserted directly into type-
writers or bookkeeping machines for processing. As a result, the 
“total” accounting system, combining the loose-leaf system with 
a bookkeeping machine, became the emphasis of advertisements 
by manufacturers of both. As Moore [1932, pp. 67-68] notes, 
without the “equal development” and acceptance of loose-leaf 
and standardized forms, “the business machine industry could 
not successfully exist.”
 Another major innovation for processing accounting infor-
mation was the tabulating machine. Leffingwell [1926, p. 164] 
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commented on why the tabulating machine emerged: “It [was] 
almost imperative that the age-old, slow, inaccurate, and costly 
methods of gathering data be supplanted by some mechanical 
substitute.” However, the gathering of such information was de-
pendent upon the “recording, storing and retrieving, analyzing, 
and presentation of large amounts of numerical information 
within companies” [Yates, 2000, p. 112]. Although some com-
panies may have kept such records, the manual cost to actually 
process the information made it virtually unusable except for 
the largest companies where the tabulating machine found its 
initial and greatest use.
 It was the need to process large amounts of data that led 
to the development of the tabulating machine. Employed at the 
U.S. Census Office, Herman Hollerith knew that census informa-
tion was still being tabulated five years after the 1880 census was 
conducted [Harmon, 1975, p. 102]. With this in mind, Hollerith 
began work on a machine that could process great amounts of 
data. In 1889, the Census Office considered three methods of 
tabulation for the 1890 census, including Hollerith’s card tabu-
lating system, which was eventually selected. In contrast to the 
seven and one-half years needed to compile the 1880 census, 
Hollerith’s machine permitted the 1890 census to be tabulated in 
less than two months [Harmon, 1975, pp. 102-103]. Recognizing 
the commercial possibilities of the machine, Hollerith started 
the Tabulating Machine Company, ultimately IBM, in 1896. For 
over a decade, Hollerith faced little competition. However, in 
1911, James Powers formed the Powers Accounting Machine 
Company, later acquired by Remington Rand, which used a dif-
ferent method of tabulation [Harmon, 1975, pp. 106-107].
 Seeing the success of the tabulating machine in processing 
census data and recognizing its potential for analyzing such 
data, companies that generated large amounts of data soon were 
renting their own tabulating machines. Among the major users 
of tabulators were the railroads where “one of the most wide-
spread uses of tabulating machines was in railroad freight ac-
counting and rate statistics” [Norberg, 1990, p. 766]. For exam-
ple, shortly before the turn of the century, the New York Central 
Railroad installed several tabulating machines, each with four 
attached adding machines. Scott [1905, p. 5976], referring to the 
tabulators’ benefit to the New York Central, wrote: “(it) will com-
pute shop costs, analyze and take account of sales, make distri-
bution of expenditures, and make almost any analysis of a great 
volume of facts…(and) where the amount of business justifies 
its installation it is much cheaper.” In the case of the New York 
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Central, the amount of data was phenomenal. It was estimated 
that tabulators processed approximately four million waybills in 
1897 [Norberg, 1990, p. 762]. The use of a tabulator also had an 
effect on the duties of the railway accountant. With a lower-paid 
bookkeeper or clerk responsible for data entry, the accountant 
now assumed responsibility for the determination of what data 
(costs) should be gathered.
 Another area in which there was a vast amount of infor-
mation to process was the insurance industry. At the turn of 
the 20th century, it was estimated that the largest insurance 
companies each had approximately one million small insurance 
policies (collected weekly) and one hundred thousand larger 
policies (collected monthly) which had to be recorded, billed, 
and collected. The companies also faced multiple-states regula-
tions of their policies and were under some pressure to provide 
“a quasi-public service at the lowest cost possible” [Yates, 2000, 
pp. 130-131]. Thus faced with a vast amount of data and a need 
for detailed cost information, insurance companies, such as 
Continental Casualty, began to make extensive use of tabulat-
ing machines, especially in the area of financial analysis. On 
one “claim settlement card,” Continental stated that it could 
record the policyholder’s account number, address, age, type of 
claim (one of 9,999 different possibilities), settlement date, and 
amount of settlement. The cards could then be sorted (e.g., by 
type of claim) at the rate of 300 cards per minute and totaled 
at the rate of 150 cards per minute. With this information, the 
general auditor of Continental Casualty stated that the company 
could “determine with absolute precision not only the claim cost 
of the many different forms of accident and health policies that 
we issue, but…determine very easily what each of those condi-
tions contributes toward the total cost of any form of policy” 
[Luse, 1911, pp. 60-62]. In contrast to the slow, expensive, man-
ual collection of information, companies could now obtain cost 
data quickly and inexpensively, encouraging them to request 
even more information.
 With the capability now of determining the actual costs of 
a policy or process, the next logical step was to develop a “stand-
ard” cost for the product. However, the determination of a stand-
ard cost required an expansion of costing theory, or, as Abbott 
[1988, p. 232] writes, “[the] estimation of standards required 
solving the ‘burden problem’ [of allocating overhead costs], 
smoothing out random fluctuations in shop work, and calculat-
ing the effects of fluctuating factors of production.” Thus, the 
accountant’s responsibility expanded beyond the mere reporting 
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of numerical data. The accountant had to become involved in 
the day-to-day operations of a plant, to analyze complex produc-
tion processes, and now to make the assumptions required to set 
a standard that could be used to evaluate the efficiency of future 
output. In Abbott’s view [1988, p. 232], it was “these conventions 
[that] created the crucial judgments that made cost accountants 
real professionals.”
 By 1910, the “complete” billing machine had emerged. 
Three popular billing machines were the Elliott-Fisher, the 
Moon-Hopkins, and the Underwood [Schulze, 1913, p. 42]. A 
billing machine combined the features of the typewriter with the 
adding machine. This allowed a simultaneous “billing and ledger 
statement posting,” which led The American Business Manual 
[Montgomery, 1911, p. 279] to declare: “The compound [billing] 
machine is probably the most efficient and accurate mechanical 
device ever designed.” These “compound” features were often 
the focus of advertisements. For example, Elliott-Fisher [“Bill-
ing and Adding…,” 1906] claimed that its billing machine would 
do “all the typewriting capable of being done by any typewriter” 
plus “all the printing and adding of figures hitherto done by 
Adding and Listing Machines.” In fact, the advertisement stated: 
“It will print the figures in columns and automatically total the 
figures wherever the column or columns may be located.” The 
price of the Elliott-Fisher billing machine, including one adding 
register, was $325. A separate register (price $60) was required 
for each column to be totaled. Thus, the total price of a billing 
machine that could record and total two columns was $385.
 Although accounting machines were comparatively expen-
sive, companies could recover their initial costs through greater 
efficiency. In 1914, the Gulf Pipe Line Company reported that 
its use of seven Burroughs listing machines allowed it to reduce 
the size of its accounting department from 39 to 35 employees, 
saving “at least $500 per month” [Lewis, 1914, p. 164]. In an-
other illustration of cost efficiency, the Warner Sugar Refining 
Company reported that its bookkeeping department now con-
sisted of “three girls and three bookkeeping machines.” These 
“girls” could post 1,000 accounts a day, prepare the brokerage 
statements, and write all checks. Using a bookkeeping machine, 
Warner Sugar reported that one operator “takes the place of 
three men” [Galloway, 1919, p. 84]. The “girl” was typically paid 
a lower wage than a male employee [Wootton and Kemmerer, 
1996, p. 569]. 
 As the complete billing machine emerged, there were con-
tinued improvements in the operations of adding machines 
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and calculators. Major brands (e.g., Dalton,6 Wales, Barrett, 
Mechanical Accountant) extensively advertised their machines’ 
advantages. However, for basic computations, the comptometer 
remained the machine of choice as it was recognized as very fast 
and very reliable. Moreover, many comptometer operators were 
trained by the machine’s manufacturer, greatly increasing their 
efficiency.7
 Despite the proliferation of accounting machines, there was 
a demand for a machine that could total multiple columns or 
calculate sales by departments as it determined the total sales 
of a business. In response, the “duplex” adder, a machine that 
could do multiple computations at once, was introduced in 
the early 1910s. The duplex had two separate adding wheels, 
upper and lower rows, and the ability to transfer amounts be-
tween wheels. Therefore, it could conduct two operations at 
once. Among the most successful duplexes were the Burroughs 
duplex and the Burroughs cost keeping machine, which had 
greater computation capacity and flexibility than the duplex. A 
15-column duplex would allow a company to “add six columns 
of five figures each at the same time” [Lewis, 1914, p. 181]. With 
the “unlimited split” option, the number of figures in a column 
could be increased or decreased to meet a company’s needs. 
Thus, businesses could record and total both the costs and sell-
ing prices of merchandise at the same time.
 While the duplex machine was useful for cost and price 
information, it was particularly useful for payrolls. With a 
duplex, a company could calculate and record the payroll for 
each department at the same time the total payroll was deter-
mined. Burroughs even offered a “payroll” version that printed 
the employee’s payroll number and earnings for the period on 
individual payroll envelopes at the same time as it recorded the 
payroll sheet [Lewis, 1914, pp. 179, 188].
6Although most adding/calculating machines (e.g., the Burroughs, comptom-
eter) were full-keyboard machines at this time, the Dalton adding machine was a 
ten-key adding machine. In contrast to the full-keyboard models where operators 
had to look at the keyboard, the Dalton could be operated by touch [Martin, 1925, 
p. 133]. 
7Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., the manufacturer of the comptometer, sponsored a 
training program on the use of its machines. The length of the training program 
was from two months to ten weeks with six hours of training each day. In 1915, 
the usual tuition to attend a training program was $40 with five to seven students 
in a class [Eaton and Stevens, 1915, p. 214]. In their comments on the placement 
of its graduates, Eaton and Stevens wrote, “great effort made. Good operators not 
idle. Girls trained according to demand.” 
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 Another use for the duplex machine was cost determina-
tion and control. Webner [1917, pp. 173-180] examined how the 
“mental calculations” of a card cost system could be reduced 
through the use of a duplex machine. The duplex’s great com-
mercial success was emphasized in a 1913 Burroughs’ advertise-
ment. “This ‘two-in-one’ machine in a little more than a year has 
made a big ‘hit’ 2,600 out of the 20,000 Burroughs machines 
sold last year were Burroughs Duplexes” [“Burroughs Duplex…,” 
1913].
 With the geographic expansion of American businesses and 
the wave of mergers between companies, the information re-
quired to manage these widespread operations grew dramatical-
ly. With the increased demand for information, there occurred 
an explosive growth in the office workforce needed to provide 
it. For example, from 1890 to 1910, the number of typists and 
stenographers increased from 33,418 to 316,693 [U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, 1914, Table 15]. As the clerical workforce expanded, 
there was a corresponding increase in the number of bookkeep-
ers/accountants needed to process the financial information 
required by these companies.
 With the greater acceptance of mechanical innovations, the 
separation of accounting from bookkeeping accelerated. Previ-
ously, many bookkeepers had worked directly with their employ-
ers [Fine, 1990, pp. 166-167]. Moreover, the accountant/book-
keeper had “assumed responsibilities that [were] managerial” 
[Rotella, 1981, p. 52]. However, with mechanization and special-
ization, the collection and recording of information were often 
moved to a central office where the financial information was 
processed by a bookkeeper or clerk. In regard to this change, 
Sweetland [1906, p. 196] wrote: “It might appear that the vari-
ous mechanical aids.…make a mechanical accountant. But they 
really make the accountant less mechanical by giving him only 
mental work.” Thus, it was the accountant who now assumed 
the “managerial and planning aspects of the bookkeeper’s job” 
[Strom, 1992, p. 185].
 Although the separation of bookkeeping from account-
ing had begun, the bookkeeper and the accountant were still 
considered to perform the same tasks for census purposes 
and were thus classified in the same category. In only 20 years 
(1890–1910), the number of bookkeepers/accountants increased 
from 159,374 to 482,814. However, the increase of women in the 
bookkeeping/accounting workforce, largely as bookkeepers, was 
even more dramatic, increasing from 27,772 to 184,999 [U.S. 
Bureau of Census, 1914, Table 15]. By 1910, women comprised 
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more than 38% of the bookkeeping/accounting workforce con-
trasted to only 1% in 1870.
THE MECHANIZATION OF ACCOUNTING, 1916-1930
 By 1920, the market for tabulating machines had expanded 
beyond traditional users, such as railroads and insurance 
companies, to large manufacturers.8 Companies in the rubber, 
textiles, and automobile industries, for example, found that 
tabulators could reduce the menial side of information gather-
ing, allowing them to concentrate on identifying and analyzing 
data [Norberg, 1990, pp. 767, 772].
 Tabulators also began to have an impact upon the account-
ing area. Kent [1918, p. 137] related the effect of the introduc-
tion of the Hollerith tabulating system upon the accounting and 
costing process of the Pennsylvania Steel Co. With its adoption 
of tabulators, the company substantially reduced its accounting 
workforce and basically eliminated the need for accountants to 
work at night. Before the adoption of the tabulator, it was not 
normally until the 15th of the next month before a cost state-
ment could be prepared. With the new technology, cost reports 
could be completed in five to seven days. Furthermore, whereas 
27 products had previously been costed and analyzed, now 130 
products were individually tracked.
 Other companies, such as Marshall Field and Eastman 
Kodak, made use of tabulating machines to implement new 
costing and sales analysis programs [Strom, 1992, pp. 181-182]. 
The Larkin Company, a food distributor, used the punch-card 
system to manage its inventory. Scovill, which already used a 
Hollerith machine to process large quantities of data, added to 
its operation a Powers tabulator, justifying its need: “The Powers 
Machine will open up a large field of statistical investigation and 
presentation” [Davis, 1919, quoted in Yates, 1991, p. 147].
 In addition to aiding the analysis of information, tabulators 
increased the timeliness of cost/financial reports. One reason for 
this efficiency was that the tabulating system allowed manufac-
turing costs to be entered on cards as incurred; then “at the end 
of the month [these data could be] quickly sorted and tabulated 
to obtain the information required to close the books and for 
8Unlike other business machines that could be purchased, sorting and tabu-
lating machines normally had to be rented. In 1924, the costs to rent a Hollerith’s 
sorting machine and a five-counter printing tabulator were $25 and $150 respec-
tively per month. The keypunch machine could be purchased for $100 [McCarthy, 
1924, p. 358].
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posting to the detail cost records” [Eggleston and Robinson, 
1921, p. 417].9 Tabulators also allowed “bookkeeping” depart-
ments to prepare daily balance sheets, which, in turn, allowed 
management and “accountants” to analyze changes in balance 
sheet items [de Wit and van den Ende, 2000, p. 99].
 While the tabulating machine gained acceptance by larger 
manufacturers, the development of the accounting machine 
 continued. As a result, while some companies still advertised 
billing machines (e.g., the Moon-Hopkins10 billing machine), 
many advertisers (e.g., Burroughs, Underwood) hawked book-
keeping or figuring machines, which emphasized the machines’ 
more expansive nature. Other companies (e.g., Elliott-Fisher, 
Remington) even labeled some of their products “accounting 
machines.”
 Regardless of their names, these machines performed many 
of the tasks that previously had been done manually. No longer 
did a transaction have to be recorded in a bound journal, posted 
to a bound ledger, and the balance manually determined. Ma-
chines could now record a transaction in the journal and ledger 
at the same time and strike the balance automatically [Geier and 
Mautner, 1932, pp. 250-251]. However, the person recording the 
transaction was probably no longer an accountant but a clerk 
or bookkeeper. The accountant was the person supervising the 
bookkeeping department. This concept of the accountant as a 
director, not a recorder, was emphasized in advertisements of 
the period. In an advertisement for its bookkeeping machine, 
Elliott-Fisher stated that the machine lifts the accountant “out 
of the machine-class…and gives you the opportunity to use your 
 9Other uses for tabulating machines included inventory control and billings. 
One company used three punching machines, one sorter, and three tabulators to 
keep track of the merchandise it distributed to 400 grocery and meat stores in 
New York. Upon receipt of merchandise, the company classified the goods and 
entered the data upon cards. As goods were distributed, the respective cards were 
removed, tabulated, and “a regular invoice [is provided] in duplicate, showing 
the number of units, description, weight, retail price, and retail extension of each 
classification of merchandise delivered” [Leffingwell, 1926, p. 178]. Moreover, the 
company could determine its inventory at any time by simply running the remain-
ing cards through the sorting and tabulating machines.
10Although still referred to as the Moon-Hopkins billing machine and often 
recognized as the leading billing machine by this time, its original manufacturer, 
the Moon-Hopkins Company, had been acquired by the Burroughs Adding Ma-
chine Company. The major advantage of the Moon-Hopkins was its rapid proc-
essing of invoices. The price of the basic Moon-Hopkins, without a multiplier- 
subtractor, was $650 while the advanced electric model was $950 [McCarthy, 
1924, p. 432].
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time, your hands and brains in directing work [“Turn That Book-
keeping…,” 1915] (emphasis in the original).
 The idea that a bookkeeping machine could take over the 
manual aspects of accounting was delineated in a two-page ad-
vertisement in System [“New York Times,” 1923, pp. 704-705]. In 
the ad, Underwood Typewriter Company claimed that the New 
York Times had installed 12 Underwood bookkeeping machines 
in its accounting department. With the machines, the depart-
ment was assured that “all the business of that day has been 
recorded – all the charges made – all the credits entered – all the 
balances struck.”
 The concept that a bookkeeping machine was to work with 
the accounting department as well as to improve its efficiency 
was emphasized in advertisements of the period. In introducing 
its new “automatic-electric,” flat-surface accounting machine, 
Elliott-Fisher stated that the only way to see how “this machine 
can be used in your accounting department…[is to] see it in 
operation.” As did similar machines, the Elliott-Fisher “auto-
matic-electric” eliminated several manual steps. It automatically 
returned the carriage, spaced lines, tabbed columns, totaled col-
umns, decimal spaced, aligned forms, fed carbons, and provided 
a written proof of balance [“Announcing the New…,” 1926, pp. 
844-845]. Martin [1925, p. 116], in his early history of the cal-
culating machine, described how an electric upright Burroughs 
machine worked in an office:
The account sheet is fed into the automatic jump car-
riage…the old balance is typed…the electric key is 
pressed…the date is automatically typed…the debit is 
automatically subtracted…the credit is automatically 
added…the new balance is automatically calculated 
and typed…the account sheet is ejected…at the end of 
the workday, the machine supplies a check of the en-
tries…except for the fact that the amounts that are to 
be entered must be typed, and the electric key must be 
pressed, the machine operates automatically through-
out.
 As accounting machines advanced, the basic adding ma-
chine/calculator also improved. With a noticeable increase in 
the number of manufacturers, the prices of machines dropped 
sharply. Emphasizing price and reliability in introducing its 
adding machine, the Victor adding machine Co. stated that it 
produced only one model. While it was comparable to other 
mass-produced adding machines, the company could offer an 
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eight-column listing machine for “a startling price” of $100 
[“One and Only One…,” 1923, p. 803]. Victor’s price contrasted 
with other “five-column machines selling at about $250, and 
nine-column machines in the $300 to $400 range” [Darby, 1968, 
p. 29]. With this price advantage, the Victor Company’s machine 
was a success. In two years, nearly 100,000 adding machines 
were sold [Darby, 1968, p. 58]. With lower prices, more busi-
nesses were able to afford the machines. It was not long before 
the adding machine became a required item in most offices 
[Cortada, 1993, p. 268].11
 Some manufacturers combined the adding machine with 
other business machines. In its advertisements, the Sundstrand 
Adding Machine Company emphasized that businesses need 
to make decisions based upon daily information, and that its 
“Combined cash register-adding machine” allowed a company 
to “keep a perpetual inventory, keep a record of sales by depart-
ments, keep a record of each clerk’s sales, and classify expenses 
for rent, salaries, etc.” [“Merchants…,” 1922, p. 731]. Although 
Felt & Tarrant’s comptometer continued to be recognized as a 
fast, reliable calculating machine and its advertisements em-
phasized the comptometer’s “99.4% first time accuracy,” other 
manufacturers now offered competitive machines [“For Speed 
With Accuracy…,” 1925, p. 805]. Indirectly criticizing the train-
ing required for the efficient use of the comptometer, Monroe 
Calculating Machine Co.’s advertisement emphasized that the 
Monroe “can be used by an inexperienced clerk” and one “you 
can operate yourself when you wish to get out confidential fig-
ures” [“Ten Reasons…,” 1925, p. 794]. At this time, the price of a 
Monroe calculator ranged from $200 (6 x 6 keyboard, 12 places 
answer) to $400 (10 x 10 keyboard, 20 places answer) [Martin, 
1925, p. 251].
 With the gathering and processing of data largely mecha-
nized in larger firms, the final separation of bookkeeping from 
accounting could occur. This growing separation was reflected 
by the U.S. Bureau of Census which, for the first time in the 
1920 Census, separated bookkeeping from accounting in its re-
porting categories. Bookkeeping was now a trade, a clerical task 
[Kirkham and Loft, 1993, p. 513]. In contrast to the apprentice-
11Two years after the introduction of Victor’s $100 model adding machine, the 
Portable Adding Machine Sales Company advertised a seven-column adding ma-
chine, built by the Corona Typewriter Company: “Truly portable [listing] adding 
machine” for $65. In contrast to other machines weighing up to 100 pounds, the 
portable machine’s weight (16 lbs.) was an attractive feature [“At Last…,” 1925, 
p. 784].
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ship concept previously used to train most bookkeepers [Samp-
son, 1960, p. 460], they were now expected to bring with them 
knowledge of and an ability to use office machines. Bookkeep-
ers, normally women, received such training in business courses 
in high schools or in special business schools, thus needing 
little additional training on the job [Blau and Ferber, 1992, p. 
30]. In contrast to bookkeeping, the technical knowledge that 
accountants were expected to bring to the job increasingly re-
quired a college education or college courses. Yet, at several col-
leges, women could not take accounting courses, while at others, 
women could take accounting courses only in night programs. 
At nearly every college, women were discouraged from seeking 
careers in accounting [Wootton and Spruill, 1994, p. 242].
 While bookkeeping was becoming a trade, accounting had 
evolved into a profession with management responsibilities 
[DeVault, 1990, p. 22]. With the separation of responsibilities 
and perceptions, dramatic changes took place in the workforce. 
Although the accountant was most likely male, the person oper-
ating the bookkeeping machine probably was a female who was 
paid substantially less than the male bookkeeper she succeeded 
in the job. By 1920, while 56.1% of bookkeepers were women, 
only 11.3% of accountants were [U.S. Bureau of Census, 1923, 
Table 4].
 The change in the composition of the bookkeeping work-
force and the corresponding change in responsibilities were 
also reflected in the advertisements of the period. Whereas 
in the early years of mechanization, advertisements normally 
presented the machine operator as a man, they now pictured 
the operator as a woman. In a typical advertisement, comptom-
eter [“The Bookkeeper,” 1916] emphasized how a “girl” with a 
comptometer could increase the efficiency of an “accounting” 
department. Instead of accountants having to prove the postings 
and balance the accounts in a ledger, the ledger now could be 
turned over to “the girl and the machine in the above picture” 
and she “will prove the postings...and balance the accounts” for 
them [“Bookkeeper,” 1916]. There was now a separation of the 
accountant from the bookkeeper with the latter responsible for 
the menial tasks and the former for supervision.
MECHANICAL ACCOUNTING
 By 1930, for most companies, the processing of account-
ing information had changed from being a manual process to 
a largely mechanical one. In his study of the use of accounting 
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machines in French banks, Bonin [2004, p. 267] points out 
two major reasons for this transformation: “They [accounting 
machines] helped reduce the number of employees and cut 
operating costs while, on the other hand, they improved the 
quality, reliability and speed of services.” At this time, whether 
the firm was French or American, it was most likely that ma-
chines were designed or manufactured in the U.S. The U.S. had 
become the leading provider of accounting and tabulating ma-
chines throughout the world [Cortada, 1993, pp. 41-43]. These 
machines were also cost effective. For example, in 1923, one 
French bank estimated that the cost of its Burroughs account-
ing machines could be recovered in 14 months [Bonin, 2004, p. 
260].
 While accounting machines could be credited with the 
coincident reduction of the workforce and operating costs, the 
accounting transformation was greater, for it had reached what 
de Wit et al. [2002, p. 65] refer to as an “innovation junction” 
where “the successful integration of system machines into an 
administrative organization called for much closer coopera-
tion between suppliers and users, who also frequently called on 
consulting firms for advice about office technology.” This was 
the case in the U.S. Now there were companies that offered 
complete accounting systems that could handle nearly every 
phase in the processing of accounting information. If a business 
could not install its own accounting system, a company could be 
hired to do so. If a business was unsure of the system it needed, 
IBM advertised: “International Business Machines for forty 
years have been solving problems of this kind” [“It’s Profit that 
Counts…,” 1929, p. 100]. If IBM could not provide an answer, 
perhaps Baker-Vawter [“Accounting a Problem…,” 1927, p. 
859] could. Its advertisement recommended that all businesses 
should use an accounting machine; the question was: “Which 
accounting machine can I use to best advantage? And that is just 
where the Baker-Vawter man can help.”
 The changes in the availability and processing of accounting 
information in only fifty years were dynamic. Whereas in 1880, 
accounting computations were basically manual operations, 
by 1930, a business could purchase a printing Victor adding 
 machine for $75 [“These are the Days…,” 1929] or a Marchant 
portable calculator for $125 [“Add-Multiply-Subtract-Divide,” 
1929, p. 455] to handle the computations. The loose-leaf system, 
which offered greater flexibility and efficiency, had replaced 
the bound volumes of the manual system. Moreover, loose-
leaf sheets could be used in electric accounting machines. The 
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 development and use of uniform accounting systems within 
industries and companies accompanied the innovations. For 
example, by 1930, the Retail Dry Goods Merchants Association 
had developed a uniform accounting system “for use in depart-
ment stores and other retail stores.” It recommended to its mem-
bers the “machines that have been found to be most capable of 
performing the operations embraced by that system” [Geier and 
Mautner, 1932, p. 338].
 In addition to the development of standardized systems, ac-
counting machines and systems were devised for specific needs. 
For a business with installment sales, Remington Rand [“Do You 
Sell…,” 1928, p. 776] offered the Kardex visible systems (“which 
signal due dates and warn against bad credit risks”), the Baker 
Vawter-Kalamazoo loose-leaf system (“available for installment 
accounting”), and the Remington accounting machine (“particu-
larly suited to posting installment accounts”). For banks, there 
was the Dalton dual bank bookkeeping machine, designed for 
“the posting of commercial checking accounts, savings accounts, 
stock records, etc.” [Geier and Mautner, 1932, p. 278].
 By 1930, the Burroughs Adding Machine Company offered 
a machine for any size company and for nearly any accounting 
need. In collaboration with the National Standard Parts Associa-
tion, Burroughs developed a manual [N.S.P.A. Manual of Stand-
ard Bookkeeping, 1929, pp. 3-24] for the Association’s jobbers in 
which the functions of individual machines were described. For 
a small business, there was the Burroughs typewriter billing and 
bookkeeping machine so “the small Jobber will be able to obtain 
all the advantages of mechanical accounting.” For larger jobbers 
with greater billings, there was the Burroughs typewriter billing 
machine that “writes and computes a complete invoice in one 
operation, including all typing, extending, figuring of discounts 
and totaling of the bill.”
 Machines were also designed for specific industries. For 
example, Burroughs manufactured a billing machine specifi-
cally for gas, electric, and water utilities. The operator had only 
to enter the customer’s account number with the previous and 
present meter readings, and the billing machine computed the 
amount of consumption, determined the customer’s charge, pre-
pared the customer’s bill, updated the customer’s ledger account, 
and automatically injected and ejected the forms. The cost of the 
machine was $2,925 [McCarthy, 1924, p. 470].
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 As the mechanization of accounting progressed from the in-
troduction of the typewriter to the more sophisticated calculat-
ing machines, coincident changes also occurred in the account-
ing workforce and the way managers viewed the information 
they needed to run their organizations. By 1930, “mechanical” 
accounting was in use at most major companies. Along with 
the general acceptance of mechanical accounting came the pro-
gression of accounting beyond bookkeeping and the perceived 
role that women would play in each.12 The changing gender 
composition of the bookkeeping/accounting workforce is pre-
sented in Table 1. Prior to the 1920 Census, the U.S. Census Of-
fice classified accountants/bookkeepers “of all kinds” in a single 
category. In 1920, recognizing the separation of accounting from 
bookkeeping, the U.S. Census Office created two categories for 
classification purposes – accountants/auditors and bookkeepers/
cashiers.
 Bookkeepers using mechanical devices recorded and posted 
transactions, prepared invoices, received and made payments, 
and totaled the accounts and ledgers. Since these tasks were 
considered repetitive [Erickson, 1934, pp. 16-17] and more of 
“a mechanical process” [Parsons, 1917, p. 188], the “prevailing 
view at this time was that bookkeeping” was a proper area of 
employment for women [Wootton and Kemmerer, 2000, p. 182]. 
Thus, instead of hiring men as bookkeepers, companies began 
to hire white, middle-class women [Fine, 1990, p. xvii]. Whereas 
less than 1% of bookkeepers were women in 1870, by 1930, the 
number had risen to more than 60% (see Table 1). However, as 
12There are several studies that have examined the entry and role of women 
in the fields of accounting and bookkeeping. Wescott and Seiler [1986], Reid et 
al. [1987], and Legge [1988] present broad studies of women’s entry into the pro-
fession. Lehman [1992] examines the obstacles women faced entering the pro-
fession and the theories that explain women’s “stratification” in the profession. 
Kirkham and Loft [1993] examine the separation of bookkeeping and account-
ing in England and Wales and, as a result, bookkeeping becoming “feminized.” 
McKeen and Richardson [1998] look at the entry of women into the Canadian 
accounting profession. Shackleton [1999] traces the admission of women in Scot-
land as chartered accountants. Wootton and Kemmerer [1996, 2000] review the 
genderization of bookkeeping and accounting in the U.S. Walker [2003a] explores 
the entry of women to bookkeeping in late 19th century Britain, and finds re-
tailing and distribution as areas in which initial employment was often found. 
Walker [2003b] examines the role and influence that household accounting had 
upon the entry of women into the outside job market, and found that it helped 
contain women in the private household sphere. Hammond [2003] summarizes 
“international research on race and gender.”
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with other office workers, the wages paid to women bookkeep-
ers were substantially lower than those of the men they replaced 
[Fine, 1990, p. 73].13
 In contrast, accountants were often considered profession-
als. The separation of management from ownership required 
someone to represent the shareholders’ and creditors’ interests 
in the company. That person often was the public accountant 
[Porter, 1995, p. 91], bringing to the audit a sense of inde-
pendence and professionalism. Within companies, accountants 
were responsible for the preparation of the financial statements, 
the analysis of cost and financial data, and the development 
and implementation of accounting systems. Accountants were 
typically viewed as managers [DeVault, 1990, p. 22]. “Women 
were usually perceived as not having the emotional makeup, 
the judgement, the analytical reasoning, or the long-term com-
mitment to the job that was required for a manager” or for 
13Although female bookkeepers were paid substantially less than male book-
keepers, women employed as bookkeepers, as were most office workers in the 
 early 1900s, usually earned more than women in other occupations (e.g., teaching, 
retail clerks, production workers) at that time [Fine, 1990, pp. 42-43]. Moreover, 
as Strom [1992, p. 205] points out, working conditions for bookkeepers or office 
workers usually were better than for women in nonprofessional employment.
TABLE 1
The Changing Gender Composition of the  
Accounting/Bookkeeping Workforce, Men and Women,  
in the U.S., 1870 to 1930
  Total Men % Women %
Year of 1870
 Book-keepers & Accountants 54,041 53,489 99.0 552 1.0
Year of 1890
 Bookkeepers & Accountants 159,374 131,602 82.6 27,772 17.4
Year of 1910
 Bookkeepers & Accountants 482,814 297,815 61.7 184,999 38.3
Year of 1930
 Bookkeepers & Cashiers 739,077 273,380 37.0 465,697 63.0
 Accountants & Auditors 191,571 174,557 91.1 17,014 8.9
Sources: U.S. Census Office (Bureau of the Census) (1872), Vol. I, Table XXIX; 
(1897), Part II, Table 78; (1914), Vol. IV, Table 15; (1933), Vol. 5, Table 6
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an accountant [Wootton and Kemmerer, 1996, pp. 583-584]. 
Thus, while women comprised over half of the bookkeeping 
workforce, women constituted less than 10% of the accounting 
workforce (see Table 1), a percentage that did not noticeably 
change until the 1960s. While the mechanization of accounting 
may not be viewed as creating the changing genderization, it 
did significantly alter the types of job responsibilities previously 
performed by both sexes.
 The mechanization of accounting also coincided with a vast 
increase in the demand for information. As Chandler [1977, p. 
109] points out, with the emergence of the large corporation, “a 
constant flow of information was essential to the efficient opera-
tion of these new large business domains.” It was “bookkeeping, 
accounting, and statistical analysis...[that] allowed corporate 
managers to gain real control of their enormous organizations” 
[Strom, 1987, pp. 65-66]. The information they required was 
both financial and managerial, for “without a corresponding 
increase in the quantity and quality of management account-
ing information, these organizations would not have been able 
to capture the full potential gains from increased scale of op-
erations” [Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, p. 8]. However, as Yates 
[1991, p. 120] observed: “This increased demand for internal in-
formation might have been curtailed by its high cost, except for 
some changes on the supply side of the equation.” The change in 
the supply side was the adoption of new technological advances 
in the processing of information. It was the acceptance of type-
writers, loose-leaf accounting systems, bookkeeping machines, 
tabulators, and other innovations to process information that 
allowed American businesses to greatly increase the availability 
and timeliness of financial and cost information. It also was the 
availability of these machines that allowed businesses to analyze 
the information in-depth.
 By 1930, the initial phase of the mechanization of account-
ing was complete. The machines (e.g., calculators, accounting 
machines, tabulating machines) that would dominate the proc-
essing of accounting information for the next two decades had 
emerged [Cortada, 1993, p. 159]. There would be advances in ac-
counting information processing devices; however, these chang-
es would be primarily improvements, not major technological 
changes in the way information was processed. It would not 
be until after the World War II “that a comparably rapid period 
of change” would occur [Yates, 1994, p. 47]. Then, as had hap-
pened at the turn of the 20th century, a series of major techno-
logical innovations occurred (e.g., computers, copiers) and the 
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second phrase of the mechanization of accounting began. Thus, 
an important area for further research is to examine this second 
phase of mechanization and its effects upon the further develop-
ment of accounting – its professionalization and the composi-
tion of its workforce.
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HOW MANY COPIES WERE PRINTED?
Abstract: This paper considers the printing of Pacioli’s Summa de Ar-
ithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni et Proportionalita (Summa) in 1494. 
In particular, it attempts to answer the question, how many copies of 
Summa were printed in 1494? It does so through consideration of the 
printing process, the printer of Summa, the size of the book, survival 
rates of other “serious” books of the period, and the dates it contains 
revealing when parts of it were completed. It finds that more copies 
were published than was previously suggested, and that the survival 
rate of copies has probably as much to do with the manner in which 
it was treated  once acquired as in the number of copies printed.
INTRODUCTION
 In 1494, Luca Pacioli’s 615-page compendium Summa de 
Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni et Proportionalita (Summa) 
was published in Venice. It was written primarily for merchants 
[Strathern, 2001]. However, its influence spread far beyond that 
audience – it is said to have laid out the program for Renais-
sance mathematics [Rose, 1976], and it has been credited with 
having led to the development of probability by Pascal [Strath-
ern, 2001], The arithmetic part of Summa was seen as being 
of sufficient importance that only 21 years after Summa was 
published, it was translated or, more accurately, used as the 
basis for a book in Spanish [Andrés de Saragossa, 1515]. The 
27-page treatise on bookkeeping contained within Summa, the 
first known published work on that topic, is said to have formed 
the basis for much of the writing on that subject for the follow-
ing fifty years [Fogo, 1905] and to have laid the foundation for 
double-entry bookkeeping (DEB) as it is practiced today.
Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Professor Neil Harris, 
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ing in Renaissance Italy and the survival rates for printed books of that period. 
Thanks are also due to Professor Brian Richardson, University of Leeds, and Pro-
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 Given its importance in the development of accounting, it 
is upon the bookkeeping treatise that most attention has been 
focused. Over the last 150 years, it has been translated into 
English five times [Geijsbeek, 1914; Crivelli, 1924; Brown and 
Johnston, 1963; Cripps, 1994; Gebsattel, 1994] and into at least 
13 other languages (Chinese, Czech, Flemish/Dutch, French, 
German, Italian, Japanese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Rus-
sian, Spanish, and Turkish). It has been analyzed, dissected, 
and critiqued by dozens of researchers from the U.S. and the 
U.K. and also from most other countries where accounting is a 
university subject, including Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, 
Holland, Italy, Japan, Russia, and Spain. 
 Pacioli’s status as the “father of accounting” is such that a 
450-page biography of his life was published by Taylor [1942] 
and reprinted in 1980. A facsimile of Summa was printed in 
Japan in 1989, and the Academy of Accounting Historians pro-
duced a 27-minute film documentary on his life in 1990. There 
are Pacioli societies in Australia, the U.S., and Japan; a Pacioli 
Institute in Holland; an accounting software package and an 
academic journal named for him; and an annual tour to his 
birthplace organized by the Accounting Department of the Uni-
versity of Seattle.
 When the 500th anniversary of the publication of Summa 
was celebrated in 1994, many more publications commemorat-
ing Pacioli’s life and work were produced, including the printing 
of one thousand facsimile copies of Summa in Hungary and 
another facsimile published in Italy. Two new translations of 
the bookkeeping treatise appeared in English [Cripps, 1994; 
Gebsattel, 1994] and others in Italian [Conterio, 1994], Spanish 
[Hernández-Esteve, 1994a], and French [Jouanique, 1995]. 
 It would take weeks to read through all the sites listed by 
a Google search for “Pacioli” – 345,000 on May 7, 2006. Over 
one hundred academic articles have been published on Pacioli-
 related topics including the derivation of his name, whether 
or not he was a plagiarist, the date of his death, what form an 
unprinted special character in the bookkeeping treatise was in-
tended to take, and the ambiguities in the text. 
 It is doubtful if as much has been written in the account-
ing literature about any other individual; yet, there still remain 
issues which have only been partially explored. One of these is 
the subject of this paper – the printing of the 1494 edition of Pa-
cioli’s Summa, including how often it was reprinted and, in par-
ticular, how many copies of that edition were printed. Only one 
author is known to have written on this topic, Antinori [1980], 
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who suggested that 300 copies were printed, a quantity for its 
day that would suggest it was of limited interest and unlikely to 
have been widely read or influential, none of which is consistent 
with the evidence presented in this paper.
 This paper reopens this debate and is of interest in that it 
provides additional contextual information on the motivation 
for the publication of Summa. The fact that a book printed in 
small numbers is clearly intended for a different audience than 
a larger edition has much to say about whom Pacioli saw as the 
readers of Summa.
 The paper starts with an overview of printing in the 15th 
century, followed by a description of the fledgling copyright sys-
tem in existence at the time. It then considers the cost of print-
ing, the selling price of books, and the motivations of authors in 
the late 15th century. There follows considerations of the quality 
of printing versus handwritten books, proofreading in the 15th 
century, the language of printing, and the printing process. The 
printer of Summa is then introduced, and the estimate of 300 
copies made by Antinori [1980] is considered in the light of the 
printing process and other factors, including claims that Summa 
was a big seller. The paper concludes with a discussion of find-
ings.
PRINTING IN THE 15TH CENTURY
 The first known example of printing using movable type 
in Europe was published in Mainz, Germany in 1454. The first 
book, commonly referred to as the “Gutenberg Bible,” was 
printed the following year. Approximately 150 copies of this two-
volume, 42-line-per-page, 1,282-page work were printed on pa-
per and 30 on vellum (parchment). Forty-eight copies are known 
to exist (www.mainz.de/gutenberg/english/bibel.htm). Germany 
dominated printing in the years immediately thereafter, and it 
was German printers who spread the use of the printing press 
throughout Europe in the 15th century. 
 The first Italian printing press was established in 1464 by 
two Germans, Sweynheym and Pannartz, who installed their 
operation at the behest of the local abbot in a monastery at 
Subiaco, 45 miles from Rome. In 1469, Johann and Windelin 
of Speyer founded the first press in Venice. There were at least 
150 printers in Venice by 1500. By that year, at least nine million 
printed books were in circulation [Carter, 1995]. Some estimates 
put the figure much higher. For example, Jones [1997] wrote 
that by 1501, there were “1,000 printing shops in Europe, which 
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had produced 35,000 titles and 20 million copies.” 
 Febvre and Martin [1984, pp. 186, 215, 248] identified 236 
towns in Europe that had printing presses pre-1500 and arrived 
at the same volume figure as Jones based on average print-runs 
of 500 copies. However, this is likely an underestimate given that 
the average print-run between 1480 and 1490 was 400 to 500 
copies, rising to an average between 1,000 and 1,500 by the early 
16th century. Richardson [1999, p. 21] suggests that 1,000 copies 
was the norm in Venice at the end of 15th century, as does Bern-
stein [2001, p. 11]. Harris [2006b] estimates that for books not 
expected to be big-sellers, 1,000 to 1,500 was the limit. Others 
dispute these figures. For example, it has been suggested that 
the number of copies printed up to 1501 rarely exceeded 300 
[Cachey et al., 1993]. However, the weight of opinion is on the 
side of the figures derived by Febvre and Martin.
 Partly because of the quality of low-priced paper and the 
ease with which it could be obtained [Brown, 1891, p. 24], by 
1482 Venice had become the printing capital of Europe, a posi-
tion it retained until a least 1530 [Febvre and Martin, 1984, pp. 
183-184]. Richardson [1999, p. 6] presents data suggesting 5,000 
editions (different books) were published in Venice before 1501, 
Such was its dominance of the printing market that between 
1495 and 1497, almost one-quarter of all books in print were 
published in Venice [Febvre and Martin, 1984, p. 186].
 The Incunabula Collection of the Bancroft Library, Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley (http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/
incunabula/) includes 142 books that were published in Venice 
before 1501, the earliest dated 1471, 23 years before the printing 
of Summa. Thus, while printing may have been in its infancy in 
1494, Pacioli’s Summa was by no means, as suggested by Weis 
and Tinius [1991], one of the earliest books to be published 
in Venice. Rather, it was actually one of hundreds of differ-
ent books printed in Venice by that date, many of which have 
survived to this day, albeit often no more than in the form of a 
single copy. 
COPYRIGHT
 In the 1490s, Italian copyright laws were in their infancy. 
Where they existed, they extended protection across a very 
 limited geographical area. Pacioli’s Summa, for example, had 
a ten-year copyright when published in 1494, which was effec-
1books printed before 1501
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tive only in the area under the Venetian Republic’s control. This 
meant that other Venetian printers were prohibited from pub-
lishing their own versions of Summa, but that printers located 
outside the area, such as in Tuscany, could freely publish pirated 
versions of the book. 
 In addition, the copyright granted did not prohibit copy-
ing a printed text by hand. Hand copying by scribes had been 
the norm since books were first written and continued to be 
commonplace after the coming of the printing press since 
scribes were in plentiful supply well into the 16th century. In 
fact, some 15th century bibliophiles so resisted printed texts that 
it was quite common for a printed book to be copied by hand so 
that the owner could have a unique, handwritten manuscript 
rather than a mass-produced book [Richardson, 1999, p. 9]. 
 However, despite these practices being fairly common, no 
pirated copy of Summa or any scribal copy is known to have 
 existed. The first known reproductions of Summa were fac-
similes published in the late 20th century in Japan (1989), Italy 
(1993), and Hungary (1994). There are currently at least three 
websites at which scanned copies of Summa can be viewed and 
printed, one of which also sells electronic copies of the book for 
€12.
 The lack of pirated copies of Summa can be explained, at 
least in part, by its great length. However, the book’s greatest 
defense against pirating is that it is replete with diagrams and 
marginal notations which would make copying a relatively unat-
tractive proposition compared to a text without such embellish-
ments.
THE COST OF PRINTING IN THE LATE 15TH CENTURY
 Printing in the late 15th century was a production process 
notable for its separation of tasks. It was organized around the 
printing press and, in all but the smallest enterprise, was un-
dertaken by a team typically comprising two compositors, two 
pressmen, an apprentice, and a proof-reader (often the master 
printer, although sometimes the author). Printers were also fre-
quently book publishers2 and booksellers. [Eisenstein, 2005] 
2The word “publisher” had a different meaning during the late 15th century 
from that which it has today. Publishers were, effectively, investors in printing, 
providing the funds to finance printing [Richardson, 1999, p. 29]. Sometimes the 
printer was also the publisher; sometimes a bookseller was the publisher; some-
times it was someone unconnected with the book trade. In the case of the 1494 
edition of Summa, the sponsor of the book, Marco Sanuto, a wealthy Venetian 
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 The printer had his own stock of inks, metal founts, and the 
wooden blocks used, for example, for the initial capital letter at 
the start of chapters and sections. Wooden blocks would often 
be prepared for specific books, as was the case with Summa, 
and, occasionally, special founts would be created to fit require-
ments stipulated by the author. Woodcuts or, alternatively, metal 
[copper] plates would be prepared for page bordering, diagrams, 
and pictures, including maps. Pacioli’s work featured all of 
these. All these items were the responsibility of the printer, and 
it would be assumed included in the amount a sponsor or a pub-
lisher3 was willing to pay the printer to produce a book. Paper 
cost as much as printing. Printers did not pay for paper unless 
they were funding the publication. Paper costs were usually paid 
by the publisher, sometimes by the author. 
 During the period up to the publication of the Gutenberg 
Bible, the “age of scribes” [Eisenstein, 2005], all published 
books were copied by hand, mainly by monks or nuns for whom 
performing scribal duties was part of their normal day. The cost 
of using scribes was far greater than the cost of printing, one 
reason why so many printers set-up business in the last 30 years 
of the 15th century.
 Comparing the cost of printing with the cost of using 
scribes, Febvre and Martin [1984, p. 112] present an example 
from 1483 where one Florentine printer, the Ripoli Press, was 
paid 3 florins per quinterno. (A quinterno was a bundle of four 
sheets of paper folded once giving 16 pages if printed double-
sided or eight single-sided.) By comparison, a scribe at that 
time would expect to receive 1 florin4 per quinterno [Eisenstein, 
and professor of mathematics who paid for it to be printed, was the publisher. The 
printer was the publisher of the second edition in 1523.
3Sponsors sometimes only contributed a proportion of the costs. Others, such 
as the author or a bookseller, could be the major investor in a book’s publication. 
4This paper mentions two different currencies, Florentine gold florins and 
Venetian gold ducats. They had virtually the same gold content and, therefore, 
typically exchanged at a ratio of 1:1. However, they were seldom used in every 
day transactions, which were usually in a coin of lower value called a soldi. The 
Florentine and Venetian soldi were not identical, either in their silver content or 
in the number of them that equaled a florin/ducat. In addition, exchange rates 
fluctuated considerably in the 15th century depending upon such events as fairs, 
harvests, sailings, changes in government expenditure, and the time of year [Lopez 
and Raymond, 1955, p. 150]. They also varied over time as a consequence of de-
basement/enforcement in the silver content of the currency involved. In 1464, 
there were 106 Florentine silver soldi per florin; in 1494, 130 [Munro, 2006]; in 
1499, 137. Throughout that period, there were 124 Venetian silver soldi per ducat 
[Mueller, 1997, p. 656]. Mueller also provides the silver content of these coins in 
1464 and 1499. On the basis of these data, and assuming the 1494 silver content 
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2005, p. 15]. At first glance, the printer would seem the more 
expensive, but the Ripoli Press printed 1,025 copies of the book 
compared to the single copy that a scribe would have produced. 
There were 30 quinternos in the book, so the total cost of print-
ing 1,025 copies was 90 florins, equivalent to the cost of three 
scribal copies.
 The scribes could not compete, especially with that particu-
lar printer, for the Ripoli employees were nuns for whom wages 
were considerably less than the “going rate” [Richardson, 1999, 
p. 160, fn. 53]. The printer could produce so many more copies 
than a scriptorium5 in the same time, and of a more consistent 
standard, that the cost of using scribes was uneconomical when 
publishing more than a few copies. Consequently, while scribes 
continued to be in demand for another 150 years or so, those 
who continued to work at the trade found the amount of work 
diminishing as the years passed.
 As an indication of how much a “serious” book (i.e., bibles; 
textbooks; Latin, Greek, and Hebrew classic texts) cost to print 
in the 15th century, Richardson [1999, p. 25] describes the 
production costs of printing 930 copies of a bible, comprising 
228 sheets of paper, printed in Venice in 1478. Paper and wage 
costs would have been about 500 ducats. Brown [1891, p. 26] 
states that the wage cost in this example was the equivalent of 
£500, approximately £36,4006 or $65,500 in modern money ($70 
per bible). On the basis of Richardson’s view that the paper cost 
would have been about the same as the printing cost, each of the 
bibles would cost approximately $140 at today’s prices. 
THE SELLING PRICE OF BOOKS  
IN THE 15TH CENTURY
 Not surprisingly, given the difference in the relative cost 
of producing such a book compared to a printed text, the pur-
chase price of a “serious” scribal text in the late 15th century 
was many times that of a printed book. In cost-of-living terms, 
a manuscript copied by hand would cost the buyer the mod-
was the same as in 1499, the silver-based exchange rate in 1464 was 1 ducat = 0.98 
florins; in 1494, it was 1 ducat = 1.13 florins; and, in 1499, it was 1 ducat = 1.17 
florins. While the values were close, they were not the same as the 1:1 exchange 
rate for gold florins and gold ducats.
5A scriptorium was the name given to a group of scribes working simultane-
ously from a single dictation.
6conversion undertaken at www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ukcompare/ 
using the Retail Price Index
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ern equivalent in U.S. dollars of $2,000-$10,000. The price of 
a printed book was equivalent to only a few hundred [Mack, 
2005]. 
 Printed short stories and early short novels were far cheaper 
and cost little more in real terms than they cost today. Aesop’s 
Fables, for example, was selling in Parma in 1484 for 2 soldi 
(�$2.12), and, in 1491, also in Parma, eight popular books were 
selling for an average of 2 soldi, 4 dinari (�$2.47) [Richardson, 
1999, p. 115]. 
 Summa was a “serious” book. It was also an extremely large 
book and sold for 119 soldi [Dunlop, 1985, p.153], making it 
considerably more expensive to buy than most printed books 
at that time, the equivalent of over $120 at today’s prices using 
Brown’s [1891] conversion rate.
 To put these examples into the context of income rather 
than shifts in general price levels, the modal salary of a univer-
sity teacher in Italy in the late 15th century was approximately 
40-60 ducats a year (4,960-7,440 soldi). Even Pacioli, despite 
his prominence and reputation, was only paid one hundred 
florins a year, approximately 85 ducats at 1 ducat = 1.17 florins7 
to teach Euclid at the University of Florence between 1499 and 
1507 [Taylor, 1942, p. 295]. He never earned a university salary 
greater than 200 ducats a year.8
 Thus, despite the cost of producing books in the late 15th 
century being many times cheaper than in the age of scribes 
and with the selling price of printed books being significantly 
less than scribal texts, prices of “serious” books remained high 
in relation to wages. It would have taken a week’s income for a 
university teacher to purchase Summa. As a result, while print-
ing significantly reduced production costs and the selling price 
of such books similarly fell, Summa was still beyond the pocket 
of the average person.
AUTHORS AND THEIR MOTIVATION
 Book authorship in the late 15th century was, at times, 
similar to what is now referred to as “vanity publishing” [Rich-
ardson, 1999, p. 59]. When authors presented their manuscript 
to a printer, they were neither paid nor did they receive royalties 
[Febvre and Martin, 1984, pp. 159-61]. They often had to agree 
to buy a quantity of copies, sometimes as much as half or even 
7See Footnote 4.
8the salary he was paid in Milan between 1496 and 1499 [Grendler, 2002]
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more of the print-run. Sometimes they had to agree to meet all 
costs. In this way, the printer covered all his costs; any copies 
subsequently sold by him were virtually 100% profit. 
 When the printer believed there was a ready market for a 
book, the author would sometimes receive some free copies. In 
all cases, the rights to the work were assumed to have passed to 
the printer once the manuscript was submitted by the author. 
Possibly because it made the printer’s life easier and may have 
helped create a good relationship between author and printer, as 
was the case with Summa, copyright applications were typically 
made on behalf of the printer by the author, rather than by the 
printer. 
 Authors earned money from publication of their books by 
giving signed, dedicated copies to the wealthy and influential 
who, in order to preserve their own reputations, would repay 
the author with financial grants or privileges [see, for example, 
Richardson, 1999, pp. 52-56]. In addition, like printers, authors 
acted as their own booksellers, selling their copies to bookshops 
and individuals.
 Authors with little money who felt they had a ready market 
for their work were not only motivated by personal gratification 
but also by the financial incentive to seek a sponsor who would 
pay for the printing of their books. This was a major difference 
between the age of scribes and the age of printing, as there was 
between the qualitative aspects of books in the two eras.
BOOK QUALITY: THE AGE OF SCRIBES  
AND THE AGE OF PRINTING
 In the age of scribes, no two copies of a manuscript con-
tained precisely the same text; neither was a copy identical 
to the original. Such corruption of text was rife and a serious 
problem with the copying of manuscripts. In scriptoria, scribes 
worked from dictation and errors abounded, even though the 
head of each scriptorium was charged with ensuring that all 
scribes performed their work accurately. Even scribes working 
alone copying a manuscript could not avoid errors and omis-
sions unless they took so long in completing the task that it 
became uneconomical for them. Scribes other than monks were 
paid on a piecework basis; the faster they worked, the more they 
could earn. Monks, who comprised the majority of scribes, were 
not generally paid, but speed was of the essence as volume of 
output was the driving force. Although there are some notable 
exceptions, most errors were not normally corrected, even when 
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identified, since to do so would have spoiled the look of the 
book. The concept of an errata list was an innovation of the age 
of printing that did not exist in the age of scribes. 
 Despite the greater consistency in the text they contained, 
early printed books had, if anything, a greater variety of errors 
than scribal texts; for example, errors in folio numbering and in 
running headers were fairly common. Neither device was used 
in the age of scribes. While individual copies of a printed book 
may have had a number of errors, these were not simply to be 
found in one copy, as in the age of scribes, but in as many copies 
as it took for someone to notice the error. Even then, an error 
would only be corrected if it was decided it would be worth-
while to halt the press to do so. 
 Nowadays, anyone who has written a book is well aware of 
the perils of typesetting. Correcting proofs is an essential part 
of the publication process. It is not uncommon for four or more 
people, including the author, to proofread a modern text concur-
rently, and for each of them to identify and prepare a different 
list of corrections. 
 Yet, despite this effort, modern books are seldom error-free 
and textbooks, in particular, frequently contain dozens of errors. 
Nobes [1995] draws attention to this ongoing problem by point-
ing out that just as there were typographical errors in Pacioli’s 
bookkeeping treatise, so also were there in its 1994 translation 
by Gebsattel. However, the incidence of printing errors was 
much worse in the 15th century than it is today. The principal 
reason was the approach to proofreading that existed at that 
time.
PROOFREADING IN THE LATE 15TH CENTURY
 Type was set into a forme.9 Once a forme was typeset, it 
could be proofread before printing. If so, one person read from 
the mirror-image type while another checked what was read out 
against the text of the manuscript; clearly, a far more difficult 
process than proofreading printed text. Yet, this was often the 
only proofreading that took place [Richardson, 1999, p. 15]. Al-
ternatively, one sheet could be printed and the press halted until 
it had been proofread. Either way, it would delay the printing so 
that proofreading was done quickly and inadequately, if done at 
all.
9A forme was comprised of type set for pages that would be printed together. 
The forme was held in place by a rectangular wooden or iron frame.
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 Sometimes, proofreading took place during printing, the 
press only being halted if a major error or omission was found. 
Typically, pages printed before the press was stopped and the 
typesetting corrected were not destroyed but included in the 
completed batch as if no errors existed. Evidence that this ap-
proach was used in Summa can be seen by comparing copies 
of the 1494 edition where, for example, folio10 numbers missing 
from or incorrect in one copy are in place and correct in another 
[Dunlop, 1985].
 There was also the apprentice problem. While the composi-
tor was a skilled tradesman, as in any trade, the apprentice was 
not. The apprentices had to learn and were given the “simple” 
tasks, such as typesetting the running headers and folio num-
bers. Summa is replete with errors in folio numbering and con-
tains a number of incorrect or misspelt running headers, both 
distinctly easy items to check in the proofreading process, sug-
gesting that the proofreading of the book was cursory at best.
 There is a very clear example in Summa of the difference 
between 15th and 21st century proofreading. Nowadays, it is 
normal practice for the author to be involved. This was not the 
case 500 years ago. The examples at the end of the bookkeeping 
treatise contain a fundamental error which would be sufficient 
to confuse and undermine the confidence of those who thought 
they had understood everything to that point – the credit side of 
a journal entry contains the instruction to debit an item when 
it should have been a credit [Hernández-Esteve, 1994b]. It was 
never corrected in any of the known printings of either edition 
of Summa, which suggests that not only was the proofreading 
careless, but that Pacioli himself never read that part of the 
printed bookkeeping treatise, either while it was being printed 
or after it was published. This view is reinforced by an error in 
another of the journal entries, where the amount stated in the 
narrative differs from the amount shown in the money columns, 
an error perpetuated in the second edition.
 It is inconceivable that the printer/publisher of Summa 
would have ignored a list of corrections compiled by Pacioli 
when it came to reprinting the book. To have ignored Pacioli 
in this way would have jeopardized their working relationship 
10Page numbering as we know it did not become the norm until well after 
Summa was printed. In 1494, the practice of numbering each folio, each double-
sided page, was becoming common although not universal, by any means. Pages 
in Summa are identified by their folio number, and the term recto (facing) and 
verso (back). Folio 144r in Summa is page 287 and 144v is page 288. The folio 
number is only shown on the recto side of the folio.
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– the same printers published other work by Pacioli in 1509, for 
which Pacioli petitioned a 20-year Venetian copyright on behalf 
of the publisher (a 15-year copyright was granted). 
 This also raises another issue relating to the first bookkeep-
ing error highlighted by Hernández-Esteve – could it have been 
in the original manuscript? If so, the manuscript was certainly 
derived from another document for nobody who knows DEB 
would have made the mistake in question, although a scribe 
copying an original manuscript could have done so. 
THE LANGUAGE OF PRINTING IN  
LATE 15TH CENTURY VENICE
 For a long time after printing was invented, most of the 
published bibles, classics, and textbooks were printed in Latin.11 
Among the educated, Latin was a second language common 
across much of Europe. However, the majority of people spoke 
only their local vernacular well, and what Latin they knew was 
sufficient solely for attending church. The vernacular varied 
from state to state within what was to become Italy. However, 
there was great commonality among the various dialects. With 
minimal exposure, citizens from other Italian states could un-
derstand and be understood in Venice as if they were themselves 
Venetians.
 In order to maximize sales, books aimed at the general read-
ing public rather than at the scholar or churchman were printed 
in the vernacular rather than in Latin, even if the target market 
was outside the state in which that vernacular was the dominant 
language. Summa was intended mainly for merchants, artists, 
engineers, and architects. Thus, apart from the bookkeeping 
treatise which is mainly in the Venetian dialect, the Summa is in 
the Tuscan dialect of 1494, with some occasional use of Venetian 
and a small amount of Latin [see Yamey, 1994, pp. 18, 22; Field, 
1999, p. 301].
 
THE PRINTING PROCESS IN THE LATE 15TH CENTURY
 The printing process in the late 15th century has been 
 described many times [e.g., Febvre and Martin, 1984; Richard-
son, 1999; Eisenstein, 2005]. Summa’s pages are folio-size, ap-
proximately 11.5 inches by 8 inches (30 by 20 centimeters). In 
11The only consistent exceptions are classic Greek texts which were published 
in Greek and Hebrew texts published in Hebrew. In both cases, these were for 
audiences who understood the language of the text.
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folio printing, two pages were printed on each side of a sheet of 
paper. First, two pages were typeset, placed into a single forme, 
and the front (“recto”) side of a sheet of paper was printed. The 
type was then removed from the forme and used with other 
type for the next forme which was then used to print the back 
(“verso”) of the same sheet of paper. The printing on the back 
of the sheet could only be done when the paper was completely 
dried from the first side printing, usually the following day. 
 After printing had been completed on both sides, the sheets 
were typically grouped with three other sheets to make a quin-
terno (“quire”) of 16 pages of printed text which was then bound 
(sewn). This is confirmed as having been the typical grouping 
for the binding of Summa by the printer’s signatures [Dunlop, 
1961], although there are occasional instances in Summa of five 
(20 pages) and seven (28 pages) folios being bundled together in 
binding.
 Although typesetting was a major task, standard-width char-
acters were used, the equivalent of the fixed-space letter spacing 
to be found in the Courier font of Microsoft Word, making the 
switching of wrongly placed letters a relatively straightforward 
process. Since the formes were broken down as soon as the 
sheets had been printed, if a book was reprinted, the type had 
to be set from scratch which, given that type wore out and was 
 often replaced with differently spaced characters, could play 
havoc with pagination [Dunlop, 1985]. As a result, reprint-
ing was not something done without full consideration of the 
likely costs, the unsatisfied demand, and the potential revenue. 
Furthermore, anyone wanting one copy after none remained 
would find it cheaper to rent the book and pay scribes to copy it 
than pay the high premium for one printed copy. Consequently, 
reprints of even a few sheets were not generally undertaken to 
satisfy the demands of a single customer; rather, print-runs were 
of a significant quantity.
 According to Febvre and Martin [1984], one hundred years 
after Summa was printed, in the late 16th century, a composi-
tor would have been expected to create one to three formes per 
day and pressmen to print at least 2,500 sheets. When Summa 
was printed in 1494, techniques were less well-developed and 
typesetting and printing were slower. Typically, two compositors 
and two pressmen worked on each press. In the case of Summa, 
on the basis of the font used, the number of lines printed per 
page, and the complexity of the marginal annotations, a realistic 
expectation was that two compositors could typeset two formes 
per day, which could then have been printed on a single press at 
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the rate of 1,000 sheets printed on both sides per day [Harris, 
2006b].
THE PRINTER OF SUMMA: PAGANINO DE’ PAGANINI
 The printer of Summa in 1494 was Paganino de’ Paganini. 
He and his son Alessandro were the printers of all Pacioli’s books 
known to have been printed between 1494 and 1523. Paganino 
de’ Paganini was from a wealthy family and a relative newcomer 
to running his own printing firm when he printed Summa in 
1494. Work known to have been completed by Paganini indi-
cates that his press was a small operation in 1494, although the 
business grew when Alessandro took it over in the mid-1510s. At 
615 pages, Summa would have been a huge book for its day, and 
it would certainly have been the firm’s largest venture since its 
inception.
 The last known work undertaken by Paganino de’ Paganini 
before Summa was completed on December 9, 1493, virtually a 
year before he finished printing Summa. While it was common-
place for jobbing workers to be employed short-term by printers 
in the late 15th century, for a job of the size of Summa a more 
permanent team would have been involved. However, as the firm 
was small and in its infancy, it is likely that the same employ-
ees were used as on previous work – one or two compositors, 
two pressmen, an apprentice, and Paganini, the master printer, 
working a single press. 
 It is Paganini who would have done any proofreading. De-
spite Pacioli’s being present during 1493 and 1494 to oversee the 
printing of the book and saying so in Summa [Taylor, 1942], it is 
clear he was not proofreading text. There are simply too many 
errors that he, the author and mathematician, would have iden-
tified had he been proofreading pages as they came off the press. 
If he checked anything, it is likely to have been the woodcuts 
used in the marginal notes to ensure that they were accurate 
representations of his artwork and that they were correctly posi-
tioned in the margin.
HOW MANY COPIES OF SUMMA WERE PRINTED IN 1494?
 No records exist of how many copies of Summa were print-
ed, either of the first (1494) or second (1523) edition. On the 
basis of a highly detailed analysis of differences between various 
copies of the 1494 edition, Antinori [1980, p. 40] hypothesized 
that there were 300 copies printed. However, in arriving at that 
figure, he does not consider the norms in the late 15th century 
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for the size of print-runs. As will be shown later, his estimate ap-
pears to have been a significant underestimate. 
 Setting aside Antinori’s estimate, in the absence of any 
information other than the average print-runs at that time, it 
would be reasonable to infer that the print-run of Summa in 
1494 was at least 500 copies. However, other factors indicate 
it may have been higher. Among these is evidence of some 
sheets being reprinted, the analysis of which goes beyond that 
conducted by Antinori; the number of extant copies of Summa; 
print output quantity limits and the time taken to print the last 
eight folios; and three estimates made over the last 90 years of 
the book’s popularity.
Page Reprints circa 502 and 509: It is known that parts of the 
1494 edition were reprinted at least twice [Business Historical 
Society, 1926], once after 1502, possibly to avoid expiration of 
the 10-year copyright, and the other after 1509 [Clarke, 1974], 
presumably taking advantage of a 15-year copyright granted to 
Pacioli in 1508. The later reprinted pages are noticeably differ-
ent from the first printing, making it easy to demonstrate that 
the book had been reprinted.
 Based on at least three definite printing dates/periods for 
the first edition, assuming a modern perspective that print-runs 
of the same book are typically of the same size, as many as 1,500 
first edition copies of Summa may have been printed between 
1494 and 1523. However, while some sheets were clearly re-type-
set, the majority in both cases are as in the 1494 printing, which 
could only have occurred if the printer had a stock of pages left 
over from that printing.12 It seems likely, therefore, that the total 
number of copies printed of the first edition was the number 
printed in 1494, bringing us back to the initial estimate of at 
least 500 copies. Support for a print run higher than 500 is pro-
vided by the number of extant copies.
Extant Copies: Boncompagni [1862-63] identified 72 extant 
copies of the 1494 printing, 19 of the post-1502 printing, and 
eight of the post-1509 printing. This suggests a pattern of sales 
indicative of a seldom-used reference text sold slowly over a 
long period, as might be expected of a book written mainly as 
12It is inconceivable that the typesetter in 1502 or 1509 could have copied the 
layout of the 1494 typesetter on all but the few obviously amended pages. Wooden 
blocks used at the start of paragraphs and sections wear out and simply could not 
be reproduced identically.
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a reference text for merchants [Harris, 2006b]. Boncompagni 
[1862-63] also counted 36 copies of the 1523 edition, suggesting 
that the print-run of that edition was approximately one-third of 
the 1494 edition.
 Very little is known of incunabula print-runs versus extant 
copies. A quarter of known incunabula are represented by a 
single extant copy [Harris, 2006a]. In addition, Harris [2006c] 
estimates that only 1% of all copies of incunabula have survived 
and that as many as 40% of editions may have been lost. Two 
examples show the difference that may exist, possibly depending 
upon how much a book was actually read once acquired. It is 
thought that only 200 copies of the first edition of Neumeister’s 
Comedy were printed, of which only about 20 (10%) are extant 
[Cachey et al., 1993]. Gingerich [2004] reports 277 extant copies 
(18%) of a print-run he estimates at 1,500 of De Revolutionibus 
by Copernicus, “the book nobody read,” according to Gingerich. 
A survival rate somewhere between 10-20% may be normal for 
“serious” books from the period of Summa, depending to a large 
extent on whether they were read once acquired. 
 Taking a 10-20% survival rate of unread incunabula as 
a starting point, Boncompagni’s count of 99 extant copies of 
the 1494 edition of Summa in 1862 suggests a print-run of 500 
to 1,000 copies. The Incunabula Short Title Catalogue at the 
British Library currently shows 160 extant copies of the 1494 
edition of Summa. It also distinguishes two more from the 1523 
edition. However, the attribution of copies to dates has not been 
accurate; some 1523 copies being misclassified as from the 1494 
edition. Taking these 162 copies and splitting them in propor-
tion to those identified by Boncompagni, approximately three-
quarters, or 120, are likely to be the 1494 edition. 
 The incunabula survival rates would suggest that the 1494 
print-run of Summa, a “serious” book read and referenced to 
with care, was between 600 and 1,200 copies. However, there 
were other uses for a book of this type, such as classroom teach-
ing, where the survival rates are even lower [Harris, 2006b], so 
a print-run higher than 1,200 is quite possible. Other evidence 
points to the actual print-run in 1494 being far larger – the print 
output quantity limits of the period and the time taken to print 
the last eight folios.
Print Output Quantity Limits and the Printing of the Last Eight 
Folios: Summa was printed in two volumes. Volume 1 contains 
448 pages of text plus 16 pages of introduction; Volume 2, 
 Geometry, has 151 pages of text. No record exists showing ex-
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actly when printing started. However, Volume 2 was completed 
on November 10, 1494, and the introduction to Volume 1 was 
completed on November 20, 1494. The first quinterno in Vol-
ume 1 comprised the 16-page introduction and, following the 
practice of the time, would have been the last part of the book 
to have been printed. It, therefore, appears that the period from 
November 10-20 was required to print those pages.
 Harris [2006b] estimates that compositors working on 
 Summa could have averaged one forme each per day. This im-
mediately makes a print-run of under 1,000 copies unlikely, 
since 1,000 impressions of two formes a day was the accepted 
pace of the pressmen, and a lower print-run would have idled 
the pressmen while the compositors were setting the next 
formes to be printed.13 
 At an average of 1,000 sheets a day, double-sided, printing 
the last 16 pages would have taken four days had the print-run 
been 1,000 copies. Assuming that the introduction was all that 
was printed during the nine working days between completions 
of the two volumes, the print-run for Summa could have been as 
large as 2,000 copies. 
 However, had the print-run been that large, the two com-
positors would have had to work on other jobs 50% of the time 
during those last nine days. They could set two formes per day, 
but the pressmen could only use one of those if printing 2,000 
copies. Most printers always had work waiting to be done, espe-
cially as one project came to an end, and it is unlikely that the 
compositors would have been idle [Harris, 2006b]. Alternatively, 
compositors were generally paid on a piece-rate basis and may 
have worked at the pace of the press during this final phase 
of the printing of Summa if no other jobs were available. This 
mismatch between compositor and press speed was not a major 
problem during the last phase of a late 15th century printing 
project. However, it would have been had it existed throughout 
the project.
 If the print-run of Summa was 2,000 copies, two composi-
tors could only have worked concurrently if the printer used two 
presses and four pressmen. This is not unlikely as many print-
ers had more than one press, but there is no evidence that Pa-
ganino de’ Paganini was of sufficient size. Compared with other 
13While this would not have been unusual as printers always had other work 
on hand such as pamphlets and leaflets to do, comments made concerning the 
popularity of the book support the hypothesis that a print-run as low as 1,000 
copies was unlikely. 
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Venetian printers of the day, very little incunabula printed by 
Paganino de’ Paganini has survived, perhaps indicating that his 
operation did not print very much during that period. 
 Had 1,000 copies been printed, two compositors would have 
been used, and the job would have taken approximately 154 
days to print. At six working days a week, this is the equivalent 
of 26 weeks or six months. However, it is inconceivable that the 
last four double-sided sheets took nine days unless more than 
1,000 copies were printed. If 1,500 copies was the number, it 
would have taken nine months, but both the pressmen and the 
two compositors would have been working at only 75% capacity. 
 On balance, based on print output quantity limits, it seems 
likely that 2,000 copies were printed, which would have meant it 
took approximately eight days to print the final 16 pages. If this 
was the size of the print-run, one compositor, not two, and two 
pressmen would have been required throughout the project. 
 Printing 2,000 copies would have taken approximately one 
year, the time available if the last job known to have preceded 
Summa had actually done so. The compositor would have set 
one forme each day, and the pressmen would then have spent 
the next day printing 2,000 copies. While this was being done, 
the compositor would have typeset the next forme. Further sup-
port for a print-run closer to 2,000 copies is provided by claims 
regarding Summa’s volume of sales.
Claims that Summa was a “Big Seller”: A “big seller” in the late 
15th century can be defined as any book that sold over 1,500 
copies [Harris, 2006b]. Evidence of this estimate comes entirely 
from secondary sources, but three scholars have delved deeply 
into the subject. Olschki [1918] wrote that, for fifty years after 
its publication, Summa was the most widely read mathematics 
work in Italy. Taylor [1942, p. 198] claimed that the second edi-
tion of Summa was even more popularly received than the first, 
justifying the publisher’s decision to finance the second edition 
personally. Finally, Favier [1998, pp. 261, 276], then president of 
the French Bibliothèque Nationale and author of many books 
on the Middle Ages, averred that Summa was “an instant suc-
cess and [was] for many years used by the business world” and 
that “merchants from every country rushed to buy this guide to 
accountancy.” Secondary or not, these three testimonies support 
the view that the print-run of Summa was greater than the norm 
which, for “serious” books in the late 15th century was 1,000-
1,500 copies [Harris, 2006b].
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CONCLUSION
 Summa was not a curiosity piece, published with a view to a 
limited market. It was intended to be sold in large quantities for 
its day, but sales were slow yet steady as evidenced by the 1502 
and 1509 sheet reprints [Harris, 2006b]. The fact that Pacioli 
himself petitioned for a 20-year copyright in 1508 on any reprint 
of his 1494 book indicates that it continued to sell at a level that 
justified reprinting missing or damaged folios. The fact that the 
printers themselves acted as publishers and financed the print-
ing of the second edition also supports the view that Summa 
continued to sell in significant quantities for many years follow-
ing its original publication.
 Available evidence – the reprinting of some sheets of 
Summa; the number of extant copies of Summa and the survival 
rate of other incunabula; print output quantity limits of the late 
15th century; the time taken to print the last eight folios; and the 
apparent success of the book – makes it appear likely that the 
print-run of Summa was at least 1,000 copies, and probably, on 
the basis of the time taken to print the last eight folios, closer to 
2,000 copies.
 However, this conclusion must be treated with caution. It is 
one interpretation of a series of facts and information relating 
to a process that transpired 500 years ago. Unless the printer’s 
records are discovered, there is no possibility of anyone ever 
stating with certainty what the print-run was of Summa in 1494. 
However, it can be said with certainty that the number of copies 
printed was significantly higher than the previously reported 
estimate.
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Maurice StanS’ ViewS on  
Social reSponSibility in the 
accounting profeSSion
Abstract: maurice Stans (1908-1998) is remembered for his role in the 
Watergate scandal of the 1970s, but he was also an early contribu-
tor to the literature on the accounting profession’s obligations to the 
general public. his writings and speeches in this area have a place in 
the history of social responsibility accounting. the paper discusses 
his writings as well as his comments collected in an audio-taped in-
terview about his role in the accounting profession as president of the 
american institute of accountants, senior partner in alexander Grant 
(now Grant thornton), and one of the first well-known practitioners 
to discuss broadly the importance of the accounting profession’s 
 social responsibilities. today when accounting scandals have created 
questions about the credibility and integrity of financial reporting, it 
is reflective to see how concerns about financial reporting were once 
articulated.
iNtroDuCtioN
 maurice Stans (1908-1998) is largely remembered for his 
political association with richard Nixon and his role with the 
republican National Finance Committee and the Watergate 
scandal of the 1970s. yet, before his entry into the politics of the 
1950s, he had distinguished himself in the accounting profession 
as one of the first senior partners in the firm of alexander Grant 
& Company, president of the american institute of accountants 
(aia) (1954-1955), gold medal recipient for distinguished service 
to the profession (1954), a member of the Committee on ac-
counting Procedure (CaP), an early member in the accounting 
hall of Fame (1960), and a writer and advocate for articulating 
the accounting profession’s social responsibilities to the public 
as defined within the accounting framework of the late 1940s 
through the 1950s.
acknowledgments: the author would like to thank the two anonymous re-
viewers for their invaluable suggestions for improving the paper, mr. Stans for 
allowing the interview to take place, and the editor for his patience.
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 it is valuable to look at his writings and consider his per-
sonal views on social responsibility as expressed in an audio-
taped interview conducted in 1994.1 Stans’ description of social 
responsibility was based on a call for fairness in financial report-
ing through a greater standardization of accounting practices. 
he perceived that this approach would help reduce potential 
social class conflicts and labor strife in the u.S. economy arising 
from an underlying suspicion that the accounting profession 
endorsed practices supporting corporate interests over accurate 
reporting responsibilities to the general public. 
 today the accounting profession has been beset by a num-
ber of scandals. accordingly, it is worthwhile to record the 
historical insights of an accountant who faced his own integ-
rity challenges and still strongly maintained his views on the ac-
counting profession’s obligations to society. this article reviews 
Stans’ writings and the 1994 oral history interview in which mr. 
Stans identified the role he played in developing practitioner-
based arguments for expanding the accounting profession’s 
public responsibilities. Prior to beginning this analysis, the 
advantages and pitfalls of an oral history methodology will be 
briefly considered.
 
oral hiStory methoDoloGy:  
aDVaNtaGeS aND PitFallS
 the primary resource for this paper was the 1994 oral his-
tory interview with maurice Stans. Such an oral history can be 
considered a record of “personal reminiscences that are of his-
torical significance focusing on impressions, attitudes, feelings, 
and descriptions, rather than facts” [lamour, 1994, p. 2]. as 
with any research model, there are advantages and pitfalls to be 
considered when using oral history. 
 academic support for oral history has evolved as it supple-
ments written records with a rich verbal account of an event or 
events [Zeff, 1980; Collins and Bloom, 1991]. others have argued 
1the oral history interview was conducted over a two-day period by the au-
thor at mr. Stan’s home in Pasadena, California on July 20-21, 1994. the questions 
covered a number of topics related to mr. Stans’ work as a practicing accountant. 
the only restriction on the questions was that they would not deal with Water-
gate. the questions were not submitted to mr. Stans in advance of the interview, 
and the direction of the discussion was open-ended. the audio-taped interview 
was transcribed into a 79-page oral history. after the interview, a copy of the tran-
scription was sent to mr. Stans. that copy now resides in the minnesota historical 
Society in St. Paul. the oral history is available from the minnesota historical 
Society in St. Paul, minnesota or from the author. 
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that the purpose of oral histories is to “problematize and contra-
dict the traditional stories of accounting” [hammond and Sikka, 
1996, p. 81]. the latter view considers oral history as a means to 
show how the official written record of events can cause more 
extensive societal effects than might initially appear. this oral 
history collection corresponds more to the Collins and Bloom 
model. 
 the problems that can arise from an oral history interview 
occur when the interviewer injects his/her preconceived ideas 
into the interview, creating a bias in the questioning that can 
skew responses toward the interviewer’s point of view. another 
difficulty arises if there is no rapport between the interviewee 
and interviewer, thus decreasing the candidness of the responses 
[Collins and Bloom, 1991]. therefore, the interaction before, 
during, and after the interview are as important as securing 
consent for the interview. None of these issues arose in the 
Stans interview.2 thus, the current paper combines the candid 
recollections of maurice Stans about his work in the account-
ing profession with an analysis of his published work on social 
responsibility. 
StaNS’ eNtry iNto the aCCouNtiNG  
ProFeSSioN aND GoVerNmeNt SerViCe
 maurice Stans was raised in the small town of Shakopee, 
minnesota before beginning his accounting career at age 20 
with alexander Grant & Company in Chicago. eventually, he 
worked his way up to become senior partner. in 1953, his firm 
was working on a consulting assignment with the u.S. Postal 
Service. as a result of that job, Stans left his position in 1955 to 
begin his career in government service in the u.S. Post office as 
deputy postmaster general during the eisenhower administra-
tion. 
 During richard Nixon’s run for governor of California, 
Stans served as his finance chairman. in 1968, he chaired 
Nixon’s election Campaign Committee, and later during the 
campaign became chair of Nixon’s Finance Committee. after the 
election, Stans was named commerce secretary in Nixon’s cabi-
net, but he resigned in 1972 to become chairman of the Finance 
2Prior to conducting the interview, the author attended an oral history semi-
nar conducted by Charles t. morrissey, a nationally renowned oral historian. 
morrissey’s oral history workshops, conducted throughout the u.S., deal with the 
methodology of oral history interviewing. the morrissey method was used in the 
Stans interview. 
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Committee to re-elect President Nixon and chairman of the 
 republican National Finance Committee. in 1973, he was in-
dicted in the Watergate scandal but was subsequently acquitted 
of those charges.3 
 Before beginning his government service, Stans spent 27 
years directly involved in the accounting profession. his concept 
of professional responsibility as reflected in his writings was 
strongly influenced by the social and political issues of the era.
the SoCial aND PolitiCal BaCkGrouND oF the era
 From the early 1930s to the mid-1950s, a social and politi-
cal upheaval occurred in the u.S. this time period began with 
an economy in virtual collapse as almost every bank closed in 
1933, and americans beginning to question the principles of 
democracy, capitalism, free enterprise, and individualism upon 
which the nation was built. Growing out of the economic tur-
moil, american business found its place in the country’s social 
fabric as overseers of commerce undergoing enormous change. 
Businessmen witnessed new political threats to the american 
system of government, labor strife increased as unions grew in 
size and powerful labor leaders were elected to represent their 
members, and new social legislation was enacted to protect the 
public from abuses of the past. 
 the u.S. reacted to the financial turmoil of the 1930s with 
new legislation to help solve the economic problems of the 
period. Such legislation provided stronger federal oversight 
of economic activities. in 1933-1934, the Securities acts were 
passed, and the Securities and exchange Commission (SeC) 
was established with regulatory powers over Wall Street and the 
accounting profession. 
 Workers were given substantial collective bargaining power 
in 1935 with the Wagner act. in 1938, the Fair labor Standards 
act set a minimum wage of 25 cents per hour and a maximum 
work week of 40 hours. During World War ii, labor-management 
disputes were controlled through no-strike pledges in support 
of the war effort. after the war, labor-management relation-
ships became bitter again. During 1945 and 1946, there were 
numerous crippling strikes in the automobile, coal, and railroad 
industries. During 1946, 5,000 strikes involved 4.6 million work-
3although mr. Stans was indicted for perjury and obstruction of justice in 
1973, he was acquitted of involvement in the Watergate scandal in 1974 [Colum­
bia Encyclopedia, 2005]. 
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ers.4 the united mine Workers under John l. lewis instituted 
one such strike in 1946 that had the potential to shut down busi-
nesses, stall World War ii recovery in europe, and deny warmth 
to american homes heated with coal. With this new political 
power, labor unions began demanding that corporate financial 
records be opened for scrutiny during contract negotiations. 
 these changes in the corporate regulatory and political 
environment began having an effect on the role of the account-
ant. With the passage of new financial market and reporting 
legislation, it became important for businesses to demonstrate 
that they were complying with the new rules. Consequently, the 
obligations of the accountant began to extend beyond the tradi-
tional role of responsibility only to corporations. Since the terms 
“independent public or certified accountant” had found their 
way into the Securities act of 1933, accounting responsibilities 
had now expanded with obligations to the public sector.5
 New practice guidelines were also developed for the ac-
counting profession. Statement on auditing Procedures (SaP) 
#1, Extensions of Auditing Procedures, was passed in 1939 by the 
aia largely in response to the audit failure at mckesson & rob-
bins Company featuring fraudulent inventory and accounts re-
ceivable.6 SaP #1 required auditors to be present when invento-
ries were counted and to conduct a confirmation of receivables. 
 the standardization process in auditing and account-
ing practices did expand with a number of new accounting 
research Bulletins (arB), accounting terminology Bulletins, 
and SaPs. however, standardization moved ahead only slowly.7 
Within this political and economic environment, Stans began to 
write about social responsibility.8 
 
4“For example, in November 1945, the 180,000 members of the auto Workers 
at General motors struck for 113 days. in 1946, national strikes crippled the soft 
coal industry and the nation’s railroads. that year there were a staggering 5,000 
strikes, involving 4.6 million workers” [american Bar association, 1995, p. 19].
5the Securities act of 1933 deals with the certification of financial statements. 
yet, the meaning of independence, as mentioned in the act, would not be more 
fully addressed until the 1960s and 1970s. 
6the fraud resulted in $19 million of fictitious receivables and inflated inven-
tory; the latter supposedly stored in Canadian warehouses (Carey, 1970; Goelzer, 
2003).
7For example Previts and merino [1998, p. 304] observed that CaP “had done 
little to promote uniformity before the war.” 
8his major publications on this topic were written in the period from 1947 to 
1955 at which time he began his career in government service. 
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a SoCial reSPoNSiBility PerSPeCtiVe:  
the Call For uNBiaSeD rePortiNG
 an underlying argument about societal responsibilities is 
that no group can survive if it simply pursues its own interests 
without considering the consequences of its actions on society 
[linowes, 1974; Committee on Social measurement, 1977]. For 
the accountant, early definitions of social responsibility were 
viewed as professionals doing good work for clients. this per-
spective did not include measures of general human well-being, 
such as environmental effects, social accounting, or the impacts 
of business on local health and housing. awareness of these 
issues began to develop in the late 1960s through the 1970s 
 [Colantoni et al., 1973; epstein et al., 1977]. 
 early views were more professionally introverted, linked to 
the avoidance of questionable practices that would reflect badly 
upon the profession in regard to tax preparation, for example, 
as noted by accounting practitioners in the Journal of Account­
ancy [Joplin, 1919; richardson, 1919]. other accounting authors 
wrote about the accounting profession’s public role. rose [1923, 
p. 337] observed that “the accountant must be prepared to fulfill 
his duties and obligations, not only to his clients, but also to 
the public,” but this role was not fully defined. another view on 
 public responsibility was voiced by Clark [1923], a well-known 
economist. he believed labor’s miseries during economic down-
turns could be mitigated if factory accounting methods were 
revised. he argued that charges for the social costs of labor 
needed to be forecasted and added to factory overhead as a new 
fixed cost.9 
 auditors’ public responsibilities were perceived as tran-
scending the mathematical accuracy of the financial numbers 
to determine the true state of affairs of the organization under 
audit, but there was little call for standardization of accounting 
practices. the institutionalist writings of Dr Scott during this 
period described accounting changes as part of a continuing 
and fluid cultural evolution or social process based on objective 
 rather than subjective thinking [Scott, 1931]. limperg [1932, p. 
19] also viewed the audit in an evolutionary context. he wrote 
9Clark was concerned with labor’s suffering during downturns in the busi-
ness cycle. he thought revisions in accounting practices were needed to allow 
labor costs to become part of factory overhead charges to be used subsequently 
by managers to moderate the effects of idle capacity and unemployment during 
economic downturns. Current employer payments to unemployment compensa-
tion funds are an implementation of Clark’s ideas. 
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about the obligation of the accountant to “carry out his work in 
such a way that he does not betray the expectations which he 
evokes in the sensible layman.” littleton [1933, pp. 267, 271] 
mentioned the “social interest” and, within that context, dis-
cussed the evolutionary rather than the revolutionary nature of 
change in the accounting profession. 
 in a 1930 injunction, issued by the Court of Common 
Pleas against the merger of Bethlehem Steel Corporation and 
youngstown Sheet and tube Company, the obligations of the 
accounting profession to the general public were identified as 
a central issue [editorial, 1931, p. 86]. after commenting in the 
decision on the need for uniform standards of accounting to al-
low stockholders to accurately determine whether the offer from 
Bethlehem Steel was fair, Judge Jenkins went on to state:
i am further of the opinion that directors, shareholders 
…should have a clear, explicit explanation of the ac-
counting facts...which...will enable the ordinary reader, 
without hiring a technical interpreter, to determine 
the actual state of the company’s business....Corporate 
statements and reports are for the information of the 
laymen.
in the same editorial section, a.P. richardson, the editor of the 
Journal of Accountancy, described this statement as the “depth 
of the morass” and called uniform rules of reporting impracti-
cal. 
 later writers wrote about a general public interest the ac-
counting profession represented within the economy, but they 
did not correlate this public interest with accurate financial 
reporting based on generally prescribed methods [Wilcox, 1939]. 
Scott [1940, p. 508, 1941] wrote of “a vision of social respon-
sibility” and expressed his concern that accounting practices 
needed to provide fair representation to all interests. Paton and 
littleton [1940] wrote about the social importance of account-
ing to the flow of capital, but did not mention social class issues. 
all these views predated Stans’ writings. although significant in 
other ways, these observations did not combine the concepts 
of social responsibilities, more uniform accounting standards, 
and societal class conflict as characterized Stans’ writings a few 
years later. 
 Citations in Stans’ writing help identify supporting sources 
for his ideas on social responsibility. Beginning in the late 
1940s, an underlying reference in Stans’ arguments regarding 
social responsibility came from arB #1 [aia, 1949, p. 1] and its 
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 reference to the social purpose of accounting.10 
the committee regards corporation accounting as one 
phase of the working of the corporate organization of 
business, which in turn it views as a machinery created 
by the people in the belief that, broadly speaking, it will 
serve a useful social purpose. the test of the corporate 
system and of the special phase of it represented by cor-
porate accounting ultimately lies in the results which 
are produced. these results must be judged from the 
standpoint of society as a whole – not from that of any 
one group of interested parties. 
 although not generally called “social responsibility” by 
the practitioners of this time period, there were two general 
views of the profession’s responsibilities. one view held that the 
accountant’s role was to serve the client professionally. in such 
cases, the accountant acted as the client’s advocate in financial 
matters. a second view considered the accountant’s obligation 
to the client to be mitigated by a duty to act in good faith to 
and to serve the greater good of the general public. Stans’ ar-
guments supported the latter view. the belief that accounting 
practices should not support any one group of interested par-
ties was repeated in Stans’ writings and speeches throughout 
his accounting career. he believed that expanding prescribed 
accounting practices served as the means for implementing 
accounting’s social responsibility to the public, not just the 
client or investors.
 
laBor uNioNS aND FiNaNCial rePortiNG
 as noted, the period immediately after World War ii was 
characterized by high levels of labor unrest in the u.S. labor 
leaders and their advisors began using corporate financial re-
ports to determine the share of a company’s resources that could 
reasonably be expected to support wage increases for union 
members. as they reviewed the methods used by the accounting 
practitioners in preparing these financial reports, they became 
suspicious of the accounting practices being followed. 
 Barkin’s [1951] views can be considered representative of 
the labor movement’s perspective toward financial reporting 
during this period.11 he wrote that financial statements which 
10See Stans [1948, 1952, 1953a, b].
11Solomon Barkin was a noted labor union activist, and in 1951, he was the 
director of research for the textile Workers union of america. 
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do not clearly disclose total income and benefits transferred to 
owners and managerial interests cannot be trusted by workers 
and unions.12 From his perspective, it was important to have 
financial statements that accurately showed the amount of in-
come available for distribution to the factors of production. For 
collective bargaining purposes, he believed the influence of the 
separate entity and the conservatism principles biased finan-
cial reporting towards owner/managerial interests over those 
of labor. these underlying principles were seen as resulting in 
overly cautious reporting that unnecessarily reduced owner 
profits and put labor at a disadvantage in collective bargaining. 
Barkin [1951, p. 1196] believed that the accountant needed to 
“define the biases and distortions introduced into the recording 
by the power which management has hitherto exercised over 
accounting.” Stockholders, creditors, directors, and executive 
managers were identified by Barkin as the four distinct entre-
preneurial groups within the corporation who act as providers 
of either capital or managerial talent. after making this point, 
he described accounting practices related to these four groups 
that distort financial reporting. For stockholders, many of the 
recognized costs of stockholder operations (e.g., meetings, legal 
fees, etc.) are withdrawals from residual earnings and not reduc-
tions in current earnings. For creditors, their interest payments 
should be recognized as a reduction of the company’s net worth, 
not an expense on the income statement. Payments to directors 
should also not be recognized as charges against income. ex-
ecutive managers act as replacements for the single proprietor; 
thus, any payments to them, such as bonuses or expense ac-
counts, should not be deducted from income but should be rec-
ognized as deductions from retained earnings. he believed that 
the current method of preparing financial statements allowed 
companies to siphon off profits to their affiliated companies 
or to burden one enterprise with the expenses incurred by an 
affiliate. Barkin called for additional reporting to the SeC to 
allow for the disclosure of such information. he argued against 
any accounting methods which would tend to build reserves for 
future losses.13 
12Barkin developed support for his arguments against conservatism by citing 
Paton [1948] and Gilman [1939]. it should be noted that Gilman’s arguments on 
conservatism in turn drew support from a Dohr [1938] article. as will be seen, 
Dohr was also a source cited by Stans as well as someone who opposed Stans’ call 
for stronger standards to control accounting procedures. 
13he cites any inventory valuation method not based on cost as recognizing 
inventory losses before the inventory is sold. FiFo, liFo, normal stock, market, 
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 John Carey [1951, p. 165], executive director of the aia, 
commented on Barkin’s article in a Journal of Accountancy 
editorial, describing Barkin’s ideas as another example of spe-
cial interest arguments that would neither help stockholders 
or potential investors nor be useful to taxation or regulatory 
authorities. rather, Carey believed accounting should focus on a 
“fair presentation of income from all points of view.” 
 Barkin was not the only labor activist calling for changes 
in accounting practices. Pillsbury [1954] reports on a national 
study of union research directors, citing their suspicions re-
garding the establishment of contingency reserves, inflated de-
preciation reserves, the liFo inventory method, and inventory 
reserves.14 these union research directors believed corporate 
profits should show the amount of resources available for distri-
bution to land, capital, and management. 
StaNS’ reCommeNDatioNS For ChaNGe
 Stans began to express his own concerns about ongoing la-
bor-management conflicts.15 Stans drew support for his opinions 
about these clashes from ruttenberg [1950], Slichter [1951], and 
Dohr [1952]. Dohr’s arguments in his 1952 article were used by 
Stans to reinforce his own ideas on the importance of avoiding 
class conflicts.16 Dohr articulated a conservative vision for the 
american economy that focused on a utilitarian philosophy for 
and standard cost are all considered inventory cost-flow assumptions that distort 
company profits. these methods are used to protect current property rights and 
are based on assumptions of future business expansion. Such assumptions about 
future changes are not likely to be shared by all the factors of production in the 
same manner as they are being currently distributed. 
14these concerns were also found in the accounting literature. in the Nature 
and Purpose of the Income Statement, the Subcommittee on the income Statement 
of the CaP reported that accounting procedures could as easily cause the under-
statement of net income as its overstatement. thus, any proposed solutions to 
accounting issues need to consider how they create both effects [aia, 1945].
15Stans acted as president and director of moore Corporation, a Joliet, illinois 
stove manufacturing company, from 1938-1945. the company’s workers were 
 represented by the iron molders and Foundry Workers (imFW) union. Stans de-
scribes being inducted into the imFW as an honorary union member in 1943 and 
retaining his union card from that date onward [Stans, 1995].
16See Stans [1952, 1953a, b]. Dohr was an accounting professor, practitioner, 
and director of research at the aia. his publications included books and numer-
ous articles in the Journal of Accountancy. it is interesting to note that Dohr coau-
thored an article with George o. may challenging the previously published Stans-
Goedert’s article calling for stronger rules of accounting practice [may and Dohr, 
1955]. this debate is discussed later in the paper. 
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societal good. as suggested in arB #1, there exists a need for 
cooperation among all economic groups. it is disadvantageous 
when a labor force adopts monopolistic practices in an attempt 
to raise wages. 
 as noted previously, labor unions were not hesitant to 
 express their opinions about factors affecting their economic 
well-being, such as the reliability of corporate financial state-
ments used in labor negotiations. Stans’ [1947a] paper on in-
dustrial peace uses sources from the united mine Workers, The 
Truth about Fake Company Financial Statements, and the united 
electrical radio & machine Workers of america, How Corpora­
tions Conceal Profits, to illustrate labor’s distrust and doubts 
about financial reporting. to support his perspective on the need 
for accurate financial reporting, Stans also built upon rutten-
burg’s [1950, p. 14] paper, Labor Views of Financial Statements.17 
ruttenburg, a labor activist, argued that the current format 
 being used to prepare financial statements is designed “to fool 
the public.” he believed such accounting reports contributed 
to the climate of labor unrest. he considered the accounting 
practice of setting up reserves for price increases and decreases 
simultaneously was only used to deceive labor unions about the 
true level of corporate profits. With better financial reporting, 
ruttenburg hoped strikes could be diminished. 
 Stans’ articles drew inspiration from Sumner Slichter’s 
[1951] book, What’s Ahead for American Business.18 Slichter, 
who favored entrepreneurship, was a conservative labor econo-
mist who wrote about labor issues such as employee turnover, 
unions, and unionization. Stans synthesized Slichter’s argu-
ments in supporting the american economy against economic 
systems that had a propensity toward communism or socialism. 
Slichter believed he was witnessing a fundamental change in 
american business as labor’s increasing influence diminished 
management’s power in the workplace. 
 Stans [1947b, d] wrote and spoke about the need for “indus-
trial peace” and the importance of the accounting profession’s 
role in serving the public interest. he believed that responsibil-
ity to the public mandated unbiased financial reports, ones for 
17See Stans [1950b, 1956]. ruttenberg worked for the Congress of industrial 
organizations (Cio), and at one time, he had been a Cio labor organizer. in 1950, 
he was the director of the Department of education and research at the Cio. 
18See Stans [1952, 1953a, b]. Stans was familiar with Slichter’s work as early 
as 1949 when he had cited per capita statistics developed by Slichter as a source 
of support in his writings [1949a, c, d]. 
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all groups, not just stockholders or potential investors. Such 
 reports would allow others, such as labor’s representatives, 
to view financial reporting as a fair process. Stans [1947b, p. 
28] mentions the “proportionate distribution of the excess of 
venture income over a measured return to each economic part-
ner.” 
 Stans [1953b] went further in outlining a method for a more 
equitable distribution to labor, capital, and management with 
social-accounting financial statements. he describes an income 
statement in which “business expenses” are initially deducted 
and then distributions are made to labor, capital, and manage-
ment as a means of recognizing the cooperative nature of these 
groups. in expanding on this approach, he suggests developing 
a pre-negotiated social budget for the division of profits. the 
budget would be based on a formula for the “social division” 
of income to all groups involved in the generation of company 
profits. again, he stressed the accounting profession’s role in 
making financial reporting understandable, trustworthy, honest, 
consistent, complete, and respected. 
 Stans [1994 interview] felt financial reports could contribute 
to industrial peace by helping to prevent general public suffering 
arising from devastating and violent labor strikes and political 
threats to the government: 
those figures were important in a great many ways 
 besides security holders too, for example, labor de-
pended on their earnings reports of companies. and, 
when they found out what was going on, they became 
very critical of earnings reports. less and less depen-
dent on the results of those reports in labor negotia-
tions. the company said we had a bad year, last year we 
lost 50 million dollars. yeah, how much did you take 
out for future reserves, future contingencies, or how 
much did you bring in to pad it by improving the earn-
ings, by that process. Well, that was my conception that 
– and i made one particular speech on it at a meeting 
in minneapolis for the institute, yeah, on carrying that 
social responsibility business still further by seeing that 
financial statements in all respects were as accurate and 
as comparable as possible for the interest in labor that 
had to deal with negotiations on wages. 
 as later stated in his book One of the Presidents’ Men [Stans, 
1995, p. 38], he believed that accounting practices at the time 
were “inadequate for a real public understanding of the facts of 
business.” his perspective for more standardization was based 
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on his worry over fairness and conflicting economic interests.19 
Stans believed that without clear reporting, accounting served as 
a tool for those who wanted to distort the general public’s view 
of the american economic system. Stans [1947b, p. 26] describes 
the job of the accountant as:
…the development of independent, truthful, and under-
standable reports of the facts of business operation for 
labor and the public, and in giving authenticity to such 
reports.
 Stans’ [1947, p. 26] speeches and writings represent the 
views of a recognized accounting practitioner calling on the pro-
fession to improve its reporting practices in order to encourage 
industrial peace: “the honest, independent representations of 
the public accountant, applied to information fully and clearly 
presented, can eliminate much of labor’s distrust of manage-
ment and management’s distrust of labor.” Stans [1947a, p. 25] 
felt that “the public accountant has thus far failed to establish 
his independence in their eyes.” 
 he was one of the early practitioners calling for the reform 
of accounting standards as a necessary part of the need to avoid 
social class conflicts as typified in labor-management disputes. 
in the interview, he stated:
Furthermore, i took the front steps, pretty largely, in 
criticizing the quality of standards and workmanship 
of the profession in a series of articles in the Journal of 
accountancy that you may have seen – even to the point 
of drawing fire on me, from some of the old timers in 
the profession, who thought that accounting would be 
better served...operated and would better serve the pub-
lic if given a lot more freedom of choice on the ways to 
make entries. i felt very strongly that that was not right 
and i defined it as a social responsibility and wrote sev-
eral articles on it. 
 in 1947, he first used the term “social responsibility” in his 
writings.20 at that time, Stans [1947b, p. 35] noted: 
19after World War ii, Storey [1964] identified accountants’ focus on social 
responsibility arising from three concerns. they were: (1) meeting the reporting 
needs of others beyond the traditional groups; i.e., investors, management, and 
creditors; (2) a growing third-party emphasis on accounting independence; and 
(3) improving the financial reporting by decreasing the discretionary differences 
in reporting practices. 
20Writing in 1943, Stans [1943, p. 239] used the term “social responsibility” 
in his first published paper on small businesses’ war obligations, but he had not 
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...the art of accounting is today a social force and those 
who practice the art must assume social responsibili-
ties. to the accountant, therefore, this implies not only 
the performance of all activities in a manner consistent 
with the public interest, but also a continuing aim to 
expand the field of service in all ways in which the well 
being of the economy can be advanced. 
 he believed the accounting profession’s role was to help 
minimize social problems by preparing public financial reports 
that clearly showed how the wealth of the production process 
was fairly allocated among the factors of production. he 
worried that the general public was suspicious of an accounting 
profession that appeared to be working with corporations to 
hide corporate wealth. 
 Stans derived many of his arguments from the american 
 political context of the times. in a 1948 paper, Stans [1948, p. 
100] referenced the social changes that have occurred in ameri-
can society over the period from 1928 to 1948:
 …of the responsiveness of accounting to social forces. 
each of these development [changes in accounting 
practices] came as an acknowledgment that the previ-
ous practices were not wholly truthful or adequate in 
reports of stewardship.
he believed accountants were “to be employed in the full recog-
nition of a primary responsibility to the broad public” [Stans, 
1948, p. 99]. 
 During this period, it was a common accounting practice to 
smooth company earnings with a variety of techniques. these 
included directly crediting or charging earned surplus (retained 
earnings), recording stock discounts, recognizing depreciation 
when “justified” by revenues, using reserves for possible price 
increases or decreases, reporting net income before depreciation 
deductions, inadequately reporting stock options resulting in 
the dilution of stockholder’s earnings, and making asset revalu-
ations without strict adherence to cost principles. income appro-
priations and charges from questionable future event income 
were recorded. there were large inconsistencies in calculating 
net income among similar companies. tellingly, Stans’ writing 
emphasizes the need for unqualified public confidence in the 
yet applied the term to the accounting profession’s responsibilities to the public. 
in the paper, he states: “But to what extent will economic regimentation and the 
growing recognition of social responsibility impose a continuation of such mea-
sures as wage and salary stabilization….”
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accounting profession’s reporting practices through the curtail-
ment of these practices. he considered accounting to be an 
art where judgment should not be circumscribed by rules, but 
where such judgment should not be used “in the narrow interest 
of [one] social structure to the detriment of others” [Stans, 1948, 
p. 106]. Stans [1948, p. 105] argued that accounting practices 
should be used in a manner to improve the general public’s un-
derstanding about the distribution of corporate resources and 
rewards. 
accounting presentations must be tailored to the pub-
lic interest by means of codified standards of adequate 
disclosure which recognize the invalidity of any type of 
statement which fails to tell a full and clear story.
 Stans argued that the public’s conceptions of financial re-
ports as confusing and untruthful only poses additional threats 
to american free enterprise. During this period, american 
society was facing some of the biggest threats of the Cold War 
in eastern europe and China. it was a time when the house un-
american activities Committee and mcCarthyism heightened 
concerns about Communists in the u.S. Beginning in 1947, 
Stans [1947a, p. 28] saw growing political threats and worried 
about the need for industrial peace:
except for those who would substitute a marxist form 
of government, americans believe that labor should 
have a fair share of the productive output, which means 
with due respect also to a fair share to capital and man-
agement. unless labor seeks the disillusionments of 
Communism or Fascism, it must accept that as a prem-
ise.
 Stans’ [1949b, p. 3] concerns about both socialism and com-
munism continued to be expressed in his writings:
in the search for social and economic adjustment, the 
world’s once most powerful empire (united kingdom) 
has turned to socialism. today’s most challenging world 
power (Soviet union) is sponsoring an uncertain hu-
man equation called communism...even in our own 
country there is a lacking of sureness, a positive confi-
dence of the outcome of the future.
 he argued that accounting must help to instill confidence 
in the capitalistic system that had been under stress and change 
since the days of the Great Depression. Stans called for the ac-
counting profession to view its link and responsibility to the 
general public as strongly as its link to corporate clients. the 
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underlying clashes between the policies of Communism and the 
free-enterprise system framed the perspective taken in many of 
his articles [Stans, 1953a, p. 19]: 
….the major uncertainty about the course of account-
ing development springs from the threats of change 
in the political system. So long as a democratic form 
of government prevails, and retains with it a climate 
that encourages free enterprise and the profit motive, 
accounting will retain its full potential. on the other 
hand, a nationalization of a large segment of industry 
or finance could lead to the paralysis of accounting. 
he went on to write: an even greater political change 
to some form of Statism or Communism in govern-
ment would...further centralize decisions and reduce 
accounting to a matter of classification and summariza-
tion according to rule books and regulations.
 Stans [1949d, pp. 466-467] continued his social responsi-
bility arguments in a 1949 Journal of Accountancy article. Stans 
felt that if accounting’s social responsibility obligations were 
 recognized and acted upon, a means would be provided for cor-
recting class-based economic disagreements, especially those 
arising from suspect financial reporting. he states that account-
ing “is the only common denominator available to solve the con-
flicting interests of capital, labor, management, and the public, 
within an economy.” he describes financial reports as “social 
documents” [Stans, 1949c, p. 50], and accounting practices as 
being “developed from a type of free-hand drawing” [Stans, 
1949b, p. 5].
 Stans became a member of the CaP in 1943. his qualifica-
tions to several arBs demonstrate his support for stronger rules 
in accounting practice. Stans’ qualification regarding the poten-
tial for practice abuses in implementing arB #27, Emergency 
Facilities [aia, 1949, p. 226], is worth noting21: 
21Stans served on the CaP from 1943 to 1948 and again from 1953 to 1954. 
he served on the Committee on accounting and terminology from 1953 to 1954. 
Stans registered dissents or qualifications on arB #27, Emergency Facilities; #28, 
Accounting Treatment of General Purpose Contingency Reserves; #32, Income and 
Earned Surplus; #35, Presentation of Income and Earned Surplus; and #44, Declin­
ing­Balance Depreciation. he did not dissent on arB #20, Renegotiation of War 
Contracts; #23, Accounting for Income Taxes; #24, Accounting for Intangible Assets; 
#25, Accounting for Terminated War Contracts; #26, Accounting for the Use of Spe­
cial War Reserves; #29, Inventory Pricing; #30, Current Assets and Current Liabili­
ties: Working Capital; #31, Inventory Reserves; #33, Depreciation and High Costs; 
#36, Pension Plans: Accounting for Annuity Costs Based on Past Services; and #37, 
Accounting for Compensation in the Form of Stock Options. 
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Stans feels that the application of individual judgment 
as to what is a ‘special situation’ [accumulated amorti-
zation or depreciation] could lead to abuses in practice. 
the qualification shows his concern for the standardization of 
accounting practices. it is a strong dissent.
 as a member of the CaP, Stans’ dissent on arB #32, Income 
and Earned Surplus, along with two other members, was based 
on reducing confusion for public users of financial statements 
[aia, 1949, p. 265]: 
…the so-called ‘all-inclusive’ concept...best serves the 
public interest because it is least subject to reader mis-
interpretation...surplus charges and credits...tend to 
hinder public understandability of financial statements. 
arB #32 is considered a first step in restricting credits and 
charges from being recorded in earned surplus. in dissenting 
with the arB’s conclusions, Stans felt this first step did not go 
far enough. of Stans’ four dissents or qualifications to arBs, 
three dealt with what he considered to be the improper record-
ing of income. 
 the argument for an all-inclusive income statement was 
also addressed in arB #35, Presentation of Income and Earned 
Surplus. Stans’ dissent, along with two other members, was 
focused on using the surplus (retained earnings) to record ex-
penses and revenues directly. the dissenters argued that such 
expenses and revenues would be better represented on the in-
come statement. they believed arB #35 was inconsistent with 
previous arBs and needed to be revised. Finally, in arB #44, 
Declining­Balance Depreciation, Stans argued that all significant 
deferred income taxes should be recognized. he did not agree 
with the CaP’s view that the time period to depreciation reversal 
was the key to recognition or non-recognition.22 
 his activities on the CaP showed his support for the ac-
counting profession’s ability to police itself rather than in the 
government setting practice rules [Stans, 1995, p. 37]. he be-
lieved that the introduction of more standardized and specific 
accounting practices was a required sacrifice for the common 
good of all society. Writing in 1955, Stans [1955, p. 216] stated:
22it is interesting to note that the 1958 revision of arB #44 stated that, “recog-
nition should be given to deferred income taxes if the amounts thereof are mate-
rial” [aiCPa, 1961, p. 2-a]. thus, the time period rule was eliminated. at this time, 
Stans was no longer on the CaP.
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i believe we will soon see a more comprehensive code 
of professionally developed accounting principles, fur-
ther refinement of auditing standards, and greater uni-
formity in terminology and method of presentation of 
financial data. 
 Stans adopted a pragmatic argument linking the pro-
fession’s future success with the profession’s ability to make 
financial statements more understandable to the general public. 
Stans’ pragmatic views correspond with the view of develop-
ing justice for all societal groups as a means of survival. his 
views encompass moral justice for “investors, bankers, the gen-
eral public, labor unions, legislators, and government agencies” 
[Stans, 1995, p. 38]. he stated his concerns about the accounting 
profession’s financial reporting in these interview comments:
and if you distort any one period by stealing and trans-
ferring into a reserve, some of the results of that period, 
you’re not serving properly the public, stockholders, 
and those who have an interest in that earning power… 
...labor depended on their [corporate] earnings re-
ports…when they found out what was going on, they 
became very critical of earnings reports and less and 
less dependent on the results of those reports in labor 
negotiations. 
 Stans wrote to convince other accounting practitioners 
to adopt a broader societal view as part of their professional 
responsibilities, specifically to eliminate accounting practices 
that were misleading. in Volume 1 of the CPA Handbook [Stans, 
1952, p. 14], he wrote:
in the hands of its experts, accounting can become an 
even more important means of creating understanding, 
confidence and rationality in economic affairs. in this 
prospect lies the real hope of eliminating the recurring 
dangers to the permanence of the american system.
 after 1955, Stans turned his writing toward federal budget 
issues given his activities in Washington. yet, in his 1962 key-
note address before the american institute of Certified Public 
accountants’ (aiCPa) 75th anniversary meeting, he again 
made a call for social responsibility. this speech, published in 
The Australian Accountant, was titled Accounting and Human 
Progress [Stans, 1963]. the address highlights how the account-
ing profession can meet its social responsibilities to better the 
conditions of the people of the world. again, Stans stressed the 
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need of the accounting profession to look beyond the techniques 
of accounting and commit to a larger role in strengthening ac-
countability through involvement in public policy issues. 
 During the 1994 interview, Stans continued to associate pro-
fessional accounting practice with social responsibilities. here, 
he provides a definition of professionalism: 
i think it’s a situation when an organized group of 
people with professional type responsibilities and 
workloads actually organize themselves in such a man-
ner as to standardize codes of ethics, principles, and 
methods of developing quality in order to better serve 
the public best. it’s basically the development of a social 
consciousness and social responsibility within the work 
defined by the boundaries of the profession.
Similar aND oPPoSiNG VieWS
 Stans’ writings on social responsibility were not greeted 
with acceptance from everyone in the profession. his calls 
for better financial reporting were viewed by many as a direct 
criticism of accounting professionalism, and his call for the 
“development and use of a comprehensive code of accounting 
principles” [Stans, 1949b, p. 5] was considered a threat against 
the professional judgment of the CPa. Stans averred in his inter-
view:
there were some of the firms–thought i should not in 
anyway talk to the public or write in a way which the 
public got a hold of it in a manner that was critical [to 
the accounting profession]. 
looking back, i can see i was absolutely right in writ-
ing despite the fact that George may, one of the retired 
partners of Price Waterhouse, took issue with me…very 
strongly. 
[the profession] did respond to all the things that i 
urged in those days…most of them were carried out un-
der threat rather than by professional decision. 
 George o. may, a leading accounting practitioner, was a 
former chairman of the CaP and served with Stans from 1943 
to 1945.23 may had been with Price Waterhouse since 1897 and 
23George o. may was a senior partner at Price Waterhouse and a well-
 respected accounting practitioner. he was the first chairman of the CaP, and his 
influence was instrumental in formulating many of the early arBs. he served on 
the CaP from 1939 to 1945. 
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a senior partner from 1911 to 1940. in 1934, he chaired the aia’s 
Special Committee on Co-operation with the Stock exchanges. 
the Special Committee determined that a variety of account-
ing methods were inevitable in practice and suggested that only 
 generalized principles should be used by the accounting profes-
sion. may believed in the subjective nature of accounting and 
that the judgment of the accountant in recording transactions 
was better than a strong set of standards. he believed that the 
accountant’s primary obligation was to investors [may, 1933a]. 
may [1937, p. 425] subscribed to the belief that the “substance 
of the accounts may and often should vary according to the 
purpose for which the accounts are required.” in this regard, the 
accountant had no obligation to disclose the nature of reserves 
in the accounts if there was no material distortion of earnings. 
may [1950b, p. 387] stated that “...no amount of standardization 
will either (a) make an understanding of the nature of account-
ing process less necessary to a proper interpretation of such 
determinations, or (b) convert those determinations into find-
ings of fact.” may’s accounting background was British-based 
where questions of asset valuation and accounting procedure 
are largely in the hands of the auditors [Zeff, 1984].24
 may, a strong advocate for more voluntary accounting 
reforms and a supporter of individualized decisions based on 
practitioner’s judgments, criticized Stans’ 1948 and 1949 Jour­
nal of Accountancy articles. in particular, Stans’ support for a 
set of authoritative standards did not find favor with may who 
preferred “intelligent variation” rather than the “wooden confor-
mity” he saw in Stans’ suggestions [may, 1950a, pp. 208, 210]. 
Further, may believed that it was unnecessary for the reader 
of financial statements to understand exactly “what was in the 
mind of the accountant on deciding...content and structure” of 
the income statement. may criticized Stans for suggesting that 
authoritative rules should be based on an external authority; 
24may was not alone in objecting to the institution of controls over accounting 
procedures followed by the accounting profession. a number of leading account-
ing practitioners were opposed to the development of authoritative accounting 
procedures that would impede judgment in selecting the accounting methods to 
follow. For example, littleton [1934, p. 72] wrote: 
Double entry is flexible enough to record and organize any data, and 
our present knowledge of uniform accounting systems is ample to 
permit the design of a variety of suitable mechanism. But account-
ants, better perhaps than anyone else, are aware of the dangers of 
over-rigid prescriptions; all business cannot be poured into a few 
uniform molds. even different enterprises in the same industry can-
not with equal economy follow identical accounting procedures. 
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i.e., “power” rather than the knowledge, experience, and reputa-
tion of the accountant. in a letter, published at the end of may’s 
article, Stans identified the primary difference of opinion as the 
ability of financial statement readers to understand “what goes 
on” [Stans, 1950a].25 again, Stans stressed a “social aspect” and 
a “social revolution” as reasons for adopting more standardized 
financial reports. Stans [1950a, p. 211] wrote:
...i plead for greater standardization, clarity, and com-
parability (in form and expression), that all may under-
stand. to me, this is ‘usefulness’ in terms of society and 
at no cost to anyone.
 even before his debate with Stans, may [1943] had objected 
to authoritative standard setting based on a new social order or 
some sort of abstract justice. he felt these reasons were unjusti-
fied. 
 Stans and Goedert [1955], along with outlining their defini-
tion for the term “book value,” wrote about the importance of 
having an “authoritative and comprehensive definition” for book 
value within the profession. in response to Stans’ proposals, 
viewed by may as another call for standard setting by a higher 
authority, may and Dohr [1955, p. 47] wrote: 
that concept is that in business accounting there is 
neither absolute rule nor anarchy but a system that has 
elements of stability and adaptability, and that stresses 
disclosure and significance – not strict uniformity. 
 Both may and Dohr had correspondingly strong opinions 
regarding the standardization of authoritative accounting prin-
ciples. For example, Dohr [1942] had written that there are no 
“immutable principles” or system of accounting, but rather 
practice consists of determining the specific facts of the situa-
tion and then selecting the principles that apply. 
 Stans refers to Carey’s Professional Ethics of Public Account­
ing [1946, p. 7] as support for his views on unbiased report-
ing.26 Carey, who served as executive director of the aia, wrote 
that accountants must not “arouse a suspicion of lack of inde-
pendence” or act in a manner that make the accountant appear 
25it is worth noting that Carey as editor of the Journal of Accountancy pub-
lished nine letters in the Correspondence, Letters to the Editor section under the 
title “many accountants approve maurice Stans ideas on accounting and Free 
enterprise.” Carey was a supporter of calls for more standardization in account-
ing practices.
26See Stans, 1947a.
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to represent conflicting interests. During the interview, Stans 
mentioned the support for his arguments that he had received 
from Carey:
... (Carey stated to me) “i think this is exactly what the 
profession needs. We need to push ourselves as a pro-
fession into doing things in a much better way…a more 
uniform way. i, as executive Director of the institute, i 
can’t say that but you certainly can. i hope you will.” he 
encouraged me several times along the way to do some-
thing more in that field. the fact that happened that 
way, with him, leads me to believe that there weren’t 
very many others geared up to write about it at that 
time.
 Stans [interview, 1994] believed that his position regarding 
standardization and the social responsibilities of the profession 
came to be generally accepted: 
and i must say i made some enemies in the profession 
by picking on that [reserve accounting] as an example 
of an unfulfilled social responsibility and that took 
awhile for me to live it down. if the situation hadn’t 
caught up with my ideas, i think that i would never 
have gotten elected President of the institute.
Stan’s position on the need for more accounting standardization 
did not alienate members of the aia as can be can be seen in 
1954 when he was awarded the gold medal for distinguished ser-
vice to the profession and contributions to accounting literature. 
 Stans continued to work for a stronger standardization of 
accounting principles by serving as one of seven members on 
the aiCPa’s Special Committee formed in 1964 to study how 
 departures from the accounting Principles Board (aPB) opin-
ions should be handled.27 the Special Committee’s recommen-
dations and subsequent aiCPa membership vote substantially 
strengthened the aPB’s role in setting authoritative standards 
and helped to eliminate “unnecessary obstacles to compara-
bility” [Carey, 1970, p. 144].
 
CoNCluSioN
 issuing untrustworthy financial statements does have a 
significant economic and social effect on public perceptions of 
27Prior to the formation of the Special Committee, aPB opinions had been 
considered important, but not important enough to override an auditor’s best 
judgment as to how an accounting event should be reported. 
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the business environment. Stans’ concern for better accounting 
standards was framed within arguments of social responsibility 
to the public based on preventing class conflicts as well as serv-
ing the self-interest of the accounting profession by curtailing 
further governmental interventions.28 Both these concerns com-
bined under his definition of social responsibility.
 although there were others who called for uniform finan-
cial reporting, Stans was the first practitioner to associate fair 
reporting with social responsibility founded within a context of 
class conflict. Stans believed it was a mistake for the accounting 
profession to continue preparing financial reports without clear-
ly prescribed practice rules since this approach created public 
suspicion that accounting methods favored corporate interests. 
underlying his concerns was labor’s growing political power as a 
threat that could justify the enactment of congressional legisla-
tion to control accounting practice. he saw social responsibility 
as the profession’s obligation to itself as well as to the country in 
a broader sense. 
 in the 1994 interview, Stans summarized his contributions 
to the accounting profession: 
i think the major contribution that i made to the pro-
fession...was the fact that i singled out this issue of 
accuracy of financial statements. if we were a profes-
sional organization we had to have standards of perfor-
mance, standards of ethics, standards of...many other 
qualifications. and we weren’t providing that. the fact 
that i stuck with that for several years and pointed out 
the risk of government intervention...i think that was, 
as least as i saw it, the most valuable thing that i could 
have done for the profession.
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Abstract: In a recent Accounting History article, Sy and Tinker (S&T) 
[2005] critique accounting history for its support of “archivalism” 
and empiricism in light of irrefutable arguments against these “an-
tiquarian epistemes.” While tempted to lambaste S&T’s article as un-
fettered social activism rather than evidence-based historical inquiry, 
we focus instead on the more substantive questions S&T raise. We 
initially summarize their essential arguments, although some of the 
statements they make are contradictory in nature. We then discuss 
fundamental issues and genuine challenges to accounting history 
posed by the post-Kuhnian critique that S&T and others represent, as 
well as the nature and purpose of historical enquiry. We reviewed the 
accounting history journal articles published between 2001 and 2005 
and use our findings to evaluate the broad assertions that S&T make 
about accounting history. We conclude that S&T’s critique is unwar-
ranted and unjust, especially when the subject matter of the most 
recent accounting history articles is considered.
INTRODUCTION: SY AND TINKER ASSERTIONS
 Sy and Tinker (S&T) contend that Thomas Kuhn’s work on 
the construction of theory in the natural sciences has created 
a seismic historiographic shift that has not been acknowledged 
by accounting historians, whom they characterize as “archival-
ists” because of their unwavering belief that historical data 
Acknowledgments: We want to acknowledge Christopher Napier specifically 
for his helpful comments and suggestions as discussant of our paper at the 2006 
IPA Conference in Cardiff, Wales. We also acknowledge an unnamed reviewer for 
helpful insights on Thomas Kuhn’s writings and the nature of the Kuhn/Popper 
debate.
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are capable of objective verification. According to S&T, Kuhn 
[1970] has proven that empiricism is defunct, notwithstanding 
that the frauds S&T cite as proof of history’s inherent fallibil-
ity were themselves refuted by evidence, and that the historical 
materialism that they promote as an alternative to archivalism 
also requires evidence before one can accept it as an historical 
explanation of social conditioning.
 S&T also allege that the Kuhnian revolution has been suc-
cessful among scientists and non-accounting historians alike, 
and that by basing their conclusions on ineffectual methodolo-
gies (i.e., historical evidence and the principle of falsification), 
accounting historians are in a serious state of denial. S&T 
describe this alleged widespread acceptance of the fallibility of 
empirical research as the “triumph of history over philosophy,” 
although they also criticize accounting historians for not engag-
ing with philosophy in the first place. Furthermore, accounting 
historians continue to address the wrong issues (i.e., the great, 
white, Eurocentric men of the past), and most importantly, do 
not embrace an unequivocal moral stance vis-à-vis their subject 
matter.1 For example, S&T [2005, p. 53] write:
Specifically, we provide a series of examples to remind 
the reader of the vulnerability of Empirical Science to 
ideological partisanship; not only in establishing the 
verity of some ideas, but also in demonstrating the fal-
sity of others. The implication is not merely about dis-
tortions of the truth, but more importantly, the need for 
greater social self-awareness by accounting historians, 
such that they systematically grasp the terrain in con-
flict situations, and make an informed but inescapable 
choice about which side to ally their history. Such an 
[sic] socio-historical episteme is diametrically opposite 
to the philosophically naïve objectivity that under-girds 
much archival research.
 S&T similarly contend that by focusing on the wrong issues, 
accounting historians have ignored the repressed voices and 
social conflicts of the past, the inference being that when they 
have taken sides, they have allied with the wrong party. As a re-
sult, S&T argue, conservative viewpoints dominate the academy, 
and those with a more progressive spirit have been unable or are 
unwilling to use the history of accounting to help liberate the 
world of the present. 
 S&T infer that a belief in the inherent objectivity of fac-
1See Sy and Tinker [2006] for a more detailed discussion of Eurocentricism.
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tual evidence is the cause of accounting history’s misplaced alle-
giances. Although they do not explain why specifically, one must 
presume it is because historical truths for post-Kuhnians are 
always relative to a particular time and place. Following Kuhn, 
this is the time and place where the historian is situated since 
Kuhn is writing about the manner in which the dominant scien-
tific paradigm of the day colors the choice of topic and interpre-
tation of evidence [S&T, 2006]. This would, for instance, help ex-
plain the Eurocentric nature of accounting history as well as its 
male gender bias and what S&T regard as an obsession with the 
great persons of the past and double-entry bookkeeping. Hence, 
S&T [2005, p. 49] argue that “any assertion as to the verity of a 
statement of fact…requires a philosophical warrant.” Any defini-
tive statement about the past is entirely unsustainable because it 
derives from an historian’s epistemic, empirical selection of par-
ticular factoids among a set of competing evidential data. Thus, 
while accounting historians would like to consider themselves 
to be even-handed, they are unable to replicate an objective past 
due to the inherent bias and subjectivity of their search and dis-
covery process. 
 Given this unavoidable bias, S&T contend that accounting 
history would be better served if accounting historians adopt an 
unequivocal moral stance vis-à-vis their particular historical epi-
sode. Thus, they should examine the context and conflict associ-
ated with the episode (S&T’s emphasis on conflict is presumably 
a reflection of the importance of class conflict in Marxist histo-
ry), evaluate the arguments of the combatants, and openly pro-
mote the socially responsible position. According to S&T [2005, 
p. 53], a failure to advocate is not only a missed opportunity for 
accounting history, it has “undermined its authority to address 
pressing problems in accounting practice and theory today.” 
 S&T are equally fervent about the outcome of Kuhn/Popper 
debates concerning the philosophy of history. These debates 
have incorporated the relationship between evidence and reality, 
the inability of competing theorists to communicate with one 
another, and the nature of scientific observation, explanation, 
and prediction. S&T collapse the debates to “the meaning of 
truth,” and extend Popper’s falsification (refutation) theory to 
the work that historians undertake. For example, S&T [2005, p. 
51] write:
Refutation itself was also a flawed project for the his-
torians. Their criticisms focused on the tenuous link 
between Theory and Reality. Ascertaining the meaning 
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of empirical observations is always problematic. Obser-
vations are invariably mediated by senses and measur-
ing instruments, and therefore all results are contingent 
ontwo theories –, not one – the primary theory of inter-
est, and a second (measurement) theory about how a 
mediating device operates.
The implication is that we can “never be certain” to have refuted 
a primary theory given that our “observation theory may be 
faulty” [S&T, 2005, p. 52], even though, as Bryer [2006, p. 552] 
has pointed out, such a dichotomy does not accord with Kuhn’s 
[1970, pp. 10-11] own view that “law, theory, application, and 
instrumentation” – “what questions may legitimately be asked…. 
and what techniques employed in seeking solutions” [Kuhn, 
1970, p. 5] – cannot be separated. 
 Thus for S&T, perception trumps reality every time, a 
view which directly links Kuhn’s historical relativism to Marx’s 
 historical materialism. Historical materialism alleges that the 
social existence of men, which is in turn a product of the mate-
rial conditions in which they live, determines their whole con-
sciousness, their ideas, and the way they see the world. Histori-
ans following an historical materialist approach would therefore 
be a) very aware of the social context of the time; b) recognize 
that their own ideas are also social constructions; and c) since 
all ideas are social constructions, accept there is no point in at-
tempting to remain neutral. According to Marwick [2002, p. 4], 
“Marx criticized the philosophers for seeking to understand the 
world, when, he declared, the problem was to ‘change it’.”
 S&T advance historical materialism as a far better modus 
operandi for accounting history than the accounting “archi-
valism” they disparage.2 In essence, S&T call for historians to 
throw away the scale, choose sides, and enter the fray, presum-
ably on the side of the vanquished, impoverished, and socially 
repressed that accounting history has, allegedly, hitherto ig-
nored, rather than to continue their support of white-male, 
Eurocentric propertied interests – the purported subject of 
mainstream accounting history.3 
2Although S&T never specifically define the word “archivalism,” they seem to 
equate it to “empiricism,” a word that signifies the primacy of evidence in validat-
ing or refuting a particular theory.
3S&T [2005, p. 47] speak thusly about mainstream accounting history: “De-
spite the Kuhnian Revolution, archival antiquarianism reigns supreme. This re-
gime survives in a North-Korean-like insularity, by combining a self-referential 
closure using the Great Men of accounting with a refusal to engage a broader 
literature in social history.”
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 Unfortunately, S&T do not provide criteria that would help 
historians (or the subjects of the historical inquiry) make the 
correct choice when the distinctions between good and evil are 
not self-evident nor do they provide specific examples of where 
accounting historians have made the wrong choice. Instead, 
they generally argue that the historian “should align herself with 
the side judged to be morally and socially appropriate” [S&T, 
2005, p. 49]. 
 In the second part of their paper, S&T describe the histori-
cal frauds that were perpetrated by Copernicus and the hoaxers 
who created the Piltdown Man, examples they would surely 
acknowledge are quite far afield from the domain of account-
ing history. S&T describe and then critique these episodes as 
examples which show the limitations of historical evidence. 
Fraud is a poor yardstick for judging whether history is capable 
of objective verification, given that subjectivity in history usually 
arises not through manipulating the evidence but through 
conflicts of interpretation. S&T conclude by calling for account-
ing historians to produce “relevant history” by addressing the 
moral quandaries of the present, such that history “becomes an 
emancipatory exercise, where knowledge of the past becomes 
an instrument of edification and ennoblement; not subjugation” 
[S&T, 2005, p. 63].
 In the balance of our paper, we briefly summarize the Kuhn/
Popper debate and conclude that if the Kuhnian revolution 
“reigns supreme,” there are insurgents outside of accounting ar-
chivalism that continue to contest the outcome. We next identify 
the substantive questions that underlie historical research rather 
than the social advocacy that S&T propound. We then review 
and categorize accounting history journal publications during 
the 2001-2005 period. We conclude with an evidence-based as-
sessment of S&T’s assertions as well as the state of current ac-
counting history research.
THE KUHN/POPPER DEBATE
 While S&T portray the debate between Kuhn and Popper 
as a clear victory for Kuhnian devotees, the outcome appears 
far less decisive. Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian (post-positivist) 
supporters argue that competing paradigms are incommen-
surable and cannot be refuted on the basis of evidence each 
party amasses. This occurs because each paradigm’s supporters 
would present only that evidence which bolsters their particular 
perspective, leaving them incapable of disproving the verity 
186
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 34 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/12
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2007178  
presented by the other side. Consequently, paradigms cannot be 
refuted on the basis of evidence, which to S&T indicates that 1) 
the concept of absolute truth can never be established, and 2) 
that absolute truth cannot therefore exist. Absent the ability to 
establish absolute truth, S&T [2005, p. 49] argue that “partisan-
ship in history is inescapable.” 
 Harris [1992, p. 89] acknowledges that the denial of truth, 
or at least this interpretation of Kuhn’s thinking, “leads di-
rectly to a radical relativism with all of attending difficulties.” 
However, Harris [1992, p. 166] proposes a different solution to 
resolve intellectual debates, one that most archival historians 
would readily embrace: 
If anything is ever to resolve the dispute between com-
peting theories it will be by the accumulation of more 
data through experiments by more researchers over a 
longer period of time.
 Laudan [1996, p. 5] similarly characterizes Kuhn, Feyera-
bend, and other post-positivists as “thoroughgoing relativists” 
who are committed to three overriding principles:
(1) that evidence radically underdetermines theory 
choice – to the extent that virtually any theory can be 
rationally retained in the face of any conceivable evi-
dence (epistemic relativism); (2) that the standards for 
theory evaluation are mere conventions, reflecting no 
facts of the matter (metamethodological relativism); and 
(3) that one conceptual framework or worldview cannot 
be made intelligible in the language of a rival (linguistic 
relativism).
Unlike S&T [2005, pp. 47, 49), who disdain accounting history 
“as soldiering under impoverished Archivalism,” and promote 
“the triumph of Kuhnian and Post-Kuhnian History over Phi-
losophy,” Laudan [1996, p. 5] views post-positivism as: 
…an intellectual failure. The arguments on its behalf 
are dubious and question-begging. Still worse, it has 
sustained virtually no positive program of research...
and that it now teeters on the brink of conceptual 
bankruptcy.
 Marwick [2002, p. 5], the founding professor of history at 
the Open University, is similarly unequivocal in his refutation of 
the impact of Kuhnian principles on both scientific and histori-
cal research:
Working historians, and working scientists, have gen-
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erally been too busy to philosophize about their sub-
jects. Au royaume des aveugles les borgnes sont rois...In 
science, a conspicuous example is T.H. Kuhn, whose 
fine-sounding thesis about the succession of culturally 
determined scientific ‘paradigms’ dictating the topics of 
research departs from the facts of scientific discovery. 
Historians and scientists have tended to pay lip-service 
to these ‘kings’ before, usually, ignoring their theories 
and carrying on as before.
 Clearly, there is ongoing debate regarding the influence of 
Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian principles on both scientific and his-
torical research. There is also controversy regarding what Kuhn 
actually meant by the term “incommensurability.” Bird [2000, p. 
264] contends that “the central element in Kuhn’s epistemologi-
cal outlook is his neutralism about truth” rather than a deniabil-
ity of truth, as S&T, Feyerabend, and other post-Kuhnians infer. 
For example, Kuhn [1970, pp. 4-5] did not maintain that the 
incommensurability of competing paradigms in science prevents 
“effective research.” Instead, he regarded the existence of “a set 
of received beliefs” about the natural world as a precondition for 
its progress. In the first place, it is the belief-set that will set the 
agenda about which questions to ask. Second, the unexplained 
anomalies thrown up by these questions will eventually become 
so compelling as to produce a paradigm shift (“revolution” 
in science). Thus, for Kuhn [1970, pp. 52-53], progress in the 
natural sciences is not driven by debates about “the objectives 
and methods of research,” but by revolutionary transformations 
in generally accepted conceptions, which are themselves the 
product of more research [Bryer, 1998, p. 670]. Indeed, one of 
the characteristics of a paradigm is that it should be “sufficiently 
open-ended to leave all sorts of problems” for its adherents to 
resolve, making use of the “rules and standards for scientific 
practice” to which they are “committed” [Kuhn, 1970, pp. 10-
11]. Kuhn was not, therefore, the “thoroughgoing relativist” that 
S&T portray. Instead, he regarded “factual and theoretical novel-
ty” as being “closely...intertwined in scientific discovery” [Kuhn, 
1970, p. 53]. It follows that progress in science is not simply an 
abstraction, a realization which, according to Bryer [1998, p. 
691], offers hope for progress in other disciplines, including ac-
counting history:
Thus, from Kuhn’s point of view, progress in build-
ing a community of historians of accounting depends 
upon recognition of the competing conceptions of the 
subject-matter, and a debate in which anomalies are  
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highlighted and resolved by recourse to imagination, to 
logic, and to the facts.
 In fairness to S&T, we acknowledge that the citations (i.e., 
“evidence”) we have gathered support our point of view; how-
ever, unlike S&T, we believe the Kuhnian “revolution” is indeter-
minate and that neither relativists nor positivists should claim 
victory. We also recognize that it is often courageous and en-
nobling to take a strong moral stance, especially when it refutes 
the position of those holding both the power and the purse. Not-
withstanding, we respect mainstream historians who attempt to 
be dispassionate about their depiction of past events, especially 
when they identify competing interpretations of their evidence. 
For example, one of this article’s authors engaged in a series of 
heated debates regarding the purpose and nature of accounting 
at the Springfield Armory and New England textile mills in the 
early and mid-1800s [Hoskin & Macve, 1988a, b, 1994, 1996; 
2000; Tyson, 1990; 1993; 1995; 1998]. We argued back and forth, 
even though each held different world views and wrote from dif-
ferent “paradigms.” We strongly disagreed on the interpretation 
of the evidence, but that is something which scholarly folks do 
all the time. Thus, while the clashes were intense, at least on an 
intellectual level, we never argued about the inherent inability of 
evidence to bolster our respective positions. 
 To put these debates another way, historians generally ac-
cept that history is subjective to some degree, and that histori-
cal progress (i.e., greater understanding about the past) is best 
achieved through dialogue. In point of fact, post-Kuhnians like 
S&T rarely provide evidence by which a reader can evaluate the 
strength of their truth claims.4 Absent evidence, their persuasive-
ness hinges on the passion of their appeal and the logic of their 
argument, something we tackle head on in the next section of 
the paper. 
THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH
 We believe that there are fundamental differences between 
historical inquiry and social activism. Unlike social activists, 
4Laudan [1996, p. 9] concludes the concept of incommensurability which 
underlies Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian thinking has never been systematically 
evaluated in a way that could lead to the triumph S&T promote: “From the begin-
ning of its vogue in the early 1960s, incommensurability has been a philosophical 
conundrum in search of instantiation. Neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend, its most 
prominent early advocates, presents any evidence that natural scientists on op-
posite sides of a theoretical fence systematically failed to understand one another, 
as the thesis of incommensurability requires.”
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who seek to build a “better” (i.e., more equitable, honorable, 
humane, etc.) world, historians simply want to understand 
what happened in the past, why things happened as they did, 
and perhaps to help explain the present and predict the fu-
ture, given that past events may serve as prologue in certain 
circumstances. To obtain their knowledge, historians examine 
primary documents that were, ideally, created by participants 
in past events (i.e., memoranda, journals, personal letters, or 
other first-hand accounts) and/or, secondarily, by contemporary 
observers of these events (newspaper reports, business records, 
etc.). In either case, documents form the core of an historian’s 
understanding and the basis for interpretations. As Evans [1999, 
p. 69] writes, “what is at issue, therefore, is how historians use 
documents not to establish discrete facts, but as evidence for 
establishing the larger patterns that connect them.”
 Most historians readily concede that while there may be 
consensus that particular events played out in a particular fash-
ion, there is rarely a single interpretation that explains why the 
event occurred or its impact and implications. Again, we fully 
concur with Evans [1999, p. 72] regarding the use and inter-
pretation of historical documents in arriving at our conclusions 
regarding these issues:
Documents can be read in a variety of ways, all of them, 
theoretically at least, equally valid. Moreover, it is obvi-
ous that our way of reading a source derives principally 
from our present-day concerns and from questions that 
present-day theories and ideas lead us to formulate. Nor 
is there anything wrong in this.
 The difficulty we have with S&T and other social activists is 
their unabashed intolerance for conventional historical inquiry. 
This intolerance compels them to reject all efforts that seek a 
greater understanding of the past, for its own sake. For example, 
S&T argue that scholars have an inherent social agenda that 
drives their search for supporting historical evidence. Accord-
ingly, this evidence is necessarily biased and, thus, its only use 
is to buttress socially appropriate agendas. Most practicing 
historians would probably reject this position out-of-hand and 
be inclined to support Ginzburg’s [1991, p. 83] views concerning 
the use and interpretation of evidence:
The historian is thus confronted with various possi-
bilities: a document can be a fake; a document can be 
authentic, but unreliable, insofar as the information it 
provides can be either lies or mistakes; or a document 
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can be authentic and reliable. In the first two cases the 
evidence is dismissed; in the latter, it is accepted, but 
only as evidence of something else. In other words, the 
evidence is not regarded as a historical document in it-
self, but as a transparent medium – as an open window 
that gives us direct access to reality.
 As far as accounting history goes, there has been some rec-
ognition in the literature of the challenge to ascribing meanings 
posed by postmodernism, with truth acknowledged as a question 
of interpretation, in turn depending on the language we have at 
our disposal for describing it. The emphasis in postmodernist 
literature on meaning in financial reporting as a reflexive con-
struct of social processes rather than as something containing 
objective reality [Hines, 1988, 1991] is a case in point. Thus, it is 
argued there is no such thing as faithfully representing econom-
ic reality in accounts. What we are in fact representing is the 
accountant’s view of reality which is determined by their prior 
training and beliefs. In this scheme, meaning is constrained by 
language as this is the medium through which meaning is both 
expressed and understood. Hence, the Foucauldian view of his-
tory is that of a series of “discursive formations” [Hopwood, 
1987, p. 230; Armstrong, 1994, pp. 28-29], as Miller and Napier 
[1993, p. 633] discuss:
We emphasize the discursive nature of calculation. We 
attend to all those diverse ways in which meaning and 
significance is attributed to particular ways of calculat-
ing. We are referring here to the language and vocabu-
lary in which a particular practice is articulated, the 
ideals attached to certain calculative technologies, and 
the rationales that set out the aims and aspirations of 
various authorities.
 The emphasis is on discursive formations rather than his-
torical events precisely because meanings are acknowledged as 
contingent on the ways in which knowledge is interpreted and 
communicated. However, the problem we have with this no-
tion is that careful attention to the singularity of such meanings 
does not allow the historian to subsume events into generaliza-
tions, and generalizations into theory. As a result, this aspect of 
Foucauldianism has tended to be rejected as accounting history 
has become more theoretical in recent years. If knowledge can 
only be interpreted in the context of particular situations, it is 
not possible to generalize causal relationships which are the es-
sence of theory construction. 
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 To get around this dilemma, Robson [1991], for instance, 
introduces the general concept of “translation” into his history 
of the genesis of accounting standards in the U.K., allowing him 
to sidestep what Armstrong [1994, p. 35] described as the lack of 
“dynamism” in Foucauldianism as a theoretical explanation of 
accounting change. Thus, Robson argues that accounting change 
can be understood as a “process” whereby “particular account-
ing statements, calculations and techniques” are translated into 
“wider social, economic and political discourses,” which in turn 
“suggest new problems and priorities for accounting practices 
and stimulate the process of accounting change” [Robson, 1991, 
p. 566]. Ezzamel and Hoskin [2002, pp. 340-341] do something 
similar while exploring the relationship between accounting, 
writing, and money. They argue that the whole history of money 
can be understood as a general process of “supplementarity,” in 
which successively more complex forms of money are created 
(i.e., coinage, bills of exchange, endorsed discounted notes, etc.) 
that enhance its “operation and power” in society [Ezzamel and 
Hoskin, 2002, p. 361]. 
 There would appear to be a tension in accounting histori-
ography, therefore, over the desire to use history to construct 
theory in a post-modern world that stresses the relativity of 
meanings. Whether theoretical history is tenable is debatable 
given the unpredictability of historical events [Oldroyd, 1999]. 
Nevertheless, theoretical perspectives on accounting history 
have gained ascendancy precisely to avoid the criticism of “anti-
quarianism” leveled at it by S&T. In particular, there has been a 
willingness to engage with other disciplines which is the ration-
ale of the interdisciplinary perspectives on accounting move-
ment [Miller et al., 1991]. And to their credit, most theoretical 
historians recognize the need to ground their theory in archival 
evidence. Bryer is a case in point. Having first spent many years 
developing his theory regarding the transition to capitalism, he 
is now seeking to validate it through archival research [Bryer, 
2005, 2006a, b; Bryer et al., 2005]. 
 Indeed, to accept S&T’s view that the past is essentially 
unknowable in any objective sense, and that it is not therefore 
worth trying to be objective, robs history of its intellectual im-
perative of trying to uncover and explain past events, and entails 
disengaging from the discipline. This can be illustrated by the 
debate over the existence of an ancient matriarchy. Here, ma-
triarchal study groups outside mainstream academic research 
have alienated themselves from academic prehistorians, includ-
ing most feminists, through their rejection of the historical 
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 processes of gathering and evaluating evidence. Instead, they 
follow the type of social advocacy promoted by S&T in discover-
ing an anti-evidentially based past in which empathy and con-
nectedness with their female ancestors assumes priority. The 
point becomes to show modern women how much they are re-
pressed, that this was not always the case, and that a better way 
is therefore possible. But it ceases to be history [Oldroyd, 2004]. 
 Finally, as scholars who are more concerned with account-
ing history than with the theory of history, we believe that 
knowledge about the past, accounting or otherwise, must be 
based on both dialogue and knowledge. Furthermore, we believe 
that the growth in knowledge derives from new evidence or 
the reinterpretation of existing evidence that often comes from 
historical inquiry as well as social advocacy and other forms 
of intellectual activity. S&T unequivocally disparaged current 
accounting history research in their recent article. The next sec-
tion of this paper reviews several dimensions of their inquiry to 
see if S&T’s claims hold up.
 
REVIEW OF RECENT ACCOUNTING  
HISTORY JOURNAL ARTICLES
 We decided to review the main articles that appeared in 
three peer-reviewed journals that specialize in accounting his-
tory – Accounting Historians Journal (AHJ), Accounting History 
(AH), and Accounting, Business & Financial History (ABFH).5 We 
limited our examination to the five-year period 2001-2005 and 
acknowledge that earlier or longer periods could provide differ-
ent results. We included “Interface” articles in AHJ and special 
issue articles that appeared in all three journals. We excluded 
ABFH articles that focus on banking, insurance, valuation, and 
other aspects of business history that are, in our view, only tan-
gentially related to accounting history. We also excluded articles 
that are described as comments, responses, editorials, book 
reviews, conference reports, or commissioned works. As a result 
of these filters, we reviewed the abstracts of 176 articles that 
were published in the five-year period of study and categorized 
them according to five criteria – topic area(s), methodology, time 
focus, geographic focus, and eclecticism.
 Clearly, the most difficult and subjective aspect of our rubric 
5We recognize that other journals publish articles on accounting history 
(AAAJ, Abacus, ABR, etc.), but these journals do not specialize in accounting his-
tory. Omitting these journals enabled us to distinguish accounting history articles 
more easily from other accounting-related or business history articles.
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has been to identify the primary topic area and methodology 
of an article. To do so, one author initially and independently 
established a possible breakdown of topic areas. The final 
breakdown was then revised through dialogue with the other 
author. Where we could not agree on a primary classification, 
we chose to place the article in a second or even third category 
area as needed.6 We had far less difficulty in determining an 
article’s primary time and geographic focus, although creating 
time boundaries between periods was problematic. For these 
two categories, one of the authors reviewed each abstract, made 
the assignment, and consulted with the other author to resolve 
uncertainties. 
 The last category, eclecticism, is included in order to il-
lustrate the gender and affiliation of the authors of current ac-
counting history publications, as well as to determine if these 
authors have in fact “avoided engaging this wider literature and 
maintained...a revivalist preoccupation with ‘The Great Men’ 
of accounting” [S&T, 2005, p. 49]. The ratio of non-accounting 
citations to total citations for each article serves as a surrogate 
measure of the extent to which accounting historians engage in 
the wider literature.7 Each article was assigned to one of four 
categories in terms of its citations to non-accounting sources – 
greater than 75%, 50 to 75%, 25-50%, and less than 25%. Finally, 
we computed the percentage of articles authored or co-authored 
by females and those written by scholars with non-U.S. affilia-
tions as measures of eclecticism or diversity.8 
STRAW MEN AND OLD SAWS
 In this section, we use the evidence derived from our review 
of the literature to identify the straw men and old saws that S&T 
6We acknowledge that our classification scheme is artificial and arbitrary. 
That said, our purpose was to organize the journal literature in a way that helped 
us evaluate S&T’s claims and generalizations about accounting history literature. 
7A citation was considered an “accounting” citation if it included the words 
“accounting,” “account,” “financial,” or “tax” in the title of the citation or publica-
tion, or if the journal or book was clearly an accounting journal (i.e., Abacus). In 
addition, if the author of the citation was known to be an accounting academic, 
the citation was treated as accounting even if it did not include any of the key 
words noted above. Finally, the total number of articles was reduced to 166 for 
this part of the study because the authors could not clearly determine if the cita-
tion was accounting or non-accounting because of language in four articles. Our 
intent is to err was on the side of conservatism (i.e., not to overstate the percent-
age of non-accounting citations).
8We contacted each journal’s editor to clarify our uncertainties in determin-
ing an author’s gender, given our unfamiliarity with non-Western first names. 
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conjure up in their assault on accounting history. Our intent 
is not simply to refute S&T’s contentions but rather to paint a 
more accurate picture of the domain of current accounting his-
tory research. We discern a pattern of faulty reasoning in the 
majority of S&T’s claims, many of which include at least one ir-
relevant premise as a basis for presenting an opposing position. 
According to Damer [1987, p. 128]:
This fallacy consists in misrepresenting an opponent’s 
point of view or argument, usually for the purpose of 
making it easier to attack. There are several different 
ways in which one may misrepresent an opponent’s 
argument or position. First, one may state it in a per-
verted form by utilizing only a part of it, by paraphras-
ing it in carefully chosen misleading words, or by subtly 
including one’s own evaluation or commentary in it. 
Second, one may oversimplify it…Third, one may ex-
tend the argument beyond its original bounds by draw-
ing inferences from it that are clearly unwarranted or 
unintended.
 We illustrate below instances where S&T present false 
or, more generously, naïve premises in the manner Damer de-
scribes. We initially replicate S&T’s comments and then briefly 
describe the fallacy and our findings in bold italics. We base our 
responses, in part, on our analysis of accounting history journal 
articles during the 2001-2005 period. We present our conclu-
sions and welcome S&T’s rejoinder if we have misrepresented, 
misinterpreted, or otherwise inaccurately captured their senti-
ments. 
1. “Despite the Kuhnian Revolution, archival antiquarianism 
reigns supreme....Accounting history’s resolute adherence to 
empiricist, archival, and otherwise antiquarian epistemes...” 
[S&T, 2005, pp. 47, 49].
 While accounting historians continue to prioritize archi-
val-based studies, as do most historians, a number of re-
cent articles can be assigned to a number of more modern 
and critical categories, including race, culture, and theo-
rizing. In our view, the range of topics and methodologies 
challenges S&T’s conclusion that “antiquarianism reigns 
supreme.”
2. “This paper redresses the balance in two ways: First, by us-
ing Kuhn’s critique to show archivalist empiricism as inca-
pable of proving a paradigm’s truth...” [S&T, 2005, p. 47].
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 We read and reread S&T’s article and are unconvinced 
that it and Kuhn’s critique clearly demonstrate that “ar-
chivalist empiricism is incapable of proving a paradigm’s 
truth.” Most accounting historians accept the subjectiv-
ity of historical truth, but this does not mean that truth 
does not exist or that it is not worth looking for. After all, 
events do happen (unless we are dreaming) and for a rea-
son, even if it is an accident.
3.  “Accounting history has avoided engaging in this wider liter-
ature and maintained a methodological naivety, by excessive 
internal self-referencing, an over-dependence on influential 
editorial oracles, and a revivalist preoccupation with ‘The 
Great Men’ of accounting” [S&T, 2005, p. 49].
 We discovered that only 13 articles out of the 176 ar-
ticles reviewed are biographical, and only three of these 
appeared in the last two years of the period – hardly “a 
revivalist preoccupation with ‘The Great Men’ of ac-
counting.” Indeed, articles on Pacioli and Littleton, the 
two “great men” identified by S&T are notable by their 
absence. We also found that over 40% of the articles have 
more than 50% of their citations from non-accounting 
sources. In our view, the data indicate that many ac-
counting historians are actively engaging in the “wider 
literature.”
4. “…progressive forms of accounting history have taken a 
back seat to conservative renditions on the subject” [S&T, 
2005, p. 49].
 Our review of the 2001-2005 accounting history literature 
revealed a wide range of primary topic areas including 
race and gender. In addition, over 30% of the 176 articles 
included one or more female authors and nearly 70% in-
cluded one or more non-U.S.- based authors. These data 
suggest that recent accounting history articles published 
during the 2001-2005 period are not “conservative” in 
that they neither focus exclusively on Eurocentric topics 
nor are they written exclusively by white, Anglo/Eurocen-
tric, male authors.
5.  “We conclude that the triumph of Kuhnian and Post-
 Kuhnian History over Philosophy is a success that has been 
celebrated everywhere in history except in accounting” 
[S&T, 2005, p. 49].
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 As we argued in the earlier narrative, the “triumph” is 
clearly not celebrated as widely as S&T would suggest.
6.  “It is arrogant and self-serving to claim that accounting his-
tory is exempt from philosophical scrutiny and pretensions” 
[S&T, 2005, p. 49].
 None of the 176 accounting history article abstracts we 
reviewed appeared “arrogant and self-serving,” and we 
challenge S&T to identify one article that makes this 
claim explicitly.
7. “Nor can archivalism get off the hook by claiming it is pre-
philosophical…” [S&T, 2005, p. 50].
 We again challenge S&T to identify any one of the 176 ac-
counting history articles that make this claim about its 
subject matter.
8. “…while some histories purport to be sensitive to context 
and times, such sensitivity is frequently skin-deep” [S&T, 
2005, p. 50].
 The wide range of articles and the extensive use of non-
accounting source materials suggests that accounting 
history authors are paying a great deal of attention to 
context and times.
9. “This is a missed opportunity of tragic proportions for ac-
counting historical research because it has undermined its 
authority to address pressing problems in accounting prac-
tice and theory today” [S&T, 2005, pp. 52-53].
 We do not believe accounting historians have the au-
thority or are they well situated “to address problems in 
practice and theory today.” That undertaking is better left 
to social activists, contemporary critics, and accounting 
regulators. Rather, historians should continue to exam-
ine, illuminate, and interpret the past. 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS
 In general, most historians accept that history is subjective 
to some degree, and that historical progress (i.e., greater un-
derstanding about the past) is best achieved through dialogue. 
Therefore, each historical study constitutes but one cell of the 
wider organism that is always growing and developing. This is 
one reason for the frequently observed phenomenon of each 
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generation rewriting its own history. It is not just new historians 
reinterpreting the past because their own social conditioning 
is different to that of their predecessors. It is because history is 
essentially about discussion fueled by the examination of new 
evidence, which in turn prompts re-examination of the old. 
Sometimes the evidence makes us change our minds. Indeed, 
this concept of progress in history through the interrogation and 
re-interrogation of evidence is not so far removed from Kuhn’s 
[1970, pp. 52-53] ideas regarding progress in science. As we have 
seen, Kuhn maintained that discoveries in science occur when 
the anomalies uncovered by research under a particular para-
digm become so great that they induce paradigm change. The 
main difference in the models, therefore, lies in the pattern of 
change. With Kuhn, these shifts in science occur in steps rather 
than continuously. Most historians, however, are inherently 
aware of the contingent nature of their investigations. Thus, we 
agree with Evans [1999, p. 90] regarding how post-modern and 
other critics of history have made the use of evidence so prob-
lematic:
It did not take the advent of postmodernism to point 
this out. But what postmodernists have done is to push 
such familiar arguments about the transparency or 
opacity of historical texts and sources out to a set of bi-
nary opposites and polarized extremes. Historians have 
always understood that they must scrutinize documents 
and evidence carefully. The language of historical docu-
ments is never transparent, and historians have always 
been aware that they cannot simply gaze through it to 
the historical reality behind. Historians know, histori-
ans have always known, that we can see the past only 
‘through a glass, darkly.’
 Probably the prime example of constructive dialogue in 
accounting history concerns the role of cost and management 
accounting in the British industrial revolution. Historians have 
moved (and are moving) through different stages where initially 
people like Solomons [1952], basing their history on manage-
ment accounting textbooks, saw useful management accounting 
as originating in the U.S. in the later 19th century, to one where 
the likes of Fleischman and Parker [1991, 1992; see also, Fleisch-
man and Tyson, 1993] and Boyns and Edwards [1996 n.b., 1997; 
see also, Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991], who look 
at the records themselves, have successfully championed the 
utility of earlier British industrial accounts to the extent that 
previous opponents, such as Hoskin and Macve [2000], now 
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accept as useful to entrepreneurs, notwithstanding their defi-
ciencies in terms of labor control. And so the debate continues, 
but without evidence the discussions would become stifled and 
essentially rhetorical.
 In terms of the triumph of the Kuhnian revolution, which 
S&T promote so passionately, we wonder whether Kuhn really 
has much to say about history at all. Kuhn’s arguments were di-
rected to the natural sciences, and his debates with Popper cen-
tered on experimental data. For example, Marwick [2002, p. 11] 
identifies several fundamental differences between history and 
the natural sciences which bring into question the applicability 
of S&T’s assertions about accounting history:
Another aspect about the autonomy of history is the dif-
ferences which undoubtedly exist between history and 
the natural sciences. The relationships studied by his-
torians are not basically mathematical in the way that 
those in the sciences are. Obviously, the subject mat-
ter studied is very different; history inevitably involves 
questions of human values, human emotions, human 
motivations. Historians do not conduct experiments. 
Scientists work within a framework of theories, which 
are taken as valid until positively disproved.
 Thus, it appears to us that Kuhn’s followers like Feyerabend 
[1975] and S&T, rather than Kuhn himself, have sought to 
extend Kuhn’s arguments to history and other social sciences. 
There are many pertinent and contentious issues concerning 
the practice of history that surround the nature of evidence, 
but placing the writings of Kuhn at the center of these discus-
sions appears unwarranted. While social activists like S&T may 
continue to prioritize the conflict between relativism and ob-
jectivity, historians have moved on and recognize that the most 
interesting historical questions center on the interpretation of 
past events, not on the evidence which attests to the existence of 
these events. 
 Although we strongly disagree with S&T’s comments about 
accounting history per se, we acknowledge that the vast major-
ity of articles published during the 2001-2005 period within the 
three specialist, English language, accounting history journals 
were written by scholars from the western tradition (U.S., 
U.K., Australasia, and Europe) and address issues in the post-
 Victorian period (1830-present). Thus, S&T are on firmer ground 
when they focus their critique on accounting history’s preoccu-
pation with Eurocentric issues, which they have done in a more 
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recent article [S&T, 2006], notwithstanding the long-standing 
Japanese tradition in this area. However, part of the problem 
here is one of communication rather than of the work not being 
carried out, with studies being published in different languages, 
and by historians outside the accounting academy. Language 
has been a problem for European scholars, as well as non-
 Europeans [Carmona, 2004], and journal editors have responded 
with special issues dedicated to particular geographic locations. 
The intercontinental World Congresses of Accounting Historians 
and the Accounting History International Conferences have also 
been significant in breaking down communication barriers, wid-
ening the field of accounting history research. In actual fact, the 
subject matter of the three English language journals dedicated 
to accounting history appears to be quite broad with significant 
space devoted to non-western topics, often through the vehicle 
of special issues. In conclusion, our review and analysis of the 
2001-2005 accounting history journal literature reveals a vi-
tal, active sub-discipline, one that is capable of change with a 
healthy eclecticism of topic, method, time, and place.
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